Seminar publication on contemporary peace operations – from theory to practice : based on EAPTC Seminar 2-4 May 2017 Helsinki : articles from  the European peace training community by Norvanto, Elisa & Dumur-Laanila, Hanne
Seminar Publication on
Contemporary Peace Operations
– From theory to practice
Based on
EAPTC Seminar 2 - 4 May 2017 Helsinki
Articles from the European Peace Training Community
Pictures and layout: Finnish Defence Forces International Centre 




Finnish Defence Forces International Centre 
Printing: Juvenes Print – Suomen Yliopistopaino Oy 
Tampere 2017
Finnish Defence Forces International Centre 
FINCENT Publication Series 2/2017
Authors: Elisa Norvanto & Hanne Dumur-Laanila
Puolustusvoimien Kansainvälinen Keskus
Finnish Defence Forces International Centre 
Helsinki 2017
SEMINAR PUBLICATION ON 
CONTEMPORARY PEACE OPERATIONS 
– FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
Based on EAPTC Seminar 2 - 4 May 2017 Helsinki 





BACKGROUND OF MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS ......................................11
Defining ‘peace operations’ ...............................................................................11
Evolving nature of peace operations ...................................................................12
ETHICS IN PEACE OPERATIONS .....................................................................14
What is ethics? ...............................................................................................14
Ethical dilemmas in peace operations .................................................................16
“What is the right thing to do?” .....................................................................16
Common standards for ethics in peace operations? ................................................17
Ethical dilemmas are context-specific ..............................................................18
Requirements for ethical behaviour .................................................................19
What and how to train ethics? ...........................................................................20
Context-specific training ..............................................................................20
Fostering communication, common language and group cohesion ..........................21
Towards a curricula for ethics ........................................................................21
PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS ...........................................................................23
Protection of civilians in armed conflicts .............................................................23
What and for whom? ..................................................................................24
UN approach to protection of civilians  ...........................................................25
Shared responsibility ...................................................................................26
Protection from physical violence ......................................................................26
Considerations as to the military component .....................................................27
The role and responsibilities of the police component ..........................................28
The role as of the civilian component ..............................................................30
Key challenges ...............................................................................................31
A variety of tasks ........................................................................................32
Maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation ..........................................32
Use of force ..............................................................................................34
Fostering sharing of lessons from past missions ..................................................36
Fragmented approaches ...............................................................................37
Lack of understanding of conflict dynamics ......................................................38
Addressing challenges through training ...............................................................39
Standardized and mandatory training ..............................................................39
Using scenarios to identify training needs  ........................................................40
Towards a Protection of Civilians training architecture  ........................................41
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO EXTERNAL CRISES ..................................43
Defining Comprehensive Approach ....................................................................43
Civil-military relations in peace operations  .........................................................46
Complex relationship ..................................................................................46
Civil-military coordination and cooperation......................................................47
Not only civil-military interaction ..................................................................49
Coordination and local ownership ..................................................................49
Considerations related to the implementation of the  
Comprehensive Approach in peace operations ..................................................50
How to mitigate the key challenges ....................................................................52
Balancing the competing timelines .................................................................53
Joint mission planning ................................................................................53
Cooperation and information sharing ..............................................................54
Alumni network ........................................................................................55
Towards effective training system .......................................................................55
Harmonizing structured training ....................................................................55
Joint mission training ..................................................................................56
Multiprofessional expertise ...........................................................................56
Research on pedagogy .................................................................................56
Best practices from training exercises ..................................................................57
Practical suggestions ...................................................................................57
WAY FORWARD .............................................................................................59
Recommendations to training & education approach ............................................59
Proposals for an EAPTC development and strategy ...............................................61
REFERENCES ...................................................................................................63
APPENDIX 1:  
RESEARCH TEAM AND ARTICLES FROM THE RESEARCHERS .....................67
‘Soft Skills for Peacekeeping and Crisis Management Experts’: ................................67
Enhancing Protection of civilians in UN peace operations ......................................73
Effectiveness in operational conflict prevention:  
How should we measure it in EU missions and operations? .................................79
Ethics Training and its Relevance to Peace Operations ...........................................87
“When Diversity is the Only Unity” 
 – How to Train for a Comprehensive Approach in EU Crisis Management ............93
APPENDIX 2:  
PROGRAMME EAPTC 2017 – 5TH ANNUAL MEETING, HELSINKI ....................100
4ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The EAPTC Meeting was made possible by distinguished guest speakers addressing current 
initiatives in their respective organizations and the comprehensive pool of experts from 
EAPTC partner organizations. We would like to express our gratitude to especially the fol-
lowing individuals who were the stars of the Meeting: Brigadier Giovanni Pietro Barbano, 
Colonel Michael Uhrig, Colonel Claus Amon, Doctor Annemarie Rodt, Superintendent 
Olavi Kujanpää, Superintendent Pekka Kokkonen, Ms Victoria Walker, Ms Kirsi Hytti-
nen, Ambassador Pia Strejnvall, Colonel Petter Lindqvist, Major Adam Åkerfeldt, Professor 
Reijo E. Heinonen, and Doctor Janne Aalto. The intense, behind-the-scenes work of the 
event management and background studies were also crucial for the success of the meeting. 
FINCENT would also like to express its sincere gratitude to CMC Finland and the Police 
University College, for their valuable support in the developing the Meeting program. In ad-
dition, we would also like to express our gratitude to the multinational research group that 
provided input for this publication. First and foremost, however, this publication was made 
possible by the enthusiastic work of the participants of the EAPTC Meeting both during 
and after the seminar. Thank you all!
5EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Peace operations deployed to date, and prospects for future missions continue to demonstra-
te that peace operations are subject to constant change. Peace operations and the environme-
nt in which they are conducted have evolved significantly since the first deployment. Today’s 
global environment requires the international community to mobilize resources to promote 
peace and support sustainable stability. In this effort, effective and unprecedented levels 
of cooperation and coordination are required of military, civilian and police components. 
Identifying the real training needs is a perpetual challenge when coping with changes.
As pointed out by the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations1 
there is a widening gap between what is asked of UN peace operations today and what and 
how they are able to deliver. This gap can and must be narrowed to ensure that organiza-
tions’ peace operations are able to respond effectively and appropriately to challenges to 
come. As UN peace operations struggle to achieve their objectives, change is required in 
order for them to adapt to new circumstances and to ensure their increased effectiveness 
and appropriate use in the future. This complexity has raised up a number of issues, such 
as the operationalization of protection of civilians, the use of force, working with partners 
and civil-military synergies, means to prevent abuse and enhance accountability, mission 
leadership, and use of technology, which have increasingly been brought to the agenda of 
the peace operations training community. To address the demands of the complex environ-
ments, new approaches are required, not only by the UN but by all international peace & 
security agencies.
In this volatile environment, the competence of personnel deployed is crucial for the effec-
tiveness of peace operations. Among other things, they need to understand their role in the 
big picture as well as their responsibility for their own actions. The actions of one person 
have an impact on not only their own organization, but also on the wider international com-
munity, and more importantly, the host community. The peace operations training commu-
nity plays a central role in ensuring that personnel deployed to crisis management operations 
are equipped with knowledge, skills and an attitude that enables them to perform in their 
various tasks and roles. Nevertheless, training needs assessments must be based on in-depth 
research and hence there is an emerging need to strengthen the collaboration between aca-
demics and practitioners in the field of peace operations training. After all, training and 
education are among the key tools needed for operationalizing theory into practice, thereby 
promoting coherent and responsible actions of individuals and troops around the world.
This report is based on the 5th Annual Meeting of the European Association of Peace Ope-
rations Training Centres (EAPTC) held from 2 – 4 May 2017 in Helsinki, Finland, and on 
relevant research carried out in support of it. The aim of this report is to improve the sharing 
of information and understanding, and to provide a basis for discussing pragmatic ways and 
1 High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. (2015). Uniting our strengths for peace –politics, partnership and people. 
Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 16th June 2015.  
6means of operationalizing ambitious concepts into training activities that would ultimately 
serve the needs of modern peace operations. The report provides an overview of the three 
topics of the meeting: ethics in peacekeeping, protection of civilians, and comprehensive ap-
proach to external crises. These topics are currently being discussed within the peace research 
and training community from the perspectives of civilian, military and police practitioners, 
as well as the research and training community itself. Hence, the report outlines the issues 
that are relevant to the debate on the relevance and effectiveness of modern peace operations.
5th EAPTC Meeting 
The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) hosted the 5th Annual Mee-
ting of the EAPTC on the operationalization of responses to some of the key issues found in 
contemporary peace operations. The Meeting took place from 2 – 4 May 2017 in Helsinki. 
The seminar brought together 80 participants from EAPTC member training organizations, 
research institutes and think tanks from across Europe.
The theme of the 5th EAPTC Meeting was selected to invoke discussion on how the peace 
training community can effectively integrate the key issues ethics in peacekeeping, protec-
tion of civilians and comprehensive approach. Hence the theme: “Addressing the contem-
porary challenges in multidimensional peace operations – from theory to practice”. The 
Meeting focused on lessons learned from contemporary peace operations, which can lead 
training institutions and academia to discover new approaches to meet the needs arising 
from contemporary crises. An important goal of the Meeting was to identify avenues for 
future research and training and education programs. 
72 As stated in the Statutes on the EAPTC website in 2017. Available at: http://www.eaptc.org/Statutes/statutes.html.
European Association of Peace Operations Training Centres (EAPTC)2
The EAPTC is an open and voluntary association of European centres, institutions, 
networks, officials and programmes dealing with peace operations and crisis management 
education, training and research. It is a Regional association in the spirit of the International 
Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC).
The purpose of the EAPTC is to contribute to the effective and efficient preparation of Eu-
ropean individuals, groups and organizations with respect to their engagement in planning 
and conducting peace and crisis response operations, through cooperative dialogue and ac-
tions, as well as through such cooperation with the wider international community within 
the IAPTC framework. Such cooperation will serve to strengthen and otherwise enhance 
both European and International peace and crisis response operations.
The principal objectives of the Association are: 
1. To strengthen coordination and cooperation amongst interested education and 
training centres/institutions, networks and interested officials within Europe.
2. To facilitate the exchange of experience, best practices, lessons-identified and 
education and training initiatives and activities.
3. To facilitate greater cooperative efforts in conducting crisis management edu-
cation and training, through regular updates and exchanges of information on 
courses and exercises, and cooperative possibilities.
4. To promote mutual understanding of different institutional and functional 
perspectives and organizational cultures present among military, police and 
the range of civilian components in peace and crisis response operations.
5. To promote efficiency in planning and conducting education and training 
through cooperation, standardisation and harmonization.
6. To share ongoing and planned research information and activity with respect 
to both peace and crisis response operations and the education and training for 
peace and crisis response operations.
7. To benefit from exchanges with other like-minded International and Regio-
nal Associations, Networks and training centres within the framework of the 
IAPTC.
8. To share European experience, best practices, lessons identified and education 
and training initiatives and activities, within the IAPTC membership.
8Finnish Defence Forces International Training Centre
The Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT) is a unit subordinate to Na-
tional Defence University that organizes military crisis management courses for command 
and expert personnel in UN, NATO and EU led peace operations. FINCENT is an inter-
nationally recognized centre of excellence of Finnish military crisis management with tradi-
tions that go back 50 years. FINCENT serves as a training centre for courses and training 
events accordant with UN, NORDEFCO, EU and NATO Partnership for Peace program-
me procedures. To guarantee the high quality of the training and that the individual needs of 
the customer organizations are met, the training combines the findings of the latest research 
with extensive field experience. Additionally, FINCENT is Department Head (DH) for 
Military Contribution to Peace Support (MC2PS) aiming to enhance interoperability and 
operational effectiveness among NATO and Partner Nations through Education and Trai-
ning. As Reference Body for NATO E&T in this specific discipline, FINCENT also ensures 
adequate response to emerging E&T requirements.
9INTRODUCTION
Contemporary peace operations take place in an extensive security environment that has 
undergone major transformations over the past two decades. The evolution that has taken 
place is connected to the changing nature of security threats as much as to the concomitant 
adaptation of policy responses. Consequently, the role and tasks of peacekeepers have evol-
ved along with the environment where they deploy. Most of the conflicts in the post-Cold 
War world are intra-state or internal in nature, rather than inter-state. Inter-state wars 
were traditionally fought between organized military forces of states. In the more complex 
internal wars of today, the protagonists are often a diverse set of antagonistic groups inclu-
ding non-state actors, militia and rebel groups whose objective could be for example control 
over governmental power or territory1. With the recognition that conflicts are likely to recur 
in the absence of a long-term effort aimed at sustainable political, economic and social re-
construction, peace operations are increasingly tasked with wide-ranging multi-dimensional 
mandates involving these elements. The affected state’s capacity to provide security for its 
population and maintain public order is often poor, basic infrastructure is likely to have 
been destroyed, and large sections of the population may have been displaced. Society may 
be divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines and grave human rights abuses may 
have been committed during a conflict, which further complicates efforts to achieve natio-
nal reconciliation. Consequently, peace operations are no longer exclusively military-led. 
A multiplicity of actors are involved in modern peace operations – NGOs, humanitarian 
agencies, police, civilian administrators, legal, electoral and constitutional experts, and even 
private military companies.2 
The effectiveness of the peace operations in responding to emerging challenges is dependent 
on their ability to adapt to the needs on the ground, which requires a wide range of policy 
tools and responses. Consequently, recent concepts of conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
have emphasized comprehensive strategies such as ‘integrated approach’, ‘comprehensive 
approach’, ‘whole-government approach’ or ‘multidimensional approach’, that focus on es-
tablishing coherence among the different sets of actors involved at all levels. These strategies 
emphasize the importance of effective cooperation and coordination between civilian, mi-
litary and police actors, as well as the local community. Implementation of multi-dimen-
sional mandates in a complex environment has brought up a variety of issues, which also 
require closer attention from the peace training community. As the environments where 
modern peace operations deploy have become more dangerous, and civilians have become 
the main victims of the intra-state wars, issues relating to use of force have increasingly 
become a central question in peace training.
Despite the changing nature of the conflicts and operational environment, the need for 
individuals to see themselves as key contributors to the process remains unchanged. 
Personnel deployed to conflict areas need to understand their role in the big picture as well 
1 Prakash, B. S., and Nandini, K.( 2005). Issues and Challenges in Modern Peace Operations, Strategic Analysis, Jan-Mar 2005.
2. Ibid.
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as their responsibility for their own actions. The actions of one person have an impact on 
not only their own organization, but also on the wider international community, and more 
importantly, the host community. Consequently, to ensure the coherence between activities 
of different organizations, nationalities, sectors or components, the personnel deployed need 
to be equipped with the skills and mind-set to enhance communication among the different 
sectors, build trust, create and maintain social networks, and align activities with needs on 
the ground in a coordinated manner.
From the training & education perspective, this means that the training community must 
identify the competences (knowledge, skills, and attitude) needed to perform the various 
jobs in the current security environment. The desired performance outcome shall be a result 
of extensive analysis of the context in which the individuals are to operate, as well as an ite-
rative process of conceptualizing, testing, and validating the preferred actions that shall be 
encouraged in such an environment. Issues relating to use of force and ability to maintain 
legitimacy and creditability in the eyes of host nations, have become a central question in 
relation to the effectiveness of UN peace operations. Thus, the personnel deployed need to 
be able to understand the nature of potential threats and their role in addressing them. They 
may also be confronted with ethical or moral dilemmas where they need to make tough de-
cisions on whether to use force or not. The inability to protect the vulnerable will have an ef-
fect on the peacekeepers’ legitimacy and the peace operations’ ability to fulfil their mandate. 
As a whole, peace operations deployed to date, and prospects for future missions continue 
to demonstrate that peace operations are subject to constant change. Identifying the real 
training needs is a perpetual challenge when coping with change. A known fact is that the 
diversity and complexity of multidimensional operational environments in crisis areas is 
increasing. Therefore, to fully mitigate the challenges on a mission, there is an increasing 
need to coordinate and enhance the education and training of the peace keeping troops. In 
addition, there is an emerging need to strengthen the collaboration between academics and 
practitioners in the field of peace operations training. After all, training and education are 
among the key tools needed for operationalizing theory into practice, thereby promoting 
coherent and responsible actions of individuals and troops around the world. So, how can 
we then make sure that individuals, units and components are well prepared to meet these 
challenges? And how can we safeguard seamless cooperation between all the actors; civilian, 
police and military?  What are the characteristics of the modern peace operations and what 
are the implications for the peace operations training?
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BACKGROUND OF MODERN  
PEACE OPERATIONS
In this chapter we will contextualize the environment in which modern peace operations 
are likely to take place. This will facilitate an understanding of why the topics of ‘ethicality’, 
‘protection of civilians’, and ‘comprehensive approach’ have become important issues for the 
peace training community of today. 
Defining ‘peace operations’
Peace operations increasingly operate in highly volatile environments where there is no 
peace to keep. The context in which international peace operations are conducted is subject 
to constant change, which includes the definition of ‘peace operation’ itself. ‘Since the first 
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, crisis response has 
taken on many different forms. Therefore, you will encounter many different terms and 
names in this field of work: from peacekeeping to crisis management, from civilian crisis 
management mission to peace operation. Names and types of missions have established 
themselves not only in relation to their mandates and functions but also depending on the 
implementing actor, which might just use a different term for the same type of mission that 
another organisation deploys. Missions of the European Union (EU) are often referred to 
as crisis management missions, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions 
or EU operations (civilian missions and/or military operations), while other organisations 
such as NATO and AU use the terms UN peacekeeping, peace operations or peace support 
operations (PSOs).1 
‘Today’s multidimensional peace operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and 
security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarma-
ment, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of 
elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.2’ Hence, 
rather than limiting our understanding of peace operations to their distinct functions (e.g. 
peace support, peacekeeping, peace enforcement) peace operations are viewed as ‘one gene-
ral type of activity that can be used to prevent, limit and manage violent conflict as well as 
rebuild in its aftermath. Other parts of this international toolkit include conflict prevention, 
peacebuilding, peace-making, which involve the use of civilian agencies and NGOs in the 
reconstruction of polities, economies and societies.3’ Since there is no one definition to 
describe this operation, for the purpose of this publication we will use the overarching term 
‘peace operations’, which includes ‘multilateral and ad hoc military and police missions, as 
1 ENTRi. (2017). What are the different types of missions? Available at: http://in-control.entriforccm.eu/chapters/chapter-1/different-ty-
pes-of-missions/.[Accessed 15.7.2017].
2. UN website. (2017). What is peacekeeping? Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml.[Accessed 
17.7.2017] .
3. Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P.D. and Griffin, S. (2010). Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd Edition. Campridge: Polity Press.
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well as civilian led political missions4. They can refer to UN peace operations and political 
missions, AU peace operations, EU CSDP missions and operations, NATO missions and 
OSCE missions and field offices.
Evolving nature of peace operations
Faced with the rising demand for increasingly complex peace operations, the UN has been 
overstretched and challenged as never before in the past few years. Hence, UN peacekee-
ping5 continues to evolve, both conceptually and operationally, to meet new challenges and 
political realities.6 Now they are more often deployed amidst armed groups that operate in 
shifting alliances and terrorize the civilian population, frequently with support from gover-
nment forces or neighbouring states.7 While the original UN principles were formulated for 
settings where there was peace to keep, most UN operations today take place in far more 
complex and challenging environments. Consequently, the changes in the nature of conflicts 
- principally from inter-state to internal conflicts - have significantly changed also the effect 
of the UN’s presence. A number of peace operations are now deployed in less permissive 
environments, such as those in South-Sudan, Mali, Central African Republic8 and Republic 
of Congo.
Today most of the operations are increasingly armed with Chapter VII mandates and dep-
loyed to Africa, providing a robust mandate to carry out the various dimensions of the 
mission and protect civilians. In addition, safeguarding the security of the mission staff 
has become an increasing concern. Alongside the need to provide protection, peace opera-
tions are also tasked, among others, to ensure a safe and secure environment and to support 
the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Although, the military remains the backbone of 
most peace operations, the many faces of peacekeeping now include administrators and 
economists, police officers and legal experts, de-mining personnel and electoral observers, 
human rights monitors and specialists in civil affairs and governance, humanitarian workers 
and experts in communications and public information.9 The multitude of different threats, 
combined with a variety of different aid and security actors operating in the same theatre, 
has emphasized the importance of shared understanding and cooperation for the enhanced 
effectiveness of international endeavours.
The strategic direction of peace operations will take on great importance in the coming 
years. As the role and expectations vis-a-vis the international community have evolved, there 
is also an increasing need to search for new ways to strengthen the capacity to enhance the 
4 Global Peace Operations Review. (2015) A monthly newsletter from the Center on International Cooperation, June 2015, ii. Available at: 
 http://peaceoperationsreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/gpor_monthly_newsletter_june_2015.pdf. [Accessed 18.6.2017].2. UN web-
site. (2017). What is peacekeeping? Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml.[Accessed 17.7.2017] .
5. The term ‘UN Peacekeeping’ was coined at the inception of peacekeeping and it is also used when referring to the changing nature of peace 
operations.
6. This applies also to the operations and missions of other international organizations such as AU, NATO, EU and OSCE.
7. In this context, the effective protection of civilians in conflict areas is often impossible without the use of force.
8. Norvanto, E. (2016). The Central African Republic (CAR) Review. H2020 project, 653371.
9. United Nations Information Services Vienna. (2017), Looking Back/Moving Forward, [online] Available at: http://www.unis.unvienna.org/
unis/en/60yearsPK/. [Accessed 20.7.2017].
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effectiveness of field operations. Among others, the use of force in peace operations has given 
rise to an array of different issues - legal, ethical, and operational - which are directly reflect-
ed in the way that peace operations are run today. If the UN and regional organizations are 
to positively contribute to sustainable peace and development in coming years, these issues 
need to be properly addressed at all levels (political, strategic, and in the field) and throug-
hout the planning and conduct of the peace operations.
Characteristics of Contemporary Peace Operations
• Most of the conflicts in the post-Cold War world are intra-state or internal in 
nature, rather than inter-state.
• Most UN peacekeepers operate in hostile conflict environments in Africa.
• At the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeeping was dominated by contingents from 
Europe. Today the biggest contributions come from Asian and African countries.
• The mandates have transformed from monitoring of ceasefire between two states 
into ‘Complex Peace Operations’ aimed at bringing peace between warring parties 
within the state. Today, peace operations are increasingly tasked to address issues 
related to sustainable political, economic and social reconstruction with wide-ran-
ging multi-dimensional mandates involving these elements. 
• Modern POs (especially in Africa) are increasingly armed with Chapter VII manda-
tes, providing a robust mandate to carry out the various dimensions of the mission 
and protect civilians.
• Most ongoing conflicts have proved difficult to end, since the protagonists are 
often a diverse set of antagonistic groups including non-state actors, militias 
and rebel groups whose objective could be control over governmental power or 
territory. 
• Peace operations cover a wide-spectrum of operations, ranging from traditional 
monitoring operations, via massive civil-military state-building endeavours, to 
smaller scale robust enforcement operations.
• A multiplicity of actors are involved in modern POs – NGOs, humanitarian agen-
cies, police, civilian administrators, legal, electoral and constitutional experts, and 
even private military companies.
• Modern POs are more dangerous than ever before. Consequently the safety and 
security of peace operations and associated personnel has become an increasingly 
important issue.
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ETHICS IN PEACE OPERATIONS
In recent years, the international community has recognized that discussing ethical issues 
is fundamental to the success of peace operations. Nevertheless, ethics in the context of 
peace operations is a complex issue. The operational environment is volatile, and the per-
sonnel presents a wide mix of different cultures, professional backgrounds and organizations 
equipped with their individual moral codes and norms. Despite guidance provided in the 
form of operation-related code of conduct and principles, the personnel is likely to face 
situations where tough decisions must be made on-site based on one’s own judgement as to 
what the ’right thing’ to do is. Finding an adequate way of facilitating the internalization 
of operation-related code of conduct and principles and ethical decision-making, is a 
challenge also for peace training. There is no manual or guidebook that would provide 
the right or wrong answer for every situation the personnel may face on the ground. Being 
able to define what behaviour or/and decisions are desired when facing unforeseen ethical 
dilemmas is close to impossible.
The 5th EAPTC Meeting sought to address some of these issues by bringing together the 
peace training community and a group of scholars to exchange views and propose soluti-
ons for peace training and education. As reflected in the summary of discussions, grasping 
ethics in terms of desired behaviour and training solutions is not easy. Ethical dilemmas that 
peacekeepers are likely to face may represent a combination of contradictions between their 
personal and social/professional standard of ethics, and moral dilemmas as to what is percei-
ved good and bad in the different situations. This will require peacekeepers and civilian per-
sonnel to increase their skills with regard to judgement, decision-making, communication 
and action in order to effectively address these moral and ethical dilemmas. The purpose of 
this chapter is to gain an understanding of the key ideas that emerged from the discussions, 
and present the suggestions proposed by the Meeting audience. 
What is ethics?
The meaning of ”ethics” is hard to pin-
point, and the views many people have 
regarding ethics are shaky. At its simplest, 
ethics is ‘a system of moral principles. 
They affect how people make decisions 
and lead their lives. Ethics is concerned 
with what is good for individuals and 
society and is also described as moral 
philosophy1’.
1 BBC, (2017), Ethics: a general introduction, [online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/introduction/intro_1.shtml. [accessed 
10.7.2017].
Examples of ethical and moral dilemmas:
1. How do you live a good life?
2. What are our rights and responsibilities?
3. How does language shape our understanding of  
right and wrong?
4. What is good and what is bad? 
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Based on discussions around the EAPTC Meeting, ethics was viewed from two perspectives. 
These following definitions will also be used later in this paper. 
1. Social standards of ethics, which refers to well-founded standards of right 
and wrong that prescribe what humans ought to do, usually in terms of rights, 
obligations, benefits to society, fairness, or specific virtues.2 This category per-
ceives that the social context (culture etc.) structures these ethical standards, 
which are manifested in terms of different laws, customs, traditions, value sys-
tems or different ethnic and professional groups. Professional ethics fall into 
this group.
2. Personal standards of ethics, which refer to moral principles (moral beliefs 
and our moral conduct) that govern a person’s behaviour or the conducting of 
an activity. This is an individual’s internal compass that goes beyond the social 
construct of ‘good’ and ‘bad’.
Ethics is a word that is commonly used 
to describe principles of belief, action 
and codes of conduct. These sets of prin-
ciples rule and regulate human actions 
within a formal or professional context. 
For example, the law often incorporates 
ethical standards to which most citizens 
subscribe.3 Different occupations and 
organizations have defined their ethical 
standards that are to guide the behaviour and actions of the individuals belonging to the 
group or profession. ‘While such principles and codes may have moral undertones or inten-
tions, they may not necessarily be moral and may even be patently immoral. These standards 
of social ethics ‘are regular features of professional discourse; but they do not necessarily 
advocate or refer to the morality or beliefs of the group or individual.’4 
For the military profession, the importance of ethical conduct is emphasized especially in 
relation to command and leadership. Deployment to war5 distinguishes military leadership 
from any other type of leadership. As described by Karpinski (2006), such ‘ethical behaviour 
is an inherent duty for leaders with the authority to place soldiers in harm’s way’6. Comman-
ders, contrary to personal belief and prejudices, must apply ethical principles in when to 
choose and assign individuals to different tasks. Hence, ethics plays a significant and relevant 
role in any discussion related to command and leadership in military service.7 
2  Velasquez, M., Andre, C., Shanks, S.J., and Meyer, M.J. (2015). What is Ethics? Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, Available at: https://
www.scu.edu/ethics/ethics-resources/ethical-decision-making/what-is-ethics/. [Accessed 13.7.2017].
3 Ibid.
4 Bamidele, O. (2013), Ethical Issues in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, Analysis, University for peace and conflict.
5. Hostile fire zones, lines of fire, or into harm’s way.
6. Karpinski, J.L. (2006), Ethical Behavior and Ethical Challenges in the Complex Security Environment, in Specer, E. J.  and Langace-Roy, D. 
(eds.). Proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leardership, p. 94.
7 Ibid.
Different aspects of ethics in peace operations
• Personal ethics;
• Professional ethics (ethical standards of the  
organization & profession);
• Values of the individual’s own society; 
• Values of the society where they are deployed 
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In the context of peace operations, the different organizations, e.g. UN, EU and NATO 
have defined their own core values, which are further translated into guiding principles and 
codes of conduct (standard of ethics). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Inter-
national human rights treaties; international humanitarian law, UNSRC Mandates, and the 
basic principles of UN Peacekeeping; (1) impartiality, (2) consent of the parties, and (3) 
non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, operate as the normati-
ve framework for most peace operations. Furthermore, aspects such as integrity, legitimacy, 
creditability and promotion of national and local ownership, are also seen to be important 
enablers for achievement of a sustainable peace, and thereby also the founding principles for 
peace operations’ ethical standards.8 Consequently, the individuals working in such opera-
tions are expected to demonstrate such principles during their service.
Ethical dilemmas in peace operations9
The misbehaviour of an individual, and inability to respect the core principles of 
Human Rights and other guiding principles, can compromise the legitimacy and 
creditability of the whole operation.
Despite the degree of clarity of code of conduct and the organizational values communi-
cated by the international organizations, much is still left to the individual conscience and 
sense of social responsibility of individual peace operators fulfilling their tasks and duties 
in the field. The conduct of peace operations cannot be a matter of routine or a mindless 
application of received rules and regulations.10  It is rather a balance between organizational 
values and individuals’ own judgement of the situation. In the end, it is the individual who 
makes the final decision and acts in a given situation. Hence, operations will always face 
challenges, either due to the behaviour of individuals or as a result of being confronted by 
issues that had not been seen as a threat and consequently, had not been given the priority 
that they deserved. Such cases may be connected to the use of force and responsibility to 
protect in the unclear settings, or to the misconduct of peacekeepers and aid workers 
towards the local population.11
“What is the right thing to do?”
Regarding the ethicality of the selected course of action, individuals may be confronted 
with an ethical/moral dilemma.  Such events do not refer to situations where a peacekeeper 
concisely violates the code of conduct for the purpose of harming the organization or other 
people, such as stealing or sexual exploitation. Peacekeepers are often faced with the so called 
harm dilemma. This dilemma occurs in situations where no matter which course of action 
is selected, harm or injury will come to others as a direct or indirect consequence of one’s 
8 UNDPKO, (2008). United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, [online], Available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/capstone_eng.pdf. [Accessed 13.7.2017].
9 The work of the Working groups chaired by Dr Janne Aalto, Col Michael Uhrig, Supt. Olavi Kujanpää and Prof.  Reijo E. Heinonen during 
the 5th EAPTC Meeting has provided important content for this section.
10 Bamidele, O.  2013. Ethical Issues in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, Analysis, University for peace and conflict.
11 Based on discussions in the working groups.
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actions.12 As described by Maddison (2006), the following example outlines the real life 
challenges peacekeepers may face on duty.
“Place yourself in the boots of those officers and soldiers who are guarding checkpoints 
in either Afghanistan or Iraq when what appear to be children or pregnant women 
approach and who do not seem to understand the instructions to stop. Do these 
people just want to travel to the next village or do they have explosives strapped to 
their bodies and are trying to get closer so that they can detonate the explosives with 
as much damage done as possible? There is no simple answer to this question but those 
folks who are ordered to man these checkpoints have to make these types of ethical 
decisions in an instant.13”
In peace operations, individuals can find themselves in circumstances, where the chain of 
command and personal values may seem to contradict each other. Peacekeepers face 
challenging situations, such as child soldiers, ethnic cleansing, etc., where the normative 
principles (e.g. law, guidelines) may provide only little assistance in decision-making. In 
these situations, peacekeepers are often guided by their own personal ethics (moral com-
pass), and hence the outcome of their actions will depend on the individual peacekeepers’ 
standard of ethics. 
The common challenges related to ethics in peace operations, as outlined by the Colonel 
Uhrig in his keynote speech can be summarized in four questions:
1. What if my personal morality collides with professional ethics?
2. What if I face a harm dilemma and I cannot make the ‘right’ decision?
3. There are professionals from several occupational categories in our team. What 
if their professional ethics collide with each other’s? 
4. What if values of my own society collide with values of local society?
These questions illustrate different aspects of ethical and moral dilemmas, including the 
contradiction between personal and professional ethics, moral stress caused by cultural diffe-
rences and the need to respect the ethical standards of the host nation, and the mental stress 
caused when faced with a harm dilemma.
Common standards for ethics in peace operations?
The operational realities of contemporary peace operations mean that personnel are likely to 
continue to confront a range of moral and ethical dilemmas during the missions that they 
are charged to undertake. Due to a number of incidents where the peacekeepers have been 
reported to exploit locals, or have not been able to prevent violent conflicts from (re)esca-
12. Beauchamp, D. (2002), Defence Ethics Program: Fundamentals of Canadian Defence Ethics, Defence National, p. 18.
13 Maddison, G. (2006). Competing Values: Loyalty to the Chain of Command and Personal Inegrity, in Specer, J.E. and Langace-Roy, D. 
(eds.). Proceedings from the 7th Canadian Conference on Ethical Leardership, p. 91.
18
lating, the need for strengthening the individuals’ capacity to function in complex settings 
increases. Issues relating to ethical behaviour have also become a concern of the training 
community. The context of chain of command, and behaviour of leaders when facing ethical 
dilemmas, has drawn increased interest in the peace operations community. This raises ques-
tions such as: How can potential internal contradictions between the personnel deployed to 
peace operations be mitigated? What can be done to strengthen the ability of peacekeeping 
personnel to function in such complex situations?
Ethical dilemmas are context-specific
Ethical standards differ across cultures, and therefore a key element of fostering ethicality 
across mission components is enhancing understanding of the environment where peace 
operations take place. Ethicality is more than simply respect of law and code of conduct. 
Preparing for operations should include and develop cultural awareness so that participants 
are conscious of the differences in ethics of countries they are to operate in, which also 
facilitates finding common ground with the locals. Moreover, continuous risk assessment 
regarding the operational environment and potential consequences of different actions vis-
a-vis the host society and the functionality of the peace operation itself, should be fostered.14
In order to foster ethicality in peace operations, police, military, and civilian operators should 
be educated together on ethics, including both social ethics and personal ethics.15 This in-
tegrative training and educational approach should be also be mission-oriented. In other 
words, it should be especially tailored to deal with that critical issue that will be encountered 
on that specific operation. Such awareness will certainly promote enhanced awareness of the 
challenges that personnel will sometimes be confronted with at the time of a decision and 
following that decision. This knowledge should be integrated into peace training for maxi-
mum impact. Once devised, the training should then be made a requirement for everyone 
deployed to peace operations.
Common standards for ethics in peace operations?
As verbalized by the EAPTC Meeting audience, ‘ethics is something that comes from inside 
us humans, and something that we develop through our interactions with our social sur-
roundings, and through our education’, among other. Hence, it is questionable if so called 
common sense of ethicality or common standards of ethics is even feasible. Instead, what 
could be done is to foster common understanding of ethics and ethicality among the 
peacekeepers and other individuals serving in peace operations. 
14 Keynote speech from Colonel Michael Uhrig on Ethicality in Military Peacekeeping, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
15 Ibid.
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Requirements for ethical behaviour
Due to the significant role of deci-
sion-making, the ethical behaviour of 
leaders is crucial in particular when 
deploying an intervention into a vi-
olent conflict. The nature of ethical 
decisions involves tough choices and 
opens up leaders to criticism. Most 
trust and confidence problems can be 
traced to the ethical climate that exists 
in an organization or profession.16 
Furthermore, especially in the military 
organizations, where respect for the chain of command is a central part of the military pro-
fession, loyalty towards the Commander can present a challenge for an individual soldier. 
What if the Commander demonstrates behaviour that contradicts what the troops expect 
from a Senior Commander? Would they still follow his/her orders in situations where they 
face moral and ethical dilemmas? 
If we are to provide training in ethics, we need to be able to define what the preferred be-
haviour is and how to measure it in terms of individuals’ on-the-job performance.17 For 
example, the role of the leaders is central in creating the culture of ethics in a mission. 
Leadership based on good moral and ethical values begins at the top. To be successful, a lea-
der must be committed to enforcing ethical behaviour. Thus, understanding and clarifying 
standards of ethical behaviour becomes critical to leadership success.18 In the context of 
peace operations, the preferred behaviour of leaders is a mix of respect for universal values 
such as human rights, professionalism, and respect for diversity, accountability and aiming 
for good.19 The EAPTC working group also discussed the fact that humanitarian interven-
tions and peacebuilding require empathy and that defending human rights and democracy 
requires integrity or living by example in the areas where peacekeepers and civilian personnel 
operate. This means that individuals deployed to peace operations - whether they are com-
manders or individual experts, will require increasing skills in judgement, decision-making, 
communication and action to effectively address these moral and ethical dilemmas.20 
In the context of training and exercising, diverse scenarios can support in preparing indivi-
duals to make decisions in unforeseen situations. It may not make on-site decision-making 
easy, but it can foster the individual’s ability to be guided by the code of ethics. Although, 
ethics and ethicality have gained increasing attention within the research community, there 
is a need to gather more empirical evidence from the field to understand the factual impact 
16 Maddison, G. (2006), p. 90.
17 Kirkpatrik’s model suggests that training effectiveness shall be measured by applying his 4-level evaluation model that seeks to analyse the 
effects via different levels: (1) Reaction, (2) Learning in terms of skills, knowledge, attitudes, (3) Change in behavior, and (4) Impact on the job
18 Maddison, G. (2006), p. 93.
19 Working group work chaired by Professor Reijo E. Heinonen on ethics in Peacekeeping – Considerations to Training and Education, 5th 
EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
20 Maddison, G. (2006), p. 122.
Ethical behaviour
1. Universal values - Human rights (Relativism- 
Fundamentalism)
2. Moral Duty - professionalism (professional values)
3. Respect - individualism (institutional 
values - individualism)
4. Aim to do good - Cultures (education,  
learning - trust) 
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of individual’s actions on the ground.21 Therefore, multidisciplinary research programs are 
needed in order to better understand the individuals’ cognitive processes and consequences 
of decisions made when confronting a moral or ethical dilemma in a peace operation. In 
addition, the link between training and research should be promoted on order to divide 
research findings into implementable training programs.   Ethics and ethical leadership trai-
ning are a necessity for every individual assigned to a position that requires leadership and 
command responsibilities.
What and how to train ethics?22
As Colonel Uhrig pointed out in his opening speech, a key issue relating to professionalism 
and ethical standards that shall be followed in peace operations, especially in relation to 
soldiers, is that modern peace operations include a range of different activities that are 
not all jobs for a soldier. These activities may include tasks ranging from diplomacy, moni-
toring, bridge building, and political administration to policing, riot control, management 
of refugees, and combat operations.23 Since the roles and responsibilities of different peace 
actors are more intertwined, there is a need to provide adequate pre-deployment training to 
not only uniformed personnel, but also to civilians. 
Context-specific training
Considering that every conflict is unique and the surrounding culture varies, it is clear 
that there is no ‘one-fits-for-all’ training solution for ethics. In order to develop adequate 
training and education, the identification of the specific ethical needs of the individual 
peace operation is necessary. The ethical dilemmas one may face can differ greatly from 
one place to another and among the different job descriptions. Understanding some of 
the common characteristics of each operational environment, be it working in an IDP24 
camp in South-Sudan, or patrolling in Mali, can help to mentally prepare personnel for the 
challenges they may face. For example, roleplay combined with self-reflection discussions 
afterwards, could be an effective tool for familiarizing peacekeepers and civilian experts with 
the particular ethical dilemmas that they will face in these operations.
21 Working group work chaired by Professor Reijo E. Heinonen on ethics in Peacekeeping – Considerations to Training and Education, 5th 
EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
22 This section is based on the Working group works chaired by Colonel Michael Uhrig; SUPT Olavi Kujanpää; Doctor Janne Aalto and Pro-
fessor Reijo E. Heinonen, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
23 For example combat training is no longer enough for the military. Military will be interacting more with the local population, either in 
providing humanitarian assistance or trying to establish safe and secure environment.
24 IDP stands for Internally displaced person.
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Fostering communication, common language and group cohesion
Communication and a common language (terminology and Lingua Franca) at all levels 
of the chain of command is necessary in order to minimize misunderstanding among per-
sonnel. In order to mitigate potential challenges caused by cultural differences and different 
organizational and professional backgrounds, enhancing the personnel’s language, com-
munication and team-working skills is essential. This includes also knowing the common 
procedures and code of conduct of each peace operation - be it UN, EU, NATO or AU-led. 
Furthermore, common language among the personnel allows different parties to better un-
derstand one another, communicate their own personal morals, as well as rules and procedu-
res, and professional codes inherent to their own cultures and backgrounds. 
Group cohesion is a crucial element as signing the Code of Conduct and attending the trai-
ning would not have the same effect as ‘disciplined group behaviour’. Carrying out missions 
‘ethically’ is more than just completing a specific task, it is also how the personnel behave, 
work as a group, and present themselves to the local population. Hence, understanding the 
code of conduct is a primary target for all actors and misconduct must be treated equally 
among the military, civilian and police sectors during the mission. Principles such as integ-
rity, accountability, creditability and respect towards humanity should all be manifested in 
the behaviour of peacekeepers and civilian experts serving in a peace operation. A culture of 
ethics (social standard of ethics) can lead to more coherent courses of action among person-
nel even when facing ethical dilemmas.  
In order to foster communication, common language, and common culture among 
peacekeepers and civilian experts, a united and coherent training program for all military, 
police and civilian experts could be a way forward. In the end, being able to work together 
is a key prerequisite for peace operations. Fostering mutual trust and understanding among 
multi-professional and multinational personnel can also strengthen the adaptation of the 
common code of conduct and principles, which can potentially help to prevent misconduct 
among mission personnel. Therefore, enabling training and exercises where different se-
ctors and cultures are brought together is a most effective tool. Approaching the issue 
from the multidisciplinary perspective could also provide a more comprehensive understan-
ding of the issues related to group cohesion and code of conduct within different sectors 
(civilian, police, military). This knowledge and best practices could be then translated into 
education programs and training of ethical advisors, who would support the training of 
personnel during the peace operation. 
Towards a curricula for ethics
What kind of ethical knowledge, skills and attitudes we must then have in peace operations? 
To demonstrate the ‘what’ and ‘how’ regarding the training of ethics for more effective 
peace operations, the following table summarizes the key ideas of the 5th EAPTC Meeting 
audience.
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Table 1. Curricula for ethics
Theme What to train How to train
Code of ethics 
in peace  
operations
(1) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, UNSRC mandates, and the 
basic principles of UN peacekeeping;
(2) Operation-specific Code of Conduct;
(3) Moral dilemmas;
(4) Rules and procedures relating to miscon-
duct such as sexual exploitation.
(1) Lectures, external mission reviews;
(2) Lectures, by example, mobile education 
and training teams;
(3) Training simulations (e.g. staging situa-
tions without the training audience knowing 
it in order to force them to align actions with 
beliefs. Facilitate questioning of one’s belief 
systems and foster self-reflection.




(1) Cultural compass -> how to navigate in 
different cultures;
(2) Understanding the key concepts of 
religions and cultures; how they interact and 
reflect the dynamics of a society.
(1) Lectures, training simulations, training in 
multi-cultural teams;
(2) Lectures, scenarios that highlight the diffe-




(1) Everyday logic and morality of a local po-
pulation, including the shorter and long-term 
horizon.
(2) Cultural, and historical understanding of 
the local population:
(3) Social, political and economic understan-
ding of the conflict dynamics.
(1) Discussing with local population for the 
purpose of understanding the value system; 
identifying moral and ethical composition 
 training, advising, mentoring (activity) at 
every level.
(2) Lectures, training simulations, using locals 
to explain the cultural dynamics.
(3) Lectures, using cultural interpretations to 
explain the dynamics, mobile education and 
training teams.
Leadership (1) Professionalism
(2) Leading by example




(7) Coping strategies when facing ethical/ 
moral dilemmas
(1) (All): Lectures; 
(2) Leadership advisory scenarios where indivi-
duals are forced to make tough decisions; 
(3) Take people out of their comfort zones; 
(4) Mentoring;
(5) Facilitate questioning of one’s belief sys-





(2) Principles of effective communication
(3) Public speaking skills
(4) Do’s and don’ts in social situations
(1) Lectures;
(2) Training simulations in order to practice 
clear messaging, trust-building,  negotiation 
techniques;
(3) Training simulations in different scenarios, 
where individuals are to find common ground 




(1) Working language of the peace operation
(2) Basics of local language
(1) Long-term language education and in-job 
language training;
(2) Intensive language training course
Teamwork (1) Team-building techniques;
(2) Group behaviour;
(3) Communication skills;
(4) Roles and responsibilities;
(5) Procedures and processes.
(1) Lectures, 
(2) In-job training and mentoring; 




(1) Mental preparation for possible ethical & 
moral dilemma situations.
(2) Having the right attitude and perception 
of issues.
(1) Training simulations (e.g. staging situa-
tions without the training audience knowing 
it, in order to force them to align actions with 
beliefs. 
(2) Facilitate questioning of one’s belief sys-
tems and foster self-reflection.
Problem 
-solving or  
critical thin-
king abilities
(1) Having the skill to apply your knowledge 
in practice.
(2) Having a good imaginative capacity in 
order to be able to better understand new 
ideas.
(1) Blended learning;
(2) Training simulations to facilitate complex 
problem-solving team work.
(3) Take people out of their comfort zones.
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PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS
‘A key characteristic of current operational environments is that civilians 
are being deliberately targeted by armed actors1.’
A key characteristic of current operational environments is that civilians are being deli-
berately targeted by armed actors. Normally the host government is first and foremost 
responsible for providing protection to its population from such threats. However, when it 
fails to fulfil this task, the international community plays an increasingly important role in 
providing protection to the population at risk. Hence, protecting civilians has emerged as 
a central purpose of many contemporary peace operations. However, it is no longer simply 
about avoiding civilian casualties or assisting the delivery of humanitarian aid. The military 
is increasingly expected to protect civilians from perpetrators who deliberately target them 
and who are responsible for the vast majority of deaths.  Nevertheless, protecting civilians is 
not just the responsibility of the uniformed forces, yet it is a job shared between the mission 
and partners from the humanitarian community, local government and a spectrum of diffe-
rent foreign aid and security providers. Despite differing tactics and priorities, as well as the 
cultural difficulty that some humanitarian actors have in accepting a military role in prote-
ction strategies, both military and humanitarian actors increasingly recognize each other as 
having important contributions to make to sustainable peace and security. 
Nevertheless, ongoing peace operations have increasingly demonstrated the inherent chal-
lenges in fulfilling protection tasks. Some of the key challenges relate to matching protec-
tion mandates with committed resources and a wider political approach. Closing the gap 
between what is expected from peace operations in relation to protection tasks, and what 
they can deliver, demands improvements across several dimensions. Some of them need to 
be addressed at the political level, and there are also a range of issues that relate to indivi-
duals’ competence to operate in such threat scenarios. Consequently, issues such as use of 
force, leadership, communication, and coordination among other actors, increasingly need 
to be addressed by the peace operations training.  The audience of the 5th EAPTC Mee-
ting sought to tackle some of these issues by sharing best practices and ideas relating to the 
operationalization of the protection of civilians into actionable solutions for more effective 
peace operations.
Protection of civilians in armed conflicts
Consensus is forming around the importance of protecting civilians not only because of the 
humanitarian obligation to shelter endangered population from the effects of armed con-
flict. It is essential also because it is critical to the perceived success of peace operations and 
1 Kjeksrud, S., Beadle, A.W. and Lindqvist, P.H.F. (2016). Protecting Civiliand from Violence: A Threat-Based Approach to Protection of Civi-
lians in UN Peace Operations. (Kjeller/Oslo: A joint publication of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and the Norwegian 
Defence International Center (NODEFIC)). 
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therefore the peace community’s ability to work credibly in the field of peace and security. 
As peace operations have grown in number, frequency, size and mandate, ‘the UN has made 
increasingly concerted efforts to put civilian protection at the heart of these operations’2. 
Out of 16 contemporary peace operations, 11 are mandated specifically to protect civilians. 
The ‘protection of civilians’ mandate in United Nations peace operations fulfils a critical role 
in realizing broader protection objectives, which have in recent years become an important 
focus of peace building, international relations and international law. 
What and for whom?
The concepts of the ‘protection of civilians’ developed by the humanitarian, human rights 
and peacekeeping communities have evolved somewhat separately, resulting in disparate 
understandings of the associated normative bases, substance and responsibilities. One of the 
most commonly used definitions in peace operations originates from the UN, which defines 
protection as ‘all necessary means, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at 
preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities 
and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host governme-
nt’3. In the context of physical protection, it shall be stressed that protection of civilians 
is much more than avoiding collateral damage,4 although collateral damage5 or casualties 
caused by mines and explosive remnants of war (EWRs) will also require special attention 
in some contexts. Furthermore, beyond violations, peace operations also need to track all 
casualties resulting from lawful actions by peacekeepers, State security forces, and non-State 
armed groups.6
There are legal, political, and operational aspects of protecting civilians as well as accom-
panying challenges. First, the protection of the civilian population in times of conflict is 
based on an essential principle of international humanitarian law (IHL).  According to the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, civilians and all per-
sons not taking part in combat may under no circumstances be the object of attack and must 
be spared and protected. In fact, another key concept that requires clarification is ‘civilian’. 
According to UN definition (Ref. 2015.07) a civilian is ‘any person who is not or is no lon-
ger directly participating in hostilities or other acts of violence shall be considered a civilian, 
unless he or she is a member of armed forces or groups’7. Understanding who is civilian is 
central for planning and conducting protection activities, since the threatening actors are 
not always armed. Nevertheless, according to UN guidelines, in case of doubt as to whether 
a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered a civilian.
2 See for example: Permanent Representation of Georgia to the UN organizations, (2017), Statement by the Permanent Representative of Geor-
gia to the United Nations at the UN Security Council open debate on “Protection of civilians in armed conflict”. [online], Accessed at:   http://
www.un.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=595&info_id=36962. [16.6.2017].
3 United Nations, (2015), Policy on The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (2015. 07)
4 Keynote speech by Colonel Petter Lindqvist on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Military Component, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017
5 Incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian property not part of an authorized target.
6 Harston, J. (2016).  Protection of Civilians. (Williamsburg: 2016, Peace Operations Training Institute).
7 United Nations, (2015), Policy on The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (2015. 07).
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UN approach to protection of civilians 
Protection of civilians has become a central purpose, not only for the UN peace operations 
but also regional organizations such as the EU8 and NATO9 , which have also developed 
polices and guidelines to operationalize civilian protection into the core of their peace sup-
port and crisis management activities.  In comparison to the EU and NATO, the UN has 
elaborated a more comprehensive doctrinal framework, and in its Operational Concept, has 
identified three tiers, in which the military, the police and civilian components are involved:
1. Tier I, in which the Protection of Civilians is to be achieved through dialogue 
and engagement within political processes;
2. Tier II, in which the Protection of Civilians is ensured through the provision 
of protection from any form of physical violence, and;
3. Tier III, in which the mission strives to create a protective environment con-
ducive to the Protection of Civilians and to the respect of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms.10
Physical protection does not only include eliminating threats, but also reducing civilian 
vulnerabilities. Protection can be achieved in a variety of ways, for example by reducing the 
number of attacks against civilians, by facilitating everyday civilian life through area securi-
ty, by reducing the presence of small arms, by removing illegal checkpoints, or by assisting 
humanitarian actors in their protection efforts.  However, if the military efforts to protect 
civilians from physical violence fail, other civilian protection efforts are likely to fail too. 
‘The practical expectations of the use of force to protect civilians must be clear, and an ove-
rarching framework is needed to facilitate the spectrum of actors working in a complemen-
tary way towards the common objectives of the broader protection agenda11.’ As described 
by Kjeksrud et al. (2016) ‘there is no inherent hierarchy or sequencing among the tiers, and 
action under all three tiers should emphasize prevention and pre-emption, as well as 
the primacy of the host-state’s responsibility to protect civilians. All mission components 
have a role to play in each of the tiers.12’ While engagement within a political process is a 
task of the civilian component, protection from physical violence, is a primary task for the 
military forces, and it is also a pre-condition for other means of protection. 
8 The EU adopted the Guidelines on the protection of civilians in EU-led crisis management operations (doc. 40805/03). The document 
imposes to adopt all appropriate steps, in co-operation with the UN and other International Organizations, to help create a safe and secure envi-
ronment for civilians endangered by a conflict in which there is a EU-led operation; and to facilitate safe and unhindered access by humanitarian 
personnel to civilians, namely to ensure assistance to Internal Displaced Persons, refugees, and to the most vulnerable groups.
9 NATO’s approach to the protection of civilians is based on legal, moral and political imperatives, which were outlined by Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July 2016. For more information about the approach 
visit: NATO website (2017), NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians, [online], Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_133945.htm?selectedLocale=en.  [Accessed 7.7.2017].
10 United Nations, (2015), Policy on The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping (2015. 07).
11 Willmot, H. and Sheeran, S. (2015). The protection of civilians mandate in UN peacekeeping operations: reconciling protection concepts 
and practices. ICRC website, [online]. Available at: https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/article/protection-civilians-mandate-un-peace-
keeping-operations-reconciling. [Accessed 8.7.2017].
12 Kjeksrud, S., Beadle, A.W. and Lindqvist, P.H.F. (2016).  Protecting Civiliand from Violence: A Threat-Based Approach to Protection of Ci-
vilians in UN Peace Operations. (Kjeller/Oslo: A joint publication of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and the Norwegian 
Defence International Center (NODEFIC)).
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Shared responsibility
The Host State’s government always has the primary responsibility for protecting the 
civilian population within its borders. This protection should come from State security 
(military, police, and gendarmerie) and judicial structures. Nevertheless, in the case that the 
Host government fails to provide protection to civilians, peace operations with Protection 
of Civilian (PoC) mandates are authorized to support or supplement the protection efforts 
of Host State institutions. To effectively address the complex challenges, protection of civi-
lians is a mandated task that requires concerted action from all mission components. 
The military and police components, along with civilian components such as civil affairs, 
human rights, political affairs, and others, have specific tasks regarding civilian protection.13 
While the civilian component has the primary responsibility for the Tier I activities through 
the civil affairs section and human rights monitoring and reporting, the military and police 
component are, by nature, focused on Tier II, in particular thanks to the activities ensured 
by Peacekeepers and Formed Police Units. But it would be incorrect not to consider the 
mutually reinforcing efforts of the different components, as well as the impact that ensuring 
law and order and public safety and security has on the political process, and on the overall 
respect of human rights.14 They all contribute to building a protective environment for the 
civilians (Tier III). 
In fact, the UN’s whole-of-mission concept or ‘comprehensive approach15’ to PoC requires 
coordinated approaches among the different components that need to be reflected in the 
structure and operations of UN peace operations, starting with their PoC strategies. Such 
strategies will need to clarify the PoC role and responsibilities of all mission components and 
ensure coherence of effort in light of the deployment area’s identified risks.16 For this reason, 
while protection is a core element of the concept of international policing and peacekeeping, 
in a peace operations context it requires the police and military component to closely align 
its efforts with the mission’s overall protection of civilians’ strategy.17 Protection of civilians 
is an outcome, not an activity. That is also why it is an element of all peace operations and 
activities –be they civilian or military.
Protection from physical violence
As outlined in the previous chapter, protection of civilians from physical violence (Tier II) 
concerns primarily the military actors and the police forces (Formed Police Unit). Nevert-
heless, civilians also play a role in relation to protection tasks. In this chapter we will briefly 
outline some of the key elements related to different aspects of physical protection in the 
context of training protection of civilians. The descriptions that follow are based on keynote 
speeches and discussions during the EAPTC Meeting.
13 Harston, J. (2016).  Protection of Civilians, (Williamsburg:  Peace Operations Training Institute), p. 19.
14 Keynote speech of Giovanni Pietro Barbano on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Police component, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017
15. This concept is discussed more in depth in chapter 5.
16 von Einsiedel, S. (2015). Non-Military Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations: Experiences and Lessons, United Nations University 
Centre for Policy Research, Occasional Paper 3, May 2015.
17 Keynote speech of Giovanni Pietro Barbano on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Police component, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
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Considerations as to the military component 18
Today, civilians in conflict are targeted and at-
tacked as a part of the strategy of the perpet-
rators of violence. Knowing the nature of the 
threat is therefore essential. Different threats 
will require different responses, ranging from 
offensive actions to no action at all. The chal-
lenge is to protect civilians from threats of 
physical violence without causing more harm 
in doing so. This is also why effectiveness in 
protecting civilians can be enhanced without 
jeopardizing the principles of peacekeeping in 
UN peace operations. That said, in cases where 
the host nation is a part of the threat to its own 
population, protection of civilians becomes a 
challenge that first and foremost must be hand-
led at the political level (Tier I), and not left 
for the mission to become the scape-goat. 
There is wide agreement within the international community that the planning of peace 
operations, particularly in terms of protection of civilians, should be improved. As the key 
task of the military is to protect civilians from physical violence, planning for PoC activities 
is about understanding the relationship between the perpetrators19 and those threatened 
(civilian population). Protection is achieved by affecting the intention and capabilities of 
a threat actor. Although the peace operation’s own forces must also prepare to defend them-
selves against perpetrators of violence against civilians, the key goal of military protection 
is to match the perpetrators’ ability to threaten civilians. The ability to apply adequate 
force in order to protect civilians remains a prerequisite for lasting peace, in UN peace 
operations as well as any others. This demands an improved ability to understand the nature 
of threats against civilians. This will also vary depending on the rationale and strategies of 
the perpetrators.
Information strategies also play a role in modern peace operations. Even increased effec-
tiveness in conducting basic tasks of a military component will have a deterring effect on a 
perpetrator who attacks civilians. Perceptions become reality through strategic communi-
cation. The ability to convey messages reflecting the capacity and ability of a military force 
will have immediate effect on target audiences aiming at attacking civilians.
How to distinguish civilians from combatants? In many operational environments, it is 
almost impossible to distinguish between civilians and armed elements. Sometimes perpet-
rators become victims, and victims become perpetrators. Hence, the ability to define scena-
18 This section is based on the Keynote speech from Colonel Petter Lindqvist on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Military compo-
nent, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
19 Perpetrators of violence against civilians may include elements of national and international security forces, non-State armed groups, crimi-
nals, and other civilians (e.g. inter-communal violence).
Protection from physical violence  
may include:
• Seizing arms 
• Military and police presence 
• Military and police engagement 
• Patrolling and monitoring hotspots 
• Providing route security/freedom  
of movement 
• Establishing physical defensive positions 
• Public order management 
• Joint protection teams 
• Visible exercises 
• Early warning measures 
• Evacuations
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rios to guide the protectors will be instrumental in ‘doing the right thing’, e.g. protecting 
without causing more harm in doing so. This is also why UN peace operations” on autopi-
lot” may jeopardize their own objectives.  Understanding the threat, and knowing how the 
threat against civilians can be reduced without causing more harm, is paramount. 
There is no one size-fits-all-solution
Multi-dimensional conflicts with a wide spectrum of actors involved cannot be approached 
with a one-size-fits-all solution where CONOPS20 and other framework documents prescri-
be the use of military assets and force without analysing the nature of threats. Why are 
civilians being attacked? What happens if the attackers succeed? How can military forces be 
used to protect them?  Passively protecting civilians by establishing PoC sites and IDP camps 
may be the only immediate solution – but with a persisting threat, peace cannot be restored. 
Protecting civilians from the threat of physical violence means affecting the capabilities and 
intentions of the perpetrators of the violence. This is the job of the military component in 
todays’ peace operations.  
The role and responsibilities of the police component21
Eleven of the current 16 UN missions, the most numerous in terms of uniformed personnel, 
have a clear PoC mandate and all of them include Formed Police Units (FPU) as robust po-
lice assets mandated, inter alia, to protect civilians. Both FPU and individual police experts 
(e.g. UNPOL) help to establish and maintain law and order through executive mandate. In 
missions with an executive mandate, police shall be directly responsible for physical pro-
tection of civilians (Tier II) against imminent threats, e.g. through force projection and/or 
high visibility and increased patrolling. More often, this will involve providing operational 
support to protection provided by host State police (Tier III), such as advice on planning 
and conducting operations and investigations into incidents, or training host State police to 
perform key protection functions, such as providing security in camps for internally disp-
laced persons. And indeed, crime prevention and repression, and protection of communities 
are the innate task of the police, both in domestic and international engagement.
Suitable tool for modern peace  
operations
20 Concept of operations.
21 This section is based on the Keynote speech of Giovanni Pietro Barbano on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Police component, 
5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
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The intra-State nature of conflicts and civil 
wars requires now more than ever a com-
munity-based approach, an attitude inhe-
rent in all police that usually makes them the 
most suitable tool in reaching out to local 
communities, understanding their needs, 
and taking preventive measures, especial-
ly those aimed at strengthening relations 
between communities and the host State 
police in order to improve early warning 
and rapid response for their protection.
 
Key considerations as to the police component
 ‘Maintain legitimacy and creditability in the eyes of the host nation’
Promotion, protection and respect for human rights must be incorporated into every aspect 
of the work of police components deployed to missions. Not only shall the international 
police officers promote, protect and respect human rights in the exercise of their duties, but 
they must also act as role models to their Host State counterparts and be prepared to raise 
issues of human rights if confronted with violations.
‘Only deploy personnel who demonstrate integrity, respect, and good code  
of conduct’
Personnel must always behave in a principled and accountable manner, in accordance with 
international human rights standards and zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and 
abuse. These standards must also be incorporated into how, and on what basis, police pro-
vide advice to Host State police, and shall be central to evaluations of police components’ 
effectiveness, and shall be included in the competencies required for the selection of interna-
tional police personnel. Peace operations shall neither select nor deploy any individual who 
has been involved in violations of international human rights or humanitarian law. 
Police components shall minimize environmental impact in their deployment areas in order 
to ensure good relations with the local community, as well as protect the Mission’s reputa-
tion. Furthermore, international police officers shall adopt appropriate behaviour around 
cultural, religious and historical sites of importance to the host State population. In addition 
to working closely with host State police, protection of civilians requires particularly close 
co-ordination between the police, military and other components.
Roles and Responsibilities of  
the police component (examples):
• Protection of UN personnel and facilities, in-
cluding individually deployed unarmed UNPOL
• Patrolling, confidence-building,  
investigations, arrests, detentions,  
seizures, confiscations
• Public order, operational support,  
regulated through DUF (Detention  
and the Use of Force)
• Training of local police
• Protection of civilians and vulnerable  
communities
• Presence in IDP camps, if assigned
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‘Take measures against misconduct’
International police must vigorously oppose and combat any form of corruption involving 
the mission personnel or contractors, or the Host State police or other law enforcement or 
governmental agencies. If a police officer develops a reasonable suspicion that acts of sexual 
exploitation and abuse or corruption have occurred, he/she shall immediately report these 
suspicions along the mission chain of command.
Gender analysis and gender equality
When defining and implementing support activities and when identifying security needs, 
the police component must pay special attention to gender and other group-specific con-
siderations, especially in relation to vulnerable and marginalized groups. Gender conside-
rations must be incorporated into key aspects of police peace operations, such as planning, 
management, budgeting and capacity development programmes. Accordingly, non-discri-
minatory and adequate representation of qualified women shall be promoted within the 
Host State police, as well as work to ensure that women in the Host State police are provided 
equal capacity and career development opportunities. Police components shall prioritize 
supporting the Host State in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of sexual and 
gender-based violence, preventing any and all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse and 
supporting the specific needs and protection of the victims.
The role as of the civilian component
Civilian peace operations (such as civilian crisis management missions and political mis-
sions) and civilian mission components have shown that they can provide crucial protection 
functions, and protection is also the ultimate objective of human rights field-work. Civilian 
components, such as the UN civilian sector, EU civilian crisis management missions, and 
political missions play a central role in Tier I and Tier III-related activities. The table below 
exemplifies a range of activities that civilian actors may perform in peace operations.
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN-RELATED ACTIVITIES MAY INCLUDE
Protection through dialogue and engagement
(Tier I)
Establishing a protective environment 
(Tier III)
• Supporting the political process, good governance  
& government institutions 
• Human Rights: ensuring protective presence and  
effective advocacy
• Monitoring and proactive presence
• Public advocacy and reporting
• Supporting reconciliation 
• Political action 
• Peace negotiations & agreements 
• Mediation 
• Conflict and crises management
• Liaison with host government, local political leaders, 
communities and regional neighbours
• Promotion of legal protection
• Facilitation of humanitarian assistance 
• Support to national institutions 
• Protection of human rights 
• Reforming of police, justice and security sectors (SSR) 
• Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(DDR) 
• Rule of law (RoL) 
• Return of refugees and internally displaced persons 
• Mine action activities
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Along with the civilian sectors such as Political Affairs and Rule of Law sectors, “protection 
of civilians has increasingly become an objective humanitarians share with UN peace ope-
rations. Interaction between peace operations and humanitarian actors is neces sary to ensure 
better protection outcomes by exchanging information and analysis on protection issues, 
and seek ing ways to maximize synergies in areas of mutual concern (including advocacy 
with conflict parties, engagement with armed groups, child protection, return and integra-
tion of displaced populations etc.).22”
On the whole, civilian actors play a central role in the protection of civilians. Although, 
provision of physical protection is a job for military and formed police units, civilian mis-
sions (such as EU civilian crisis management missions, and UN political missions) make 
significant contributions to their protection of civilians efforts, both in support of military 
responses and in their own right. The close collaboration across functions is paramount, 
since the protection tasks of the UN require joined-up approaches, including planning; 
early warning and situational awareness; and engagement with international partners, local 
communities, and national authorities.23 To foster the effectiveness of protection actions, 
the UN has promoted the adaptation of comprehensive Protection of Civilians strategies, 
which have helped to coordinate efforts through improved coordination and information 
sharing within missions.
Key challenges24
As stated by Brigadier Giovanni Pietro Barbano in his opening speech, despite the outstan-
ding and commendable doctrinal efforts, there is still an urgent need for increased capacity 
in protection of civilians. The international community has repeatedly been criticized for 
being unable to alleviate the suffering of the affected populations. Huge challenges are po-
sed by the recent trends in the conflicts, and the need to adapt the peace operations to the 
changes in conflicts, where terrorism and organized crime share a “grey area” with the parties 
to the conflict.
Undeniably, all field missions have faced innumerable challenges in implementing the ext-
remely complex, but critically important mandate. According to UN three common chal-
lenges that peace operations commonly face that make the operationalization of PoC even 
more challenging;
1. The protection of civilians is often necessary in harsh conditions, with limited 
or insufficient resources, and with partners who sometimes lack the will or 
capacity to do their part.  
2. Peace operations often deploy amidst the unrealistic expectation that they will 
be able to protect all civilians at all times.
22 von Einsiedel, S. (2015). Non-Military Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations: Experiences and Lessons, United Nations University 
Centre for Policy Research, Occasional Paper 3, May 2015.
23 Ibid, p. 2.
24 The main content of this section stems from the work of the Working groups chaired by Colonel Petter Lindqvist, Brigadier Giovanni Pietro 
Barbano, Ambassador Pia Stjernvall, and Colonel Claus Amos, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
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3. The dynamic nature of the places in which they operate means the security 
situation can change very quickly.25
In addition to these challenges, the EAPTC Meeting audience brought up a number of ot-
her issues that also tend to hamper the peace operations’ protection of civilian efforts. These 
are discussed in the following chapters.
A variety of tasks
As pointed out by Brigadier Barbano, it is evident to all that the nature of conflicts has chan-
ged over the years. Peacekeeping, originally developed as a means of dealing with conflicts 
between States, was increasingly being applied to conflicts inside States and to civil wars. 
This was also argued by Rubert Smith (2006) that a consequence of modern warfare is that 
war is fought amongst people, and hence we must rethink how military force can be utilized 
and organized to better support new political objectives.26
In addition to this, peacekeepers are now increasingly asked to undertake a wide variety 
of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to human 
rights monitoring; from security sector reform, to disarmament, demobilization and reinte-
gration of former combatants; and from the support to the substitution of local law enfor-
cement agencies in ensuring public security and order. The adaptation of the new tasks and 
the variety of different roles require the peacekeepers to have, among other things, flexibility, 
social and teamwork skills, respect towards diversity, and the ability and attitude for coope-
ration and collaboration with the different actors.
Maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation
The safety and security of civilians is in effect critical to the legitimacy and credibility of 
peace operations. They rely upon their legitimacy with the local civilian population and 
external observers alike to help build peace and maintain political momentum behind the 
peace process. Moreover, wherever peacekeepers deploy, they raise expectations among the 
local population and among those who view missions from a far that the reason for their 
presence is to support people at risk and any failure or lack of action in addressing large-scale 
violence directed against civilians will result in a loss of legitimacy and credibility that will 
hamper the achievement of other mandated tasks to assist with the political and local recon-
solidation efforts and peacebuilding. 
Peace operations perform a crucial service in resolving conflicts, saving lives, building peace, 
restoring and rebuilding broken states. However, incidents where troops seconded to the 
UN by member states under its command become sexual predators to the civilians under 
25 UN website. (2017). Protection of civilians. [online], Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/civilian.shtml. [Accessed 
16.6.2017].
26 Smith, R. (2006). The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. (New York: Penguin Book).
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their care have continued to present a cyclical challenge to the United Nations.27 This occurs 
even though, according to UN Code of Conduct and Discipline, sexual relations with pros-
titutes and with any persons under the age of 18 are strictly forbidden, and relations with 
beneficiaries of assistance are strongly discouraged.28
Unfortunately, several cases of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers and civilian staff have 
been reported during the recent years. In her keynote speech Ambassador Pia Stejrnval 
pointed out that sexual abuse is a widespread and complex problem in peace operations. 
Although the UN condemns such behaviour, and stronger measures are developed to pre-
vent and punish such misconduct, these incidents have demonstrated the role that divergent 
social and personal moral codes may play in international peace operations. There have been 
cases, where the victim or abuser does not feel or believe that what is happening is wrong. 
What makes this complex is that the victim may be the one enforcing the exploitation by 
proposing to exchange sex for some basic goods such as water, food or soap. There have also 
been several cases, where peacekeepers or civilian personnel have exploited minors, com-
mitted rape or other forms of exploitation or abuse.
Measures for addressing misconduct were discussed during the working group sessions. The 
Meeting audience widely agreed that especially preventive measures should be strengthened 
in order to avoid all forms of misconduct including sexual exploitation and abuse. Pre-
ventive efforts could include mandatory training at all staff levels, sensitization, risk 
management and enhanced screening of all incoming personnel – be it military, police 
or civilian – for prior misconduct while serving in peace operations. Typical behavioural 
patterns of the personnel should be identified and followed up –what kind of patterns of be-
haviour can predict the likelihood of misconduct. In addition, open communication among 
the personnel as well as a culture of respect and the Code of Conduct should be promoted 
within operations. 
Leadership plays an important role in all missions, both in terms of setting the example 
for behaviour and intervening in potential misconduct in advance, and in addressing the 
issue. The leaders are role models and their actions have a major impact on the overall cul-
ture of the operation. Sometimes the colleagues of the exploiters may know about or even 
witness the misconduct, but they may be afraid to act as whistle-blowers for different rea-
sons, such as losing their job, becoming an outsider or for other social reasons. Hence, an 
effective whistle-blower system could encourage mission personnel to report possible 
cases. Furthermore, more skilled and trained female peacekeepers can only be an asset to 
peacekeeping operations. Gender needs to be “mainstreamed” across peace operations, and 
more women should participate in field operations in military roles as police and as human 
rights observers. A training course that would also equip personnel in peace operations 
to tackle sexual and gender-based violence should be promoted. Finally, an impartial 
civilian society could also be involved in monitoring the activities of peacekeepers and civi-
lian personnel, and reporting possible cases of misconduct.
27 See for example: Opande D. and Chatterjee, S. (2017). Time for Tough Action to Stop Sexual Exploitation by UN Peacekeepers. Huffpost, 
[online], Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lieutenantgeneral-rtd-daniel-opande-/time-for-tough-action_b_10792688.html. [Acces-
sed 18.7.2017].
28 UN website (2017), Conduct and discipline, [online], Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/cdu/. [Accessed 10.7.2017].
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In case prevention is not enough, adequate responses also need to be in place. These may 
include deployment of immediate response teams to gather and preserve evidence, rapid 
investigations, immediate disciplinary measures such as repatriation of uniformed personnel 
when the perpetrator is known and suspension of payments, and pursuing criminal ac-
countability with Member States, including imprisonment. Furthermore, sharing informa-
tion within the vulnerable groups, and showing that UN or other peace operations convict 
abusers is essential. Cases of misconduct will affect local perceptions, and peace operations 
must prioritize maintaining creditability and legitimacy in the eyes of the host nation.
Use of force
Since the beginning of the 1990s, there has been a continuously increasing tolerance for 
the use of force in peacekeeping. The use of force in the protection of civilians has proved 
to be a complicated task in mission environments, along with answering the question ‘who 
is a civilian’.  As discussed in Chapter 2, one of the key features of the current operational 
environments is that the conflicts are intra-state, and the targets of peacekeeping actions 
tend to be non-state actors. This makes identification of the ‘civilians’ a difficult task. The 
implication of these shifts has also become evident to the peace training community and the 
use of force came to be a topic of a discussion also during the seminar. 
The core principles of UN Peacekeeping are (1) consent29; (2) impartiality30, and (3) non-
use of force except in self-defence. As stated in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), 2008, a UN peacekeeping operation should 
only use force as a measure of last resort. It should always be calibrated in a precise, ‘pro-
portional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to 
achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. The use 
of force by a UN peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often 
give rise to unforeseen circumstances. Judgments concerning its use need to be made at the 
appropriate level within a mission, based on a combination of factors including mission 
capability; public perceptions; humanitarian impact; force protection; safety and security of 
personnel; and, most importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and local 
consent for the mission.’31
29 “UN peacekeeping operations are supposed to be deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. This distinguishes them from 
enforcement operations. Consent requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. As the Capstone Doctrine argues, “In the absence 
of such consent, a United Nations peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, 
and away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace.” This is not just for normative reasons, but also for purely practical ones. Consent is sought 
to make the work and tasks of UN peacekeepers more achievable. It is usually obtained through a peace agreement among the main parties 
to the conflict. While peacekeepers are deployed to volatile situations, they are not intended to conduct their activities in the midst of open 
conflicts” Peter, M. (2015) Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma. Global Governance, Review of Multilateralism and 
International Organizations. July-September 2015, Vol. 21, No. 3, p. 358.
30 According to the Capstone Doctrine, UN peacekeeping missions must implement their mandates without favor or prejudice to any party. 
Furthermore,  impartiality is seen as “crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with 
neutrality or inactivity.” It is clear that the cornerstone of impartiality is actually consent to peacekeeping activities; impartiality is intended 
to ensure the continued cooperation of all key political players so that the operation can successfully implement its mandate. In addition, the 
Brahimi Report clearly argues that “the United Nations does not wage war,” and continues that when such action is required it is entrusted to 
coalitions of willing states with the authorization of the Security Council. See for example: Peter,M.( 2015), p. 359.
31 UN Website, (2017), Principles of UN peacekeeping, [online], Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.
shtml. [Accessed 3.7.2017].
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While the reality on the ground is changing and the Security Council is becoming more 
willing to authorize robust missions, the official UN responses to these challenges have not 
acknowledged the extent of the mismatch between doctrine and practice. The principle of 
non-use of force except in self-defence is one of the cornerstones of peacekeeping and dates 
back to the first deployments of armed UN peacekeepers. A move toward more robust man-
dates in the post−Cold War era led to the Security Council’s willingness to authorize UN 
peacekeepers to use all necessary means to ‘deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political 
process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national 
authorities in maintaining law and order.32’ The increasing robustness of missions and their 
state-building mandates in contemporary peace operations, make it increasingly challenging 
for individual peacekeepers to operate according to the doctrine and with the objective to 
protect civilians. 
As the link between protection of civilians and peace operations mandates is crucial, the 
challenge, at the politico-strategic level, is represented by the clarity and credibility of achie-
vable and sustainable mandates. This does not only apply to the military component but 
also to consequences of the executive power of the police forces. To this respect, the Securi-
ty Council Resolution mandating a mission, and all subsequent planning and operational 
documents, including the “directives on the use of force and firearms, and power of arrest, 
search and detention”, must be coherent with the overall intent of protecting civilians, 
and bringing to justice those responsible for the most serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law principles and norms.33 In this domain, although uniformed 
personnel are normally used to making their decisions more autonomously than military 
personnel, who are normally bound by Rules of Engagement or explicit orders, it is quite 
important to receive clear guidance and to possess all the relevant information to plan and 
effectively conduct any kind of operation. 
Prioritization of protection is also a propounding question for the military and police. 
Since the impossibility to be present in any given place of the mission area and to physically 
protect any single person appears evident, clear priorities should be set forth by the strategic 
level to direct the subordinate elements in order to better allocate the resources in accordan-
ce with the overarching politico-strategic view. Gaps have, regrettably, been identified also 
in the equipping and arming the contingents. To effectively defend civilians from physical 
violence, the uniformed elements must be adequately robust and credible in terms of quan-
tity and quality. 34
32 Ibid. 
33 Keynote speech of Giovanni Pietro Barbano on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Police component, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
34 Ibid.
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The Meeting audience suggested that some improvements can be made relating to the 
use of force in Protection of Civilians; 
1. Timing and sequencing of the use of force should be improved. When 
peacekeepers enter a country, the population expects change. If this does not 
happen fast, there is a risk of losing their support. Sometimes this may require 
early use of force, while other times this could prove to be very costly. 
2. There are different approaches to the use of force, hard or soft, and the man-
date should be devised accordingly, with more focus on the potential threats. 
3. Training and doctrines should be adopted to fit the specific conflict context. 
This should be done in close consultation with other sectors and actors, to 
ensure the comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the operational 
environment. Currently though, there is a lack of information on what is ac-
tually happening, so improvement is needed there too. 
4. Redlines and rules of engagement have to be clearly set in the mandate, and 
they should be coherent across all sectors involved in the operation.
5. An area where improvement is also necessary is politics, and more specifically 
the political will to use force. Presently, the lack of will is caused by fear of the 
consequences that may arise from the use of force, which limits the potential 
of peace operations. 
Fostering sharing of lessons from past missions
The international community’s ability to learn lessons from past missions has often been 
criticized. Although much work has been undertaken lately by the international organiza-
tions to identify the best practices and main shortfalls with the aim of understanding the 
effectiveness of the interventions, the ability to operationalize these lessons into the planning 
and conduct of current and future operations still seems to be limited. One important ele-
ment complicating the process is related to the fact that since 2005, the main contributions 
to peace operations are no longer coming from European or other ‘Western’ countries such 
as Australia, New Zealand or Canada, they now come either from the continent itself or a 
few key Asian countries, including Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan.35 Consequently, 
passing on the experience gained from over 60 years of involvement in peacekeeping 
operations to the new key troop contributing countries becomes essential. Bearing the-
se aspects in mind, the EAPTC Meeting audience raised the issue of how the experience 
gained among the European nations in the last decades can help enhance the protection of 
civilians in peace operations. As a result of the discussions, the following practical suggestion 
was made in order to foster the sharing and learning of lessons within the peace operations 
community.
35 Della-Giacoma J. and Rappa, R. (2017). UN Peace Operations by the Numbers in Global Peace Operations Review 2016.  Center on 
International Cooperation.
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(1) Enhance a culture of communication between the sectors and build effective kno-
wledge management mechanisms
The lack of communication between the different sectors, missions and actors is proven to 
be a critical issue since it hampers establishing a common understanding between the actors, 
creates a lack of coherence among the different activities, as well as, a lack of standardization 
in terms of reporting and information & knowledge management. 
(2) Consider the use of Mobile Training & Education Teams in operations
An array of different training programs, doctrines, guidelines and procedures from different 
organizations and countries have proven to overload the uniformed and civilian personnel 
and all those exposed to the excessive amount of information. The overload of information 
makes it more difficult to distinguish what information is relevant for each actor in different 
operational environments. This is reflected also in terms of a limited capacity to process and 
adapt the lessons from past missions into the planning and conduct of on-going peace ope-
rations. Hence, one practical solution that would support the utilization of past experiences 
in the conduct of ongoing operations, would be to use Mobile Training & Education Teams 
in the operations.15 
(3) Joint training and exercises
Joint training for the different mission components and between the different actors should 
also be encouraged in order to foster daily interaction between the sectors, and the sharing 
of experience not only before deployment but also during a peace operation.37
Fragmented approaches
Although, UN peace operations increasingly perceive protection of civilians as a ‘who-
le-of-mission concept’, challenges related to fragmented approaches still prevail. The int-
roduction of comprehensive PoC strategies for missions with such mandates has improved, 
as have efforts to improve intra-mission coordination and information sharing. This is still 
a work in progress and the latter remains a work in progress with information silos even 
between different mission components.  Many of the issues inherent in fragmented ap-
proaches are related to, among others, different command and control structures, organiza-
tional cultures, professional backgrounds, roles and responsibilities, different mandates and 
prejudices towards different professions and cultures. 
36 Results of the discussions in the ‘Militrary Working Group’ chaired by Colonel Petter Lindqvist, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
37 These passages precisely represent the content of the conclusions of the Working Group Research & Training (Challenges with reference to 
POC, Strengthening of cooperation) chaired by Colonel Claus Amon.
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These challenges can only be overcome through dedicated coordination mechanisms, per-
sistent leadership and promoting a common understanding of the desired outcome of the 
peace operations. Joint training and exercises could be an efficient tool for fostering mutual 
understanding across the different actors and mission components.  All in all, coordination 
during a peace operation is critical. Different disciplines must communicate with one 
another and design and decide on a common strategy to ensure the effectiveness and rele-
vance of a comprehensive PoC strategy.
Furthermore, it was highlighted during the Meeting, that rather than seeking to overco-
me sectoral barriers through unified structures and practices, efforts should be about re-
cognizing one another’s competences and strengths, and using them for enhanced civilian 
protection. It is the appropriate mix of different tools that brings the added value.  For 
example, in certain situations a military advisor can be better suited for a mediation task 
than a civilian expert, and the involvement of certain civilian experts, such as e.g. legal ad-
visors, can be highly beneficial for the work of military and police component. Using joint 
protection teams is a good best practice of military-police collaboration, as well as joint 
patrols with civilians in meeting local leaders, for example. The key issue is that the different 
components and organizations should not contradict one another, but should rather combi-
ne their efforts in a reinforcing manner in order to better protect the vulnerable.
Lack of understanding of conflict dynamics
The point was raised several times during the Meeting that a common failure to understand 
local conflict dynamics tends to undermine the international community’s ability to tailor 
appropriate protection responses. Furthermore, at times this “lack of local embeddedness” 
prevents mission staff from building trust and personal networks, and inhibits the ability to 
collect in-depth information and produce high-quality analysis, which is directly reflected in 
the planning of responses. These deficits are all the more problematic, since local-level con-
flicts are a key driver of violence against civilians in civil wars.  In addition, the importance 
of local-level political economy analysis in the effort to understand PoC risks would be es-
sential for understanding the long-term effects of PoC activities. A common understanding 
of the operational environment and threats against civilians should ideally be shared across 
all components of a peace operation and at the different levels of the organization.38 
For example, when addressing the host country’s political leaders, national civilian staff 
should be utilized in order to have a better understanding of the dynamics on the ground. 
It is also paramount for the peace operation to be aware of how their actions are interpreted 
by the locals, and ensure that the desired perceptions are pushed forward. Sometimes, a local 
person can be the ‘door opener’ in a local region. Operations should also consider making 
use of the expertise of NGOs and development personnel in planning, since quite often 
they have the longest experience in the country, and hence a broader understanding of the 
dynamics of the region.
38 Based on the results of the working group work of Colonel Claus Amos on Protection of Civilians – considerations for Training and Educa-
tion, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
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Addressing challenges through training39
As discussed in previous chapters, there are a range of challenges that make the implemen-
tation of protection of civilians on the ground extremely complex. The identified challenges 
relate to:
• Fragmented approaches as there are many different actors on the ground
• Inefficient coordination and information sharing among the actors
• Different approaches to and understanding of PoC, lack of integration with non-sta-
te players
• Lack of understanding of the threats and local dynamics
• National caveats and issues related to use of force
• Managing of local expectations
• Maintaining/establishing creditability and legitimacy among the local population
• Adequate resources to match the ambitious mandates
• Learning from past experiences and making use of those lessons in planning and 
conduct of ongoing and future peace operations.
The EAPTC Meeting audience agreed that some of these challenges cannot be solved with 
adequate and effective training and education, yet many of them can. Consequently, a num-
ber of suggestions were made to enhance the performance of peacekeepers and civilians 
experts through valid and systematic training programs.
Standardized and mandatory training
The EAPTC community itself is an example of the fact that there are plenty of training cour-
ses and educational programs available for enhancing the capability of peacekeepers (both 
military and police) in order for them to meet their mandate. Training is often based on UN 
Standard Training Modules, NATO doctrines and European Security and Defence College 
(ESDC) curricula. However, there is still a lack of standardized and mandatory training 
for deployed personnel across all sectors (civilian, military and police), which also limits the 
potential of the existing training architecture.
Standardization should be expanded to include general peacekeeping and crisis manage-
ment courses, pre-deployment training, mission-tailored training, in-mission training, and 
task-specific training. This would harmonize the training, and promote establishing at least 
39 The main content of this chapter stems from the work of the Working groups chaired by Colonel Petter Lindqvist, Brigadier Giovanni Pietro 
Barbano, Ambassador Pia Stjernvall, and Colonel Claus Amos, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
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a minimum level of knowledge and skills with regard to protection of civilians, including 
understanding of PoC-related threats and measures that each actor can take to address them. 
Hence, joint training across the civilian, military and civilian components (pre-deployment 
training and in-mission area-training) and exercises (e.g. VIKING, CAX, field exercises) 
should be promoted. In addition, post-mission analysis and lessons identified from past mis-
sions should be integrated into new training programs. Finally, the exchange of experienced 
PoC instructors (mobile training teams), exchange of manuals and course materials, enhan-
ced partnering among the different countries and training institutions should be facilitated 
and encouraged.40
Using scenarios to identify training needs 
Scenarios are often used in peace operation-related training. They provide a simplified but 
effective way of outlining the roles and responsibilities of different actors, and assessing the 
consequences of different actions. In addition, playing scenarios can provide important in-
sight into what kind of actions would be ideal in different situations.
Two scenarios/settings were used to delve into the question as to what and how PoC should 
be addressed in different situations. This exercise was developed and conducted by Brigadier 
Barbano during the working group session.
Scenario 1:
Whereas the primacy of Police and Military in addressing Tier II PoC (protection from phy-
sical violence) is well-recognized in the community in practice, there is a role to be played 
by uniformed personnel also in Tier III (creation of a protective environment conducive to 
the Protection of Civilians and to the respect of fundamental human rights and freedoms). 
In the field, however, there is still to some extent mistrust and suspicion towards uniformed 
personnel from humanitarian and human rights components: how might we overcome such 
distrust in order to enhance mutually beneficial collaboration?
40 These passages precisely represent the content of the conclusions of the Working Group Research & Training (Challenges with reference to 
POC, Strengthening of cooperation) chaired by Colonel Claus Amon.
Means for enhancing collaboration Recommended training solutions
• Getting people in the same room (co-location)
• Leadership, units etc. who are working in the same 
areas
• Coffee (informal etc.) meetings with collaboration
• SWOT-analysis from the “coffee meetings”
• Trust-building
• Addressing inter-agency cooperation awareness in 
training;
• Emphasizing different roles of different actors in 
contributing to the mission’s end state in training;
• Establishing mission coordination mechanisms (e.g. 
through imposed coordination meetings or by enfor-
cing this in the mandate/OPLAN).
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Scenario 2: 
The existing training programs on PoC are all theoretical/academic in character. The 2011 
UN ITS Specialized Training Modules (STM) on PoC provided scenarios for conducting 
Table Top Exercises (TTX)/Map Exercises (MAPX)/Command Post Exercises (CPX) upon 
completion of the course. There is a need for addressing practical/tactical training in PoC for 
the police component. What could be done to address this gap?
Towards a Protection of Civilians training architecture 
What kind of knowledge, skills and attitudes should one have to enhance the protection of 
civilians in peace operations? To demonstrate the ‘what’ and ‘how’ regarding the training 
of ethics for more effective peace operations, the table below summarizes the 5th EAPTC 
Meeting audience’s key ideas.
Considerations Recommended training solutions
• Policies are not institutionalized 
• Training analysis, and a qualification framework should 
be established
• Different requirements for different jobs should be 
developed
• Common competencies needed in peace operations 
should be identified and training them should be 
standardized e.g. conducting threat analysis, reporting 
and procedures
• Advising and mentoring should be enhanced and 
coordinated between IPO and FPU, and also between 
military and civilian components
• Use different types of training, tailored according to 
mission, environment, and desired end-state
• Seize the advantages of blended learning
• Training in real-life context when appropriate -> 
push officers outside the classroom into informal 
training
• Focus on the tools for PoC according to different 
context or environment
• Evaluate the training, consider training results, 
lesson learned and good practice as well as providing 
feedback for the trainees
• Create an expert pool for LIVEX/role play
Issue Objective How to train
Use of force • Providing an understanding of the challen-
ges and dilemmas facing military and police 
personnel in the field, as well as best prac-
tices aimed at preventing further violence 
from escalation with a minimum use of force
• Providing a comprehensive understanding of 
the legal framework and guidelines related 
to use of force, strengthening individual 
peacekeepers’ knowledge on their rights 
and responsibilities related to protection of 
civilians from physical violence
• Legal training by providing different real-li-
fe case examples, and demonstrating the 
rights and responsibilities from a normative 
point of view 
• Dilemma training on PoC for all peacekee-
pers to be included in e.g. crisis manage-
ment courses, pre-deployment training, 
mission-specific training
Misconduct • Zero tolerance for SEA must have clear con-
sequences for individuals, leaders, units and 
sending nations
• Transparency in all incidents – in spite of 
risks to the credibility of the mission
• Coherence on the handling of the zero-to-
lerance
• Enhanced gender perspectives in training 
and education
• Pre-deployment training
• Leadership and policy programmes targe-
ting those TCCs that are more exposed and 
at risk, based on culture and proximity to 
the conflict zones
• Multi-cultural presence in areas at risk
• Mixed patrols
• Mentoring and in-the-field partnering 
between nations and cultures
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Table 2. Training architecture for the protection of civilians
Issue Ojective How to train
Understanding 
PoC threats 
• Training and education adapted to the 
various levels of a mission
• Enhanced research- and empiric-based kno-
wledge as a basis for training and education
• Focus on the tools of PoC according to the 
different context or environment
• Improved planning capacity
Fragmented 
approaches
• Establishing a common understanding of 
what “protection” means in the context 
of UN peacekeeping, and in the context of 
non-peacekeeping protection functions and 
actors, and how they can align to reinforce 
each other
• Clarifying the different roles and responsibi-
lities of all protection actors – civilian, police 
and military – within a UN peacekeeping 
operation, and how the work of each actor 






• Improve training and preparedness for civili-
an leadership in UN POs
• Establish training programs with comp-
rehensive and integrated curricula across 
mission components
• Develop horizontal SOPs
• In-mission training of senior leadership
• Increased use of mentoring – also on leader-
ship at operational and strategic levels




• Political programmes to be developed paral-
lel to mission plan;
• Increased utilization of strategic commu-
nication – and communication strategies 
targeting host nation audiences
• Strategic communication program should be 
developed to meet the needs on the ground
• Training for personnel in strategic communi-
cation should be increased
Managing 
legitimacy in 
the eyes of the 
host nation
• PoC strategies of the missions should be 
subject to communicative efforts through 
political and diplomatic channels towards 
the host nations’ various target audiences. 
This may provide a certain basis for measures 
taken along the PoC strategy
• Training could also include training of host 
nation personnel, based on a wider strategy 




• Supporting more effective protection plan-
ning by improving awareness of protection 
threats and civilian vulnerabilities, and by 
giving peacekeepers explanations of what 
has worked,
• and what has not
• Allowing access to data from other and 
past peace operations will help instructors 
and training centres as well as scholars and 
researchers in the pursuit of improving effe-
ctiveness of protection
• Training and curricula should be develo-
ped based on empirical data, research and 
factual information related to each specific 
mission. Again this supports the idea of 
using real life scenarios in the training
Job-specific 
considerations
• All branches to have PoC-related considera-
tions and relevant issues described as a basis 
for support to the missions’ PoC strategy
• Training based on the missions’ PoC strategy 
– would probably be the most effective way 
of tailoring and creating an understanding 
of how tailoring should be developed
Leadership • Providing an understanding of the challen-
ges and dilemmas facing military and civilian 
decision-makers in the field, as well as best 
practices aimed at preventing or responding 
to sexual violence
• Dilemma training on PoC for mission 
leadership to be included in e.g. crisis 
management courses, mentor training mis-
sion leadership, pre-deployment training, 
mission-specific training
Planning • Developing operational level planning tools 
for integrated missions – tailored to peace 
operations as they are – not as they should 
be
• Cross-functional training where planners 
make use of the same methodology and the 
same planning tools 
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COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO  
EXTERNAL CRISES
In the contemporary world the complexity of environment and the changing nature of 
conflicts challenge the effectiveness of peace operations as they have simply become more 
demanding. The growing violence against civilians and poverty, the increasing inequality 
between humans, the competition for natural resources, corruption and other challenges 
such as the poor governance of host countries and their capacity to re-build the society, are 
factors that deeply affect the way peace operations function today. The environments in 
which peace support activities take place are complex and multi-faceted. Therefore, they re-
quire responses that are themselves multi-faceted, taking into account the security, political, 
development, social, humanitarian, human rights and economic dimensions of crises.1 To 
enhance human security through security and development endeavours, solid coordination 
and cooperation among different actors becomes paramount. Although the different na-
tionalities, actors and organizations have their separate objectives, tasks and competences, 
a holistic approach, also referred to as Comprehensive Approach, is needed to reach the 
goals of the individual actors. The implementation of Comprehensive Approach requires 
the various civilian, military and police actors to acknowledge one another’s competences, 
and identify the combination of the full range of available capabilities and resources and use 
them in a coordinated and coherent manner. Despite the clear advantages of this Compre-
hensive Approach, its operationalization in the peace operations has shown to be difficult, 
with common challenges circulating around several questions: How do you get agreement 
on a same goal? How do you balance competing timelines? Who should be involved? What 
actions should a CA be applied to?
The 5th EAPTC Meeting audience discussed theoretical and practical considerations related 
to the implementation of the approach, and came up with a number of practical solutions 
on how the Comprehensive Approach could be better used as a tool in contemporary peace 
operations. 
Defining Comprehensive Approach
Nowadays, most national governments and international organizations that deal with secu-
rity challenges have at least a reference to ‘comprehensiveness’ in their crisis management 
operations in their policy documents. The rationale of including this reference relates to 
developing synergy, especially between military and civil interventions, acting on the root 
causes of conflict, coordinating the efforts of various actors involved and increasing cost-ef-
fectiveness in crisis management.2 
1 Keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
2 Rasmussen, C. V. (2013). Linking instruments in development and foreign policy- Comprehensive Approaches in the EU. Copenhagen: Diis 
Report.
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As a concept, Comprehensive Approach (CA) has been around for a while, and various 
definitions and practices have evolved in international and regional organizations and na-
tional governments due to the need to improve coordination, interaction or interoperability 
between different instruments and actors.3 From the point of view of international organiza-
tions, the development of the concept has been promoted by the UN family and is currently 
verbalized in UN  multidimensional peacekeeping UNSCR 20864 in the search for better 
linking security and development concerns; by NATO in the search for better interaction 
between its military efforts and endeavours in civil reconstruction; and by the EU need to 
enhance internal coherence among the different instruments and actors as outlined in Joint 
communication: EU Comprehensive approach to external crisis and conflicts.5 As outlined 
in the table of nuances in how the different organizations refer to the approach resembling 
their different needs and implementation strategies. NATO and the EU use the term Comp-
rehensive Approach, whereas in the UN system ‘Integrated Approach’ is applied. In fact, as a 
result of the EU Global Strategy, there has also been a shift in EU discourse, and since 2016 
it has increasingly started also to use the term ‘Integrated Approach’, emphasizing the need 
to address all dimensions and stages of a conflict, starting from early action and prevention 
6, and thereby also expanding the meaning and scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’.7
3 Mustonen, J. (2015). Good Practices of a Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. Finnish Centre of Expertise  in Comprehensive 
Crisis Management. [online], Available at: http://puolustusvoimat.fi/documents/1951249/2094941/FINCENT-Publication-2015-20162202.
pdf/b9dc3163-ab68-4e6c-978f-b1503f036121 [Accessed 13.7.2017].
4 (21 Jan. 2013). 
5 Norvanto, E. (2016). D1.3. Civil-Military synergies, IECEU (653371).
6 The different actions as outlined in the EU Global Strategy are; (1) develop a shared analysis; (2) define a common strategic vision; (3) focus 
on prevention; (4) mobilize the different strengths and capacities of the EU; (5) commit to the long term; (6) linking policies and internal and 
external action; (7) make better use of EU Delegations; (8) work in partnership. European Union. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A 
Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy.
7 European Union. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And 
Security Policy.
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In general, comprehensiveness in security refers to an understanding that peace and de-
velopment are fundamentally intertwined and that a wide spectrum of civil and military 
instruments are required to address the complex security environment in which crisis mana-
gement operations are conducted.8 The common denominator for the diversity in unders-
tanding the comprehensive approach is that it refers to a mind-set that recognizes a holis-
tic approach9. Some of the approaches entail the establishment of structures and processes 
for coordination, including pooled funding arrangements, and all the approaches involve 
cross-sector work. Hence, Comprehensive Approach in the context of peace operations can 
be understood as a general working method that focuses on results or effectiveness, and aims 
at promoting coherence among the institutions, instruments and policies to enhance human 
security by better achieving sustainable security and development.10
”Comprehensive Approaches”
UN EU NATO






nation across political, 
security, development, 




Narrow: Civil-military integration within 
crisis management missions and operation
Broad:  EU institutions and member states 
seeking to enhance coherence within the 
wide range of policies, instruments and 
actions for a more coherent and effective 
action upstream and beyond crises
Integrated Approach: Fostering human 
security through commitment to synergisti-
cally use all tools available in all stages of the 
conflict cycle while paying attention to all 
the different levels of EU action (from local, 
to national, regional and even global)
Comprehensive  
Approach:
Contribute to crisis 
management opera-
tions in a concerted 
effort, based on a 
shared sense of res-
ponsibility, openness 
and determination, 
taking into account 
all actors’ respective 
strengths, mandates 





A need to better link 
the security and deve-
lopment concerns
Comprehensive approach:
A need to enhance internal coherence 
among the different instruments and actors 
within EU
Integrated approach:
Need to expand the approach to conflicts 
and crisis beyond the security nexus deve-
lopment–
In search of better 
interaction between 
military efforts and 











Cooperation between the civilian and 
military missions/operations during planning 
and conduct
Broad: Coordination across EU policies and 
instruments on the ground
Integrated approach.
Ensuring a holistic, coherent and integrated 
response from the various EU institutions 
and instruments at all stages from early 
warning to post conflict development
Cooperation with 




learned,  planning & 
conduct,  cooperati-
on, public messaging
8 Rasmussen, C.V. (2013). Linking instruments in development and foreign policy- Comprehensive Approaches in the EU. Copenhagen: Diis 
Report.
9 Wendling, C. (2011). The Comprehensive Approach to Civil–Military Crisis Management, A Critical Analysis and Perspectives, (IRSEM 
Report), 13.
10 Ibid.
Table 3. Definitions of Comprehensive Approach 
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At its simplest, ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is based on the idea that a single actor or count-
ry does not have all the competences or resources needed to restore peace or manage and 
prevent crises and conflicts. Consequently, for the purpose of this publication we use the 
term ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to refer to coordination, cooperation, and communication 
among the different components (civil, police, military); coordination of different compart-
mentalized tools (diplomacy, defence, development) at different levels (political – strategic 
– field level) within one organization (e.g. UN and EU), but also between the different 
actors (e.g. between UN and AU); and between the international actors and local actors, for 
enhanced human security. 
Civil-military relations in peace operations 
All mission personnel should have a basic understanding of the important cont-
ribution of each component and its function within a mission. Everyone in 
a mission has an important contribution to make in achieving the comprehensive 
approach and the mission mandate.
There is a greater need for understanding the current challenges in a wider, yet more inter-
dependent context, whereas no single organization is capable of managing conflicts or crises 
solely in their own capacity. Therefore, there is a need for joint planning, coordination and 
cooperation between the different organizations, and for the inclusion of the host com-
munity throughout the activities that either ease the burden or avoid duplication of work. 
A central issue identified by the peace training community is fostering cross-sectoral 
collaboration, namely in terms of civilian-military relations. As witnessed in the previous 
chapters, there is a need for collaboration among civilian and military actors. Coordination 
and cooperation between civilian and military actors is perceived to be a most important 
factor for cohesive and effective conflict management in peace operations.11 Nevertheless, 
due to prejudices, different organizational cultures, procedures, and among others objecti-
ves, the collaboration between these actors has been everything but straightforward. In this 
chapter we will briefly discuss some of the aspects related to civil-military cooperation and 
coordination.
Complex relationship
Civil‐military relations vary in nature and depend on the scope of agreement on the ove-
rall goal of the interaction. Thus, the scope of the interface is context-specific and can take 
place at different levels and in different forms. Ensuring coherence in terms of limitation of 
contradictions and search for positive synergies between the multitude of civilian and mili-
tary components is not an easy task.  Due to the major shift from traditional peacekeeping 
environment to asymmetric conflict, the tasks and mandates of military and civilian actors 
11 For example, the need for cohesive cooperation is often described using the term “development-security nexus”, which refers to the difficulties 
faced when “promoting development without security, and vice versa”. Rye, O. G. (2011), Civil–military cooperation in crisis management in 
Africa: American and European Union policies compared. Journal of International Relations and Development. p. 333. p. 333–353. Italics 
original.
47
have both expanded from their traditional fields. The civilian actors, including humanitarian 
organizations and civil servants, have engaged in several peace building tasks ranging from 
provision of humanitarian aid to several security sector reforms and border management 
projects. At the same time, the military has adapted its activities into complex post-conflict 
settings thereby increasing interface with its civilian counterparts. As a result, civilian and 
military actors have often found themselves coexisting in the same conflict settings.12 For 
this reason, a growing number of policymakers and scholars recognize the urgent need for 
standards, guidelines, and best practices for civil-military relations in peace operations.13 
Civilian and military specialists share the goal of avoiding tensions and conflicting purposes 
and maximizing potential for cooperation in order to achieve more effective and timely 
peace-building interventions. For instance, a civilian organization might undertake huma-
nitarian or monitoring activities during the first stage of post-conflict management. The 
activities of humanitarian and military operations may affect each other at the strategic, 
operational and tactical level, and even, on some occasions, have a negative impact on each 
other. Consequently, the civil-military co-ordination has been recognized as a key issue in 
post-conflict management, both for its positive and negative attributes.14 
As a result, international organizations have created various concepts to describe the scope 
and depth of the interaction between civilian and military functions. Civil-military inte-
raction is a broad concept that is reflected through a number of specific doctrines, models 
and guidelines and policy approaches. The discourse for describing civil-military relations is 
enriched with different terms. Concepts have emerged based on the functionality and need 
of the specific organizations, ranging from UN-CMCoord, to CIMIC. Despite the varying 
definitions, two distinct elements can identified. These are civil-military coordination and 
civil-military cooperation.
Civil-military coordination and cooperation
As described by Holshek and de Coning, ‘civil-military coordination is an inherently stra-
tegic endeavour that is essentially about managing interaction among disparate players in-
volved in or peripheral to the peace process. It is also about the management of transition 
from conflict to peace and from military to civilian dominance of that process’15. As such, 
the civilian-military coordination is referred to a strategic-political level that sets the guide-
lines for the cooperation at the tactical level. Therefore, it is an essential feature in any peace 
operation as it has a central role in mission coordination - providing the framework for 
further dialogue between civilian, police and military contributors with respect to the politi-
cal, security and humanitarian dimensions. At best, it helps to achieve the politico-strategic 
objectives that were planned for the peace operation.16
12 Schroeder, U. C. (2011). The Organization of European Security- Internal and External Security in Transition. (Milton Park., New York: 
Routledge).
13 Tardy, T. (2015). CSDP in Action – What Contribution to International Security?” Chaillot Papers. No.134, p. 1-54.
14 Metcalfe, V., Haysom, S. and Gordon, S. (2012). Trends and challenges in humanitarian civil–military coordination- A review of the litera-
ture. (London: HPG Working Paper).
15 Holshek, C. and de Coning, C.  (2016). Civil-Military Coordination in Peace Operations. Peace Operations Training Institute, [online] ix. 
Available at: http://cdn.peaceopstraining.org/course_promos/civil_military_coordination/civil_military_coordination_english.pdf: [Accessed 
10.7.2017].
16 Holshek, C., Coning, C. (2016), p. 5, 13.
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On the other hand, civilian-military cooperation (CIMIC) mostly takes place at the tac-
tical, e.g. operational field level. Although the CIMIC concept is primarily concerned with 
coordination in a theatre of operations rather than an overall strategic concept of a complete 
institutional cooperation, CIMIC nevertheless represents an important operational compo-
nent of Civil-Military Coordination. At its simplest, CIMIC is a function and a capability 
that aims to enhance the relationship between a military force and a civil society. In a way, 
CIMIC is about ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the population in order to contribute 
to force protection and peace and stability. Thereby, CIMIC derives from the military pers-
pective that focuses primarily on force protection, and on the need to cooperate with local 
authorities and civilians to reach that aim, as a part of a complex military operation.17 In 
practice, CIMIC interaction usually takes place in two cases: a peace operation is partially 
dependent on civilian institutions and the population for resources, information and even 
security or/and secondly, there is cooperation between a military force and other interna-
tional or non-governmental organizations.18 The following table summarizes the different 
approaches to civil-military cooperation.
17 Khol, Radek. (2007). Civil-Military Coordination in EU Crisis Management. Conference Publication, 6th International Seminar on Security 
and Defence in the Mediterranean. Human Security, CIDOB, p. 122.
18 Malešič, M. (2015). Crisis Management in the EU: International Coordination and Civil-Military Cooperation. (Ljubliana: University of 
Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences), p. 12.
Approaches to “CIMIC”
UN EU NATO
Definition Military staff function, that 
contributes to facilitating the 
interface between milita-
ry-civilian components of an 
integrated mission, including 
humanitarian and deve-
lopment actors in order to 
support UN-led missions
Civil-Military Co-operation 
(CIMIC) is the coordination 
and co-operation at all levels 
- between military com-
ponents of EU-led military 
operations and civil actors 
external to the EU. This  
includes the local population 
and authorities, internatio-
nal, national and non-gover-
nmental organisations and 
agencies - in support of the 
achievement of the military 
mission along with all other 
military functions 
The coordination and co-ope-
ration between the NATO 
Commander and civil actors, 
including national population 
and local authorities, as well 





Narrow: To manage the 
operational and tactical inte-
raction between military and 
civilian actors in all phases of 
a peacekeeping operation; 
and to support creating an 
enabling environment for the 
implementation of the mis-
sion mandate by maximizing 
the comparative advantage 
of all actors operating in the 
mission area
Wider: Support to the peace 
process, facilitation of huma-
nitarian and development 
assistance, election assistance, 
human rights monitoring, 
protection of civilians, di-
sarmament, demobilization, 
repatriation, reinsertion, and 
reintegration) and security 
sector reform under a single 
over-arching management
• Civil-military liaison 
• Support to the civil envi-
ronment 
• Support to the military 
force 
• Civil-military liaison
• Support to the civil environ-
ment
• Support to the force
Table 4. UN, EU and NATO approaches to civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)
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Not only civil-military interaction
The use of the police component in peace opera-
tions is not new, as for example the UN has been 
deploying police officers since the 1960s. Howe-
ver, while traditionally the police component was 
mandated mainly to monitor, observe, or report, 
since the 1990s tasks have also involved adviso-
ry and training functions alongside the monito-
ring activities. This has enabled more cohesive 
cooperation between international and national 
police forces with other law enforcement agen-
cies.19 While military organizations and from 
the civilian side NGOs, such as humanitarian 
aid agencies, are usually seen as vital roles for 
securitizing and providing necessary needs, the 
police component also plays a critical role in 
establishing public safety, protection of civilians 
and preventing crime, as well as facilitating the 
implementation of the rule of law and human 
rights. In some cases, the post-conflict environment law enforcement and justice systems 
may be the first local authorities to be rebuilt in the society step by step.20 In such cases the 
civilian police component of the peacekeeping operation becomes an important contributor 
during the transition period.21
Coordination and local ownership
The implementation of a comprehensive approach is anything but easy, and it demands 
coordination between the different international actors, as well as the close involvement of 
the local authorities and promotion of local ownership.22 This is because the different actors 
often co-exist in the same region or are even part of the same peace operation. To avoid 
wasting resources or incurring fragmented approaches, collaboration must be based on a 
clear and shared understanding of priorities, and the willingness by all actors to contri-
bute towards the achievement of common objectives.23 In addition, the Meeting audience 
pointed out a number of other requirements which would enhance the implementation 
of the Comprehensive Approach. Among others, it requires a coordinated multilateral 
approach, that includes security or police reform activities, a strong commitment from the 
host nation law enforcement agencies and other relevant authorities (local ownership), as 
19 UN website (2017), UN Police, [online], Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/police.shtml. [Accessed 2.8.2017]. 
20 Typically the police stations, courthouses or prisons are destroyed following the conflict and legal documents are missing. Laws need to be 
promulgated and enforced with the consistency of international norms. See more: UN website, (2017), Rule of Law, [online], Available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ruleoflaw/. [Accessed 2.8.2017]. 
21 UN. (2002). UN Civilian Police Principles and Guidelines.[online], Available at:  https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/GLINES_UN_CIV-
POL_2000.pdf.
22 There is sometimes difficulty to identify the local peacebuilding agencies, without always knowing what “local” might be or entail, what it 
consists of and how it communicates. OECD. (2005). Security Sector Reform and Governance. DAC Guidelines and Reference series, DAC 
Reference document.
23 Based on keynote speech by Pekka Kokkonen – Considerations on a Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017
Measures to promote the police 
component as part of a  
comprehensive approach
• Integrated and coordinated security  
or police reform activities 
• A strong commitment from the host  
nation law enforcement agencies  
(local ownership) 
• A strategy to provide common vision  
and framework for security / police  
reform efforts 
• A process to mobilize shared objectives  
and provide a comprehensive response 
• A structure to ensure congruence and  
coordination between the mission,  
host nation and other relevant actors  
Presence in IDP camps, if assigned
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well as an efficient strategy to provide a common vision and framework for security or po-
lice reform efforts. It would also require a process to mobilize shared objectives and provide 
a comprehensive response within a clear structure to ensure congruence and coordination 
between the mission, host nation and other relevant actors.24 Overall, multilateral coopera-
tion is a central element for implementation, as it enables parties to understand each other’s 
capabilities, resources and objectives. However, the EAPTC Meeting audience also raised a 
number of concerns that in their view hamper the outcome of peace operations, such as a 
lack of local ownership and host nation-driven approach peace and security. 
Considerations related to the implementation of the  
Comprehensive Approach in peace operations
Despite the commonalities between the civilian, military and police actors serving in peace 
operations (in terms of the contributing countries involved, international organizations e.g. 
UN, EU, NATO, and the country of deployment), the cooperation is often challenged by 
the fact, that organizations may have overlapping, but diverse goals, different organizational 
and cultural values, lack of shared training and sharing educational experience or that they 
are using different lexicons.25 These aspects are further elaborated below. 
(1) Competing priorities
As discussed above, a Comprehensive Approach relies on the idea that everyone has a 
shared understanding of what the desired end state is, and how best to get there. Yet 
many peace support activities have inherent differences. For example, during the planning 
for the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo26, there was a constant struggle to balance the 
demands by those working on judicial reform to prioritize tackling impunity, particularly 
regarding senior political and security figures, and those working on security, who needed to 
rely on the stability brought about by such figures in order to advance the reform of security 
institutions. This conflict was also seen within the EU’s Aceh Monitoring Mission27, with 
frustrations arising over the restricted scope of the human rights element of the mandate, 
which was narrowly interpreted in order to better assure the engagement by the Government 
of Indonesia senior leadership in the process.28
24 Based on keynote speech by Pekka Kokkonen – Considerations on a Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017
25 Ross, K. G., Thornson C. A., Wisecarver M., Foldes, H., Roberts M., Schaab B., Peluso D. A. and Prevou, M. (2012). Development of a 
Competency Model for Civil–Military Teaming. U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences Research Report 1960.
26 The mission, launched in February 2008, assist and support Kosovo institutions in the basis of the rule of law, with a specific focus on the 
judiciary. The mission is a joint effort taking into consideration the local authorities (local ownership principle). The mission entails monito-
ring, mentoring and advising actions. See more: European Commission, (2017), The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, Service 
for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), [online], Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/showcases/civilian_mission_kosovo_en.htm. [Accessed 
8.7.2017].
27 The objective of the EU mission was to contribute to a peaceful and sustainable solution to the devastating conflict in Aceh. See more: EEAS, 
(2017), Aceh Monitoring Mission – AMM, [online], Available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/aceh-amm/
index_en.htm. [Accessed 6.7.2017].
28 Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
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(2) Lack of information sharing
Successful recovery from conflict requires the engagement of a broad range of actors, in-
cluding the national authorities and the local population. One fundamental issue of the 
Comprehensive Approach is the integration of activities undertaken by the peace operation 
to assist countries in making the transition from conflict to sustainable peace. One of the 
key enablers in peace operations is information sharing providing a common situational 
awareness to actors. Most often the lack of information sharing is due to cultural and 
national features; language, national interests or diversity in leadership style impacting the 
operation or mission both internally and internationally.
Communication and information sharing are prerequisite factors for effective peace 
operation. Civil and military organizations need to gather information from the field, con-
cerning both physical and human dimensions. In general communication refers to sharing 
information whether it is done in face-to-face meetings or through electronic means. If there 
is no reliable means of communication between civilian and military organizations, the mi-
nimum interaction needed will fail as critical information may not reach the right people. 
29 As a result, the communication fails to meet the conditions for building desired mutual 
trust, confidence, respect and basic coordination.30
(3) Separate planning processes
Planning is often done separately between key actors and personal prestige and self-in-
terest, for example, can prevent actors from approaching situations comprehensively – 
referring to both individual people, national governments, people in the local areas, NGOs, 
and the military. For example, in EU crisis management (CSDP) the civilian and military 
missions are planned and conducted mainly in separate structures. This has at times caused 
overlapping efforts and inefficiency in the use of resources. In EU missions, the chains of 
command for civilian and military missions and operations are likely to remain separate and 
distinct, and the challenge therefore is to develop effective coordination at all levels of com-
mand. Additionally, all too often the local actors are not involved in the planning of peace 
operations. In order to ensure the local ownership of the peace support and peace building 
efforts, as well as their appropriateness, more measures should be taken in order to involve 
local actors in the planning process.31
(4) Lack of clear exit strategy
Although in UN Multidimensional missions the chain of command between the different 
components is unified, one key issue related to planning activities on the ground is that 
the mission planning tends to lack clear goals and a related exit strategy. This has created 
uncertainty and challenges for personnel serving on missions, as well as for other actors on 
29 Based on the results of the “Military Working Group”, chaired by Major Adam Åkerfeldt, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
30 UNOCHA. (2008). UN Civil-military Coordination Officer Field Handbook, 66–86.
31 Based on the results of the “Research and Training Working Group”, chaired by Ms Kirsi Hyttinen, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
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the ground. The clarity of the preferred end-state often results in the staff having an unclear 
understanding of what the peace operation is ultimately about and its future role in the host 
country. 
(5) Coordination
This uncertainty is also reflected in the coordination of efforts, both between the mission 
components and different actors. There exists a tendency for actors to co-ordinate mostly 
with others who resemble themselves, such as military actors coordinating mostly with ot-
her military actors due to familiarity or similarity in their outlook and approach. On the 
other hand, additional challenges occur when there is no clear vision of who should lead 
during the co-operation or when there is a clear lack of funding and resources, which may 
lead some actors to co-ordinate things less. What is required, is an increased awareness of 
different timelines, outcomes, roles and responsibilities “Responsive capacity” rather 
than “Standing capacity”.
How to mitigate the key challenges
One fundamental issue of the Comprehensive Approach is the integration of activities un-
dertaken by the peace operations in order to assist countries to make the transition from the 
conflict period to sustainable peace. From the practical point of view, this means that every 
individual in a mission has an important contribution to make in achieving a unified 
Comprehensive Approach and on the other hand the mission’s mandate at the same time. 
As such, a purposeful and cohesive approach means, that each actor working in the peace 
operations should have a basic understanding of the main tasks and functions of the diffe-
rent components in a mission. 
The plethora of different actions that occur during support to peace processes also need to be 
recognised in the Comprehensive Approach (CA). These include information gathering, 
analysis, planning, programming, implementation, political dialogue, adapting, and 
lesson learning. They combine political, strategic, operational and tactical support. One of 
the biggest contributing factors to failure in SSR processes is implementers treating it as a 
purely technical undertaking, when in fact it is inherently political and requires a constant 
dialogue between those best placed for political dialogue and those with the technical un-
derstanding of the issues. Institutional processes, timelines, permissions and awareness may 
preclude a genuine CA in some of these processes, or between certain actors. So, the ques-
tion arises how to get the best solution mindful of the restrictions in place, in such a way 
as to improve the CA as and when possible as circumstances change.32 Bearing in mind 
what was discussed above, the next sections outlines the main suggestions of the military, 
civilian, and research working groups during the EAPTC Meeting. 
32 Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
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Balancing the competing timelines
When working with security actors, there is often a tension between the short-term, 
operationally driven goals of security capacity building, and the longer-term, 
governance focused goals of Security Sector Reform (SSR).33 A Comprehensive 
Approach can help in such cases. Given the threats that national security actors need 
to tackle, there is indeed often a need to improve their capacity quickly, for example to 
counter extremist threats. Yet the empirical evidence from recent years in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America underlines how doing this, without also focusing on building strong 
accountability mechanisms, can do significant harm further down the road, and contribute 
to greater overall insecurity. The different parts of governments or organizations working 
on training and education and governance are not always culturally or operationally 
aligned, and this must also be addressed.34
Actors need to be realistic regarding the time it takes to plan and work together. For ins-
tance, Sweden is currently pioneering a four-agency approach to supporting juvenile justice 
reform in Albania. This involves the Swedish police, the national courts administration, the 
prosecution agency, and the prison and probation service. This is a very positive example 
of a Comprehensive Approach being applied to the programme cycle, and one that takes 
into account good practice principles in supporting security and justice reform, but also 
one that highlights how much additional time is required to go through the different stages: 
the process is already entering its second year of planning, and this is with agencies that are 
already within the same national institutions. In more unstable environments, where the 
international community generally operates in a very crowded space, and where a Compre-
hensive Approach would be most beneficial, the luxury of time is rarely there, reducing the 
capacity for different organizations to bring together their ideas to discuss and be open to 
change in their plans.35
Joint mission planning 
The diversity of security and development related challenges requires a wide range of policy 
tools and responses, both civilian and military. The net effect is that planning tends to inhi-
bit a peace operations’ operational effectiveness. It was discussed during the EAPTC Mee-
ting, that the different organizations (e.g. NATO, UN, EU, AU) have different planning 
processes and capabilities, which reflect the scope and nature of the challenges related to the 
conduct of the operations. For example, for EU institutions the planning aspect is difficult. 
Nevertheless, as the empirical evidence has shown, many of the issues seem to be cross-cut-
ting for all the international security providers. Member states have different self-interests, as 
do other intervening nations and the host nation that requires help. The political scene can 
be as complex and fractious as the security situation on the ground. Among other intra-ins-
titutional challenges, the different components (be they civilian, military, humanitarian, 
political, or the police) have their own sets of principles, mindsets, procedures and budgets, 
and a low level of interoperability and cross-sectoral efficiencies. 
33 The term Security Sector Reform describes the security system, that involves key actors, their roles and responsibilities in terms of managing 
and operating for the benefit of the host nation, in a manner that it is more consistent with democratic norms and principles of good governance. 
(OECD. (2005). Security Sector Reform and Governance. DAC Guidelines and Reference series, DAC Reference document.)
34 Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
35 Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
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Cooperation and information sharing
During the EAPTC Meeting discussions it was also raised that, despite working on the same 
problems and being in the same country, different teams and sectors have been restricted 
from accessing information from the intelligence agency of the military. The shortage of 
shared databases and hybrid platforms built specifically for sharing information has 
prevented complete coordination and co-operation between civilians and military se-
gments. Most organizations have their own closed information technology systems with 
limitations on access by other actors, as the informational needs are different even when 
the topic may remain the same. Also, the system of intelligence gathering is often far more 
sophisticated by the military, and designed for the specific military purposes. In contrast, 
civilian organizations are highly dependent on open sources of information. 
To increase the effectiveness of cooperation, the officers responsible for the cooperation and 
coordination between civilian-military components need to understand the military and 
humanitarian issues which may arise in the planning process.36 Experience has shown that 
in order to maintain the high standing of peace operations, intelligence gathering needs to 
be controlled and conducted in a way that it meets the expected purposes of the operation.37 
Therefore, information needs to be shared with the most critical organizations in the field; 
primarily this will mean the military organization but information must be shared with eve-
ry key organization in the field as well. As such, it is essential to clarify and identify all needs, 
and then provide the necessary information, including all networks and all actors. Providing 
a clear and reliable vision will help to create trust between the actors fostering cooperation. 
Furthermore, it is critical that information sharing is executed flexibly at all stages, from 
lateral to vertical, cutting through political levels to the operational level. For instance, the 
current challenges in EU-UN peace operations remain mostly at the political level, especial-
ly for joint strategic planning, the division of labour, joint reviews and coordination of exit 
strategies to mention few areas.38
As a whole, the lack of shared tools for joint action and shared planning remain current 
challenges and harm the success of peace operations. What is required, is to have appropriate 
tools to analyse the enablers for the Comprehensive Approach. Consequently, joint unders-
tanding of the Comprehensive Approach would benefit from sharing lessons in action 
as well as field experiences from the national perspective. 
Better coordinated information sharing can prevent harm or at least reduce consequences. 
Such an environment requires common platforms and common understanding without 
forgetting the right mindset for information sharing. Even though information sharing tools 
still need to be developed, there have been improvements between NGOs and military orga-
nizations in the past years as it is one vital tool especially in a complex world where borders 
become more blurred alongside with new emerging forms of terrorism and organized crime. 
Increased strategic level coordination is recommended to facilitate information sharing 
with other international actors on the ground. 
36 UNOCHA. (2008). UN Civil-military Coordination Officer Field Handbook.
37 See for example: NATO. (2017). Lessons learned in peacekeeping operations. NATO review. [online], Available at: http://www.nato.int/
docu/peacekeeping_lessons/peacekeeping-lessons-eng.pdf. [Accessed 28.7.2017].
38 European Parliament. (2015). EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management. EU Briefing paper, November 2015. [online], 
Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572783/EPRS_BRI(2015)572783_EN.pdf  [Accessed 28.7.2017].
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Furthermore, it was highlighted, that there seems to be a clear need for dialogue between 
training centres and the field so that there is a constant diffusion of freshly gained expertise 
and knowledge from the field to training. What was also discussed among the EAPTC Mee-
ting audience, was that information sharing should be continued during the operation itself 
without stopping at the planning phase and combined panels between key actors should be 
created for cohesive sharing of information.39
Alumni network
Beyond the previous discussions, it was also raised in EAPTC Meeting that, the alumni 
network allows continuity in sharing societal and professional capital, just like the comp-
rehensive platforms for communication help to avoid knowledge overflow. The alumni 
network could allow the handover of information in an easier and more convenient manner 
at the same time enhancing the continuity of providing skilled personnel for work in the 
field. Sharing information can be further improved by comprehensive platforms, which 
would eliminate the overflow of knowledge and information. Joint mobile training teams 
and institutions in turn would create the opportunity for different countries to be prepared 
for upcoming missions.40
Towards effective training system
A systematic and well-structured training system is the key enabler for successful peace 
operations. While it can be argued that there is still some overlapping in the training provi-
ded, both training and education can offer the development of a common mindset of what 
a Comprehensive Approach is in peace operations and how it can be applied in a cohesive 
manner. What is required, is more systematic education on raising the awareness of the di-
verse aspects that individuals face in peace operations; diverse cultural backgrounds, exper-
tise, or experience from the field, for example.
Therefore, a versatile training system for peace operations would enhance the capacity 
for actors to work safe in complex conflict environments; produce the adequate capaci-
ty to work with local authorities and civil bodies; as well as other international actors. 
At best, training activities would also propose the range of needs that individual require to 
fulfil the mandate adequately. This section discusses the EAPTC findings on how a harmo-
nized and structured training system, joint mission training and cohesive training at the 
strategic level can respond purposefully to peace operations.
Harmonizing structured training
The current training system would profit from standardized structures among all sectors 
and units. As contemporary peace operations are often deployed jointly, with organizations 
39 Based on the results of the “Military Working Group”, chaired by Major Adam Åkerfeldt, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
40 Ibid.
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in zones around the world, there is also an increasing need for the standardization of termi-
nology and concepts. The standardization of terminology and concepts would allow better 
coordination and mutual understanding between countries involved and lead to better si-
tuation awareness of the personnel on missions. 
Joint mission training
The structure of the training provided should also be relevant and time efficient for the 
participants. The objectives and goals of the training should be clear and shared among all 
sectors so that people can work towards a common target and mission. Harmonization 
and the importance of joint training policies could allow quality training structures that 
include joint mobile training for exercises, leadership training, in-mission training, without 
forgetting pre-deployment training for all sectors involved. Joint training and practice in the 
pre-deployment stage would enable participants to demonstrate a positive attitude to those 
going on operations because they would actively be networking and learning more about 
the roles of their colleagues. 
Multiprofessional expertise
The complexity of environments is driven by the increasing number of regional intra-sta-
te-conflicts, often becoming internationalized, prolonged, or even more deadly.41 The rea-
sons behind this are driven by a mix of factors42 requiring a mix of tools. In such conditions, 
peace operations require high degrees of professionalism and expertise in the field. Develo-
ping expertise and improving the level of professional expertise is highly beneficial for future 
peace operations. For instance, during the seminar the military working group brought up 
the idea that training with a mix of participants allows participants to share visions and 
experiences, and provides a diverse working environment between sectors. This is beneficial 
when dealing with complex situations where the diversity of the background can ease the 
work. Additionally, the capital of experience and acquired expertise from several missions 
helps to “pass on lessons” and share knowledge as professional instructors can provide the 
proper training and education for the peace operation personnel.43 
Research on pedagogy
In recent years there has been an emerging need to better understand the best way to train 
individuals, and to combine civil and military training and how the training provided can 
be evaluated effectively. It can be argued, that well-trained and educated personnel improve 
the best practices in the field, and enhance the cost effectiveness and impact of operations. 
41 UN website. (2014). New Challenges and Priorities for UN Peacekeeping United Nations Under Secretary General Hervé Ladsous. The 
Brookings Institution, 17 June 2014. [online], Available at:  http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/HL-remarks-brookings.pdf. [Ac-
cessed 1.8.2017].
42 These states are often considered as failing or incapable states, flamed up with the ethnic quarrels, organized crime or terrorism, and filled up 
with humanitarian and health crises. (Ibid.)
43 Based on the results of the “Military Working Group”, chaired by Major Adam Åkerfeldt, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
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For such purposes, the use of pedagogic tools is directly linked to teaching and learning 
quality. Thus, while teachers do not teach in the same way and neither do students learn in 
the same way, teaching styles have either positive or negative impacts on how education and 
training is processed by students. While there are a wide range of education and training 
methods available for traditional class-room teaching including scenarios, and simulations 
and including modern training technologies, such as mobile-based learning, there is howe-
ver an increasing need to understand how the research in pedagogy and adopting a more 
holistic approach to training and education methods could improve teaching. Furthermore, 
it is important to understand the best ways to combine different training methods. 
Best practices from training exercises
Although, as the previous discussions demonstrate, much can be done for the better coor-
dination and cooperation from the Comprehensive Approach perspective, there are already 
available a wide range of training courses that target the current challenges in peace ope-
rations and many national military and civilian crisis management organizations provide 
a multiple range of courses aiming at strengthening the idea behind the Comprehensive 
Approach. This is also the aim of Finnish International Training Centre (FINCENT), which 
provides a wide range of courses annually, all related to improving cohesion and cooperation 
in peace operations.
Practical suggestions
At first it should be remembered that the Comprehensive Approach is a means to an 
end, not an end unto itself. A common framework for engagement can be developed from 
a shared understanding and commitment to best practice principles in terms of: national 
ownership; doing no harm; relevant support based on an in-depth understanding of the 
context, actors and their relationships; human rights based approaches; gender equality; and 
the political nature of peace support.44
It is not possible to develop a set methodology to achieve a Comprehensive Approach, 
given the uniqueness of different contexts in terms of actors, roles, threats, goals, national 
capacities, and other factors. However, much progress can be achieved through building the 
evidence base on what works across all the different. Furthermore, this should focus on how 
to create a flexible Comprehensive Approach, based on an iterative method that would also 
create space for different agencies and institutions to come on board at their own pace and 
build strong, solid foundations. However, this does require a commitment by the relevant 
actors to take risks, and to put in the resources to monitor progress, as well as to ensure the 
continuity of the personnel deployed to maintain relationships, to learn from the lessons 
gathered, and to invest the time required.45 The following table summarizes the discussion 
related to the Comprehensive Approach.
44 Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
45 Ibid.
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46 Based on keynote speech by Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach; “Research and Training Working Group”, chaired by Ms Kirsi 
Hyttinen, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
Issue Objective
Policies • Creating enabling policies to support a CA in the field, including taking an iterative 
approach whereby plans can be adjusted to take into account the growing awareness 
of other actors and approaches to support the development of peace. 
• Harmonization and importance of joint training policies
Information sharing • Shared approaches to information analysis, risk management, developing indicators 
(including ones that move from short-term outputs by actors working in those roles, 
to longer-term outcomes and impacts enabled by others). 
• Joint assessment missions
• Field experiences from the national perspective
Training • Joint pre-mission training, involving the right people (those deploying or already on 
the ground). Lessons could be learned from the First German Netherlands Corps and 
Dutch MFA Exercise
• Improved communication training
• In-mission training
• Professional teachers
• A mix of participants
• Standardization of terminology (common understanding)
• Time efficient courses
• Shared objectives and goals
• Understanding roles and responsibilities
• Standardized structures
• Harmonization of joint training policies
• Research on pedagogy
• Using alumni networks
• Joint mobile training and institutions
Joint exercises • Common effort: designed to further understanding of the multiple dimensions and 
complexities of present-day crisis situations and (joint) operations, by exchanging 
multi-actor, civil and military, perspectives in intensive interaction.
• Viking exercise
Capacities • Use of standing capacities that can reinforce different international actors. ISSAT is an 
example of this within the field of security and justice reform.
Table 6. Suggestions based on EAPTC seminar discussions46
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WAY FORWARD
We live in a world of problems that are so complex — so tangled up with other problems, 
so non- linear, ambiguous, and volatile — that they defy solutions and cannot be effectively 
addressed by any single organization or even by any one sector. In addressing these complex 
situations, both the root causes and causes of instability, be they political, ethnic, social, or 
economic, must be addressed. Hence, when looking at specific countries in conflict, interna-
tional actors should be able to collaborate with other foreign actors, choosing among them 
the most appropriate mix of diplomatic, economic, security and development instruments 
for the situation. In addition, human security needs to be at the centre of all planned ac-
tions, be it the provision of protection from violence or building a protective environment. 
The host state’s capacity to provide protection must be fostered concurrently. To address the 
challenges of the current uncertain, volatile and complex environment, there is an increased 
need to develop and adapt agile, innovative and multilateral solutions to prevent, manage 
and solve conflicts world-wide. The international peace training community can be the key 
vehicle in promoting the performance needed to enhance the effectiveness of peace endea-
vours. 
The 5th EAPTC Meeting demonstrated the importance of platforms that bring together 
policy-makers, practitioners, researchers and educators from different disciplines to discuss 
and innovate training solutions for enhanced peace and security. Each year, the EAPTC 
community has grown bigger. The added value of the EAPTC community is that it seeks 
to advance the exchange of ideas, expertise in the field of peace operations, and progressive 
methods of training and education, and welcomes any interested expert or organization –be 
it military, police or civilian – to get involved and contribute. Sustainable peace is a too big 
of a challenge to be solved solely by one nation, organization or tool.
Recommendations to training & education approach
Based on the 3-day discussions and results put forward by working groups during the 5th 
EAPTC Meeting, the following recommendations can be drawn to enhance the performan-
ce of peacekeepers and civilian personnel in peace operations.
Ethics
• More effort must be put into the provision of context specific training that seeks to 
describe and explain the historical and cultural dynamics of the conflict in question, 
as well as the political, social and economic aspects of the host country.
• Training leaders in the fundamentals of ethical behaviour should be emphasised. 
Training programmes should be designed for mission leadership in line with the 
Comprehensive Approach for integrated missions.
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• The context the training takes place in is instrumental to the usefulness of the trai-
ning during operations; this could be helped by using simulations. This supports 
the use of real-life scenarios rather than artificial scenarios – real life situations could 
therefore be considered as a basis for training for peace operations.
• Consequently, if we are to teach ethics, we need to be able to define what its funda-
mentals are and how to measure this in terms of job performance. Military ethics 
in training programmes could be integrated in a variety of topics, across the entire 
range of different types of training for peace ops.
• Another aspect of teaching ethics, is to present personnel with typical ethical dilem-
mas other personnel will be facing: military personnel will face entirely different di-
lemmas than humanitarians – but the underlying considerations may be the same.
Protection of civilians
• Standardized and mandatory training. 
 º Standardization to include general peacekeeping and crisis management cour-
ses, pre-deployment training, mission tailored training, in mission training, 
and task specific training. 
 º Joint training including military and civilian personnel (pre-deployment trai-
ning and in-mission area-training) and exercises (e.g. VIKING, CAX, field 
exercises) should be promoted. 
 º Post-mission analysis and lessons identified from past-missions to be integrated 
into new training programmes. 
 º Exchange of experienced PoC trainers (mobile training teams), exchange of 
manuals and course materials, enhanced partnering among the different count-
ries and training institutions.
• Identify concrete training needs related to POC in each mission.
• Make use of planning tools and approaches to planning known to most audiences.
• Create a doctrinal baseline for approaches to protection from physical violence.
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Comprehensive approach / Cross cutting issues
• Build a culture of communication between the sectors and create effective knowled-
ge management mechanisms
• Harmonization and importance of joint training policies
• Shared vision and prevention
• Tools to analyse the enablers and impediments
• Consider the use of mobile training and education teams in the operations
Proposals for an EAPTC development and strategy
Current statutes of EAPTC consist of purpose, goals and objectives, in addition to criteria 
for membership. Access to communication between members can be further described and 
could need a simple mechanism for communication between the annual conferences. The 
EAPTC network has existed for 5 years – and has reportedly demonstrated steady progress 
in the time elapsed. It seems there has been an increase in participation, among all inte-
rest-audiences. This has potential for reaching out to communities and building a network 
of competence. With its current loose structure, increased volume may also call for carving 
out a direction, content and short-term objectives to maintain a unity of purpose and to 
ensure the effectiveness of the efforts and resources spent during annual conferences – and 
between meetings. Hence, it is advised to consider mechanisms for a balance between the 
need for a flexible and non-formal structure on the one hand, and a way of providing di-
rection, priorities, planning horizons and maintaining a clear sense of purpose within the 
association on the other.
Each annual meeting is chaired by a volunteer host, who provides the venue, facilitates par-
ticipation, and organizes the meeting secretariat and the planning for the event. A host for a 
prior annual meeting is expected to provide advice for the upcoming host. The advice should 
also include considerations related to topics, views and expectations on the way forward 
from this years ‘participants, possible continued discourse, follow-up by certain organisa-
tions or members, and on overarching trends that would be of interest to the membership 
communities. 
A concrete proposal from FINCENT and the expert team behind the 5th EAPTC Meeting 
in this regards should therefore be sent to DCAF, and could be posted on the EAPTC web-
site to maintain transparency for members and adherence to the statutes. These proposals 
could be forwarded to the next host, and included in the planning for next year’s EAPTC, 
with copy to the interest community.
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Suggested points for development: 
1. Every annual conference should assign an amount of time at the beginning 
and towards the end of the conference to allow for participants to consider 
the programme, contents and contributions against the backdrop of the sta-
tutes. During the conference, a programme committee could prepare a final 
sequence to review possible amendments. Statutes should be reviewed during 
the annual conference. 
2. Establish an executive board with the purpose to maintain consistency and 
continuity in activities and development between the annual conferences. The 
board is to exercise oversight over the association and its purpose related to 
overarching goals, and should provide strategy and direction in line with the 
purpose of the association. The board should also maintain dialogue with the 
board of the IAPTC and other relevant actors in the international community.
3. The outgoing host should provide an overview of those organisations and bo-
dies who were present during the conference. This would help maintain and 
build on achievements and outcomes of each conference and further cultivate 
development over several meetings.
4. Publications and products from the annual conference should be published 
under an “EAPTC Co-brand” in addition to that of the host, to help maintain 
purpose and utility of the association.
5. In line with the above, a simple communication plan should be developed and 
approved by the annual conference. 
6. It should be considered whether each conference should advise on the contents 
of the forthcoming conferences, e.g. the 2017 publication could include a 
section with suggested topics for the next years - without obliging a coming 
host, but at the same time ensuring a strategic approach in the interest of the 
communities involved. This would be within what is already suggested in the 




The 5th EAPTC Meeting, organized by the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (FINCENT), 2 -4 
May, 2017, Santahamina, Helsinki, Finland
Keynote speech from Colonel Michael Uhrig on Ethicality in Military Peacekeeping, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 
2017.
Keynote speech of Giovanni Pietro Barbano on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Police component, 
5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
Keynote speech from Colonel Petter Lindqvist on Protection of Civilians – Considerations to Military compo-
nent, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
Keynote speech from Colonel Claus Amos on Protection of Civilians – considerations to Training and Educati-
on, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
Keynote speech from Pekka Kokkonen– Considerations to Police component, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 2017.
Keynote speech from Victoria Walker – Considerations on Comprehensive Approach, 5th EAPTC Meeting, 
2017.
Working group work chaired by Colonel Michael Uhrig on ethics in Peacekeeping – Considerations to Milita-
ry component.
Working group work chaired by SUPT Olavi Kujanpää on ethics in peacekeeping- Considerations to Police 
component
Working group work chaired by Doctor Janne Aalto on ethics in Peacekeeping – Considerations to Civilian 
component.
Working group work chaired by Professor Reijo E. Heinonen on ethics in Peacekeeping – Considerations to 
Training and Education.
Working group work chaired by Colonel Petter Lindqvist, on Protection of Civilians- Considerations to Mili-
tary component.
Working group work chaired by Colonel Claus Amon on Protection of Civilians- Considerations to Training 
and Education.
Working group work chaired by  Brigadier Giovanni Pietro Barbano on Protection of Civilians – Considera-
tions to Police component.
Working group work chaired by Ambassador Pia Stejnvall on Protection of Civilians - Considerations to 
Civilian component.
Working group work chaired by Major Adam Åkerfeldt on Comprehensive Approach - Considerations to 
Military component.
Working group work chaired by SUPT Pekka Kokkonen, on Comprehensive Approach - Considerations to 
Police component.
Working group work chaired by Ms Victoria Walker on Comprehensive Approach - Considerations to Civilian 
component.
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Introduction: Gaming for Peace (GAP) Project 
Gaming for Peace (GAP) was launched in September 2016. GAP is an EU H2020 Fra-
mework Programme for Research and Innovation project. The main goal of the project is 
to develop a curriculum in relevant ‘soft skills’ (cooperation, communication, gender and 
cultural awareness) for personnel from diverse organisations working in the field of conflict 
prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations. This curriculum will be embedded 
in a serious online role-playing game, renewed and updated by returning personnel playing 
the game. GAP fills a gap in training and offers an efficient and inexpensive way of delivering 
universal and standardized training in these skills.
The requirements to effectively operate and partake in conflict and post-conflict situations 
for preventive measures and peacebuilding, demands the best expertise and individual 
skills in adapting to fraught and complex environments. Although the personnel involved 
in conflict prevention and peace building (CPPB) generally have ‘traditional based skills’, 
(e.g. intelligence, investigation, weapons handling etc.), soft skills such as communication, 
cooperation, negotiation, mediation, gender and cultural awareness are less well emphasised. 
The GAP project proposes to fill this recognised training gap in peacekeeping; embedding 
a base curriculum of soft skills that facilitates coordination and relationship building in 
an environment of organisational, gender and cultural diversity. The ability to foresee and 
surmount social, cultural, or historical barriers necessitates the most up-to date training 
for peacekeeping. Gaming for Peace represents an innovative technique for the training 
of personnel involved in peace operations and requires further expert input as the project 
continues.
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The CPPB training landscape
Twenty-first century peacekeeping has evolved into a multifaceted and complex process. 
Immersion into the CPPB world requires in-depth knowledge of the practices of peacekee-
ping in diverse contexts and on a variety of distinct levels. The first phase of research in the 
GAP project therefore focused on assessing the often-complicated nature of current training 
methods in CPPB and determining areas for improvement. [The full report will be available 
publicly on the project website (www.gap-project.eu) December 2017.] It incorporates an 
evaluation of CPPB in terms of EU development, concepts and training approaches in a 
European context; the UN approach to crisis management and peacekeeping; worldwide 
approaches to training, looking at the OSCE (Organisation of Security Cooperation in Eu-
rope), the African Union (AU), ASEAN (Association of South Eastern Asian Nations) and 
other trends in CPPB training.
With the growth of peacekeeping, there has also been growth in international organisations 
and joint UN missions, especially between the UN, EU and AU. In the evaluation of CPPB 
training approaches, there are many similar approaches to training from these organisations, 
but there are also significant differences in training assessments and requirements and from 
classroom-based teaching and seminars to simulations, role playing, online learning and 
e-learning. There have been various attempts at the standardisation of approaches but with 
limited success. In addition, there can be many phases to peacekeeping training. While there 
is a level of interconnectivity between the UN and other international organisations, in par-
ticular the EU in terms of CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) missions, the lack 
of coordination and standardisation in pre-deployment training has limited the potential 
impact of practical cooperation in the field. These problems result chiefly from differences 
in the organisational culture, practice and procedures of the EU and UN at both policy and 
operational level.1 Recognising these deficiencies, the recent document on strengthening 
the UN-EU strategic partnership on peacekeeping and crisis management facilitated the 
linking of the EU ‘Goalkeeper’ and ‘Schoolmaster’ platform to recruitment and training 
of civilian personnel in addition to uploading information on UN training opportunities. 
The statement also calls for a move toward a tri-lateral training partnership with the AU in 
terms of supporting indigenous training and capacity building, including police and civilian 
components.2
Given that there are around 300 centres, colleges, institutions and academies worldwide 
providing training for personnel involved in peace operations or crisis management opera-
tions (over 100 of these training providers are in Europe alone), finding common ground 
between these facilities is a daunting task. Naturally, with different rules of engagement and 
different training backgrounds, involvement in peacekeeping operations requires a whole 
range of skills and effective training needs to incorporate specialised skills, including soft 
skills. Most approaches in the EU, U.S. or Asian training centres do account for courses on 
gender and culture, for instance, but this is not consistently applied and in-depth knowledge 
of these subjects is both undersupplied and inadequate. 
1 European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), EU-UN Cooperation in Peacekeeping and Crisis Management Briefing (2015):9
2 EEAS, (European External Action Service). Strengthening the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peacekeeping and Crisis Management: Priorities 
2015-2018 (2015): 5
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The Evolution of E-Learning and Online Training
As online training has gained momentum in recent years and is less classroom-based, several 
core topics in the training of personnel for peacekeeping have yet to be developed. More 
needs to be done in terms of reform to training procedures at all levels and developing a 
coherent curriculum for online learning. The evolution in the field of distance education 
and distributed learning increased rapidly after the development of Computer Support-
ed Collaborative Learning (CSCL)3. Online learning includes sets of learning applications, 
web resources, web-based applications and new collaboration technologies. Moreover, new 
hybrid approaches regarding online learning activities are increasing. Ideally, the online lear-
ning components are combined or blended with face-to-face instruction to provide more 
learning outcomes.4 Even with the opportunities that technology can provide, researchers 
have seen the implementation of a technology-supported collaborative learning environme-
nt as a challenge.5 
The Soft Skills Approach in CPPB
While soft skills in particular, are not easily discernible in peace operations, there are certain 
models and assessments of soft skills available that can be ascertained for the GAP project. 
For instance, the cornerstone to peacebuilding is building relationships and the element 
of trust is clearly important in that endeavour. Trust, like empathy, communication and 
negotiation can be considered a soft skill. In training for missions, organisations need to 
give soft skills prominence. This includes areas such as negotiation techniques, mediation 
and stress management, particularly to improve the chances of success in any mission. Soft 
skills, can be interpreted and adapted for scenarios that will fit into the design of game. 
What is certain, is that the concept of soft skills is a recent phenomenon and not universally 
well-known; attempts to define the concept have encompassed such phrases as “emotional 
intelligence,” “individual skills”, “emotional competencies”, “soft aptitudes” and the “soft 
side of work.” There is no consensus on, or a universally accepted, list of soft skills. While 
there is a need for greater demarcation, within this constraint Matteson et al have provided 
the following examples;6
3 Charalambos, V., Michalinos, Z. Chamberlain, R. 2004. The Design of Online Learning Communities: Critical Issues. Educational Media 
International. ISSN 1469-5790 online © 2004 International Council for Educational Media.
4 Means, et al. 2009. Evaluation of Evidence-Based Practices in Online Learning: A Meta-Analysis and Review of Online Learning Studies. 
Available at: www.ed.gov/about/officewww.ed.gov/about/offices/list/opepd/ppss/reports.html
5 Zhang, D., Zhao, J. L., Zhou, L., & Nunamaker Jr., J. F. 2004. Can e-learning replace classroom learning? Communications of the ACM , 
45 (5), 75-79.
6. See Matteson, M. L., Anderson, Lorien & Boyden, Cynthia. 2015. ‘Soft Skills’: A Phrase in Search of Meaning’. Portal: Libraries and the 
Academy, 16 (1), pp. 71-88.
7 Trevithick, P. 2005. Social work skills: A practice handbook (2nd ed.). Maidenhead: Open University Press. p.81
• Sociability; 
• Self-management;
• Communication skills; 
• Ethics; 
• Diversity sensitivity; 
• Teamwork skills;
• Problem-solving or critical thinking abili-
ties;




Soft skills are the personal attributes that allow one person to successfully relate to another. 
In terms of empathy, Trevithick states that ‘empathy involves trying to understand, as care-
fully and sensitively as possible the nature of another person’s experience, their own unique 
point of view and what meaning this conveys for that individual.’7 It is a key inter-personnel 
skill, a vital component of emotional intelligence and an important soft skill. It aids our abi-
lity to understand others by being able to put ourselves in their shoes but also supports and 
fosters a sense of teamwork and shared goals. For emotional intelligence, Salvoey and Mayer 
first explained emotional intelligence as a form of social intelligence which involves a per-
son’s ability to monitor not only their own but others’ emotions, to distinguish among them 
and to use that information to inform responses and actions.8 The 2014 Hanover Research 
examined best practice in measuring soft skills, such as teamwork, creativity, and character, 
with a focus on soft skill assessment embedded into the core academic curriculum being key. 
Serious Games and CPPB
As a result of the popularity of gaming, professional trainers, educators and managers have 
sought to utilise the prevalence of gaming by bringing gaming into the training room and 
classrooms. Serious games (SR) are games for learning, educating, and developing new skills. 
It is argued that digital games, including simulations and virtual worlds, have the poten-
tial to be an important teaching tool because they are interactive, engaging and immersive 
activities.9 The applicability of gaming for soft skills training is gaining ground especially 
given the capacity of gaming to support reflective learning, self-efficacy and reflection on 
performance. Yet these critical elements require central components of the game design to 
feature learning outcomes that are recognizable and measurable as well as feedback on per-
formance and opportunities for reflection. Substantive literature, research and scholarship 
have pointed overwhelmingly in favour of gaming as an educational tool.10 However, several 
studies have pointed to a dearth of evidence regarding the design and delivery of gaming as 
a method for training in soft skills. 
Gaming can be distinguished from traditional learning because games by their nature are 
designed to measure progress since learning is happening and is captured in the gaming 
experience itself.11 An important aspect of any education tool is the ability evaluate outco-
mes and obtain feedback, to self-reflect and build on the feedback. Gaming is particularly 
well suited to such self-reflection and critical learning. Within this mechanism, learning soft 
skills avoids a linear approach and extends into a more complex lesson learning process. A 
key study carried out as part of the GaLA: The European Network of Excellence on Serious 
Gaming (FP7: ICT) demonstrated a number of structural, organizational and individual 
barriers to utilizing gaming for soft skills training. The report highlights some of the pro-
8 Salovey,  P., &  Mayer,  J. D.  1990.  Emotional intelligence Imagination, Cognition and Personality, Baywood Publishing Company., 
Inc. 9, pp.185–211.
9 Ulicsak, M. & Wright, M. 2010. ‘Games in Education. Serious Games. A FutureLab Literature Review. See also Gee, J.P., 2005. ‘What would 
a state of the art instructional video game look like?’ Journal of online education. Smith, R, 2007. ‘Game impact theory: The five forces that are 
driving the adoption of game technologies within multiple established industries. Games and Society Yearbook.
10 Pivec, M, and Dziabenko, O. 2004. Game-Based Learning in Universities and Lifelong Learning: “UniGame: Social Skills and Knowledge Trai-
ning” Game Concept, Journal of Universal Computer Science, (1) 14-26
11 See GLASSlab. 2012. ‘Groundbreaking Video Game Design Lab will Research and Develop Video Games to Engage Students and Measure 
Learning.’ Computer Weekly News 12 July 2012: 985
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grammes which may be helpful in arena of soft skills: Minecraft: Education Edition, Use 
Your Brainz Edu, Gamelearn and Merchants all of which encompass a variety of game lear-
ning techniques. A further well-known example is Food Force, the first serious game develo-
ped by the United Nations. By focusing on the potential of gaming to contribute to the key 
soft skills debates, GAP research has revealed that the utilisation of this methodology offers 
up new horizons in terms of equity of access and supporting learning through experience. 
Serious gaming is a developing area with significant research starting to emerge that helps to 
underpin the need for strong pedagogical frameworks in terms of learning outcomes, feed-
back and reflective learning. This aspect does not detract from the gaming element but ser-
ves as an important reminder that learning methods remain paramount. Existing approaches 
to soft skills training are embedded in pedagogical design, delivery and implementation as 
well as monitoring and evaluation of that training. 
Stakeholders have a key role in planning and designing soft skills curricula  
and game development
The selected key stakeholders and initially identified end users are playing a crucial role in 
the development of curricula and GAP game focusing on soft skills. Almost 200 interviews 
of peacekeeping experts (military, police, civilians) have been conducted thus far in the 
project from several EU countries. The interviewees were selected based on their individual 
experience during peacekeeping missions and operations, with a special emphasis on soft 
skills (communication, interaction, trust building, risk and stress management, gender and 
sexuality) and training needs. All the interviews have been analysed using qualitative met-
hods with the GAP methodology set by Trinity College Dublin and all academic partners. 
Beyond the interviews, end user stakeholder panels will be facilitated in Finland, Poland, 
Portugal, Ireland and UK. Based on the analysed research data, scenarios focusing on skills, 
competences and behaviours will be developed by the GAP consortium and stakeholders 
throughout 2017. As an example, based on the research conducted in GAP, communication 
has been identified as essential in peacekeeping missions by military experts. At the meta-le-
vel, communication is identified in multiple ways, such as via language, or the use of an 
interpreter, in meetings, by using various communication channels, facilitating official and 
unofficial discussions, as well as physical presence in the field. The ability to communicate 
effectively can make a difference in avoiding future conflicts and risks. In a peacekeeping 
operation, an expert may communicate with multiple organisations, civil servants, local 
authorities and the local population.12 
12 GAP Stakeholder Consultation Report, 2017 (not published). The consortium working on this GAP project includes Trinity College Dublin, 
Laurea University of Applied Sciences, Kennedy Institute for Conflict Intervention Maynooth University, EnquiryA, Haunted Planet Studios, 
Upskill Enterprise, Ulster University, Future Analytics Consulting, and end-users including Fincent, Ministry of Interior Portugal, Police Service 
Northern Ireland, Bulgarian Defence Institute, National Defence University Poland, Irish Defence Forces and the Police Academy Poland. 
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Conclusion
Given that peacekeeping has grown into a multidimensional phenomenon, enhancing the 
training of peacekeepers in soft skills is paramount. Capability gaps in peacekeeping opera-
tions have been a feature of modern peacekeeping missions. However, operating effectively 
in UN and EU missions requires the best expertise and skills available and organisations in-
volved in crisis management need to have the right mix of capabilities in terms of personnel, 
operations and equipment. Just as the EU is taking steps to strengthen its training initiatives, 
the UN is also bringing preventive diplomacy to the fore. Implementing training reforms to 
advance the effectiveness of training must be a priority. Moreover, the development of GAP 
can go a significant way to improving and advancing current training approaches in the field 
of CPPB. Visit www.gap-project.eu for more information on developments in GAP and 
information about our upcoming conference and other consultative activities. 
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ENHANCING PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS  
IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS
AUTHOR: 
Colonel Lindqvist, Petter HF, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
Introduction
In contemporary UN peace operations, protection of civilians involves the entire spectrum 
of actors, from NGOs, humanitarian communities, agencies engaged within rule of law, on 
the political level, and the military force. POC is therefore a shared responsibility of several 
actors both within and outside the UN’s structure. The orchestration of efforts requires abi-
lity to conduct multi-annual planning, coordinating resources and assets along the various 
lines of effort in each mission.  The ability to protect civilians from threats of physical vi-
olence is however a pre-requisite for other actors to play their role. As long as the host nation 
fails its primary responsibility to protect its own population, the military force becomes the 
UN´s most important tool to protect civilians from violence. 
In a UN peace operation, planning must consequently include all substantial actors involved 
in POC. The mission analysis will include all aspects related to the particular mission’s POC 
tasks, ranging from the specific mandate, to policies, strategies, guidelines and concepts. 
The development of courses of action focuses on how the military component can utilize its 
assets in response to specific threats within this framework.
Human security
Protecting civilians from violence is all about creating human security. Human security, as 
defined by the UN General Assembly, contains: “the right of people to live in freedom and 
dignity, free from poverty and despair. All individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are 
entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy 
all their rights and fully develop their human potential” (UN General Assembly 2012, 1). 
The dilemma of creating human security through the use of force requires a thorough un-
derstanding of how and when to use it. Understanding when not to use military force, is 
equally important.
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Two key questions are essential to understand how one can utilize force to protect 
civilians from violence;
1. What is the potential role and utility of military force to protect civilians? 
Military leaders and the leadership of a mission must understand what the 
military component can and cannot do to protect in different situations.
2. How can military force be more targeted towards protection in particular si-
tuations? Military leaders and the mission leadership must understand which 
courses of action will reduce the threat to civilians most effectively, and oppo-
site; which courses of action may inadvertently increase the threat to civilians.  
Different situations will require different approaches. Understanding the threats remains key 
to answer the questions above. A set of generic scenarios describing fundamentally different 
types of threats to civilians seeks to capture the full range of threats a UN mission can be 
expected to protect civilians from. 
Scenarios describing the range of POC-threats
The following eight POC scenarios systematize the complexity of violence against civili-
ans by breaking it down into generic categories. This categorization is meant to facilitate 
systematic analysis of perpetrator behavior and strategies to inform POC planning, POC 
responses, and POC monitoring and evaluation within a whole-of-mission UN approach. 
The scenarios have been drawn up using five parameters that describe the characteristics of 
violent perpetrators: (i) actor type, (ii) rationale for attacking civilians, (iii) strategies and 
tactics used, (iv)relevant military capabilities to attack civilians, and (v) the expected outco-
me in terms of human suffering, if the perpetrators succeed. 
Mob violence. Individuals or mobs committing criminal acts for personal gain, revenge or 
political influence. Few killed, but possibly extensive material damage to property and gene-
ral perception of insecurity. Examples: Liberia (´04, ´05, ´09, ´11, ´15), Ivory Coast (´04), 
Sierra Leone (´00, ´02).
Post Conflict Revenge. Individuals or mobs involved in tit-for-tat score-settling through 
criminal acts of violence such as murder, arson, kidnapping, looting to avenge past crimes 
on a personal basis. Few killed, but groups associated with previous perpetrators may flee 
following relatively little violence. Examples: Kosovo (post-´99), Iraq (post-´03).
Insurgency. Rebel groups (with political or ideological objectives) using selective and in-
discriminate violence such as threats, targeted killings, bombings etc to control populations 
upon which they depend and undermine trust in their rivals. Fewer killed and injured than 
many other scenarios, most due to indiscriminate weapons; gradual displacement from areas 
of heavy fighting. Examples: Mali (´13-´15), DRC (´12-´13), South-Sudan (´12-´13).
Predatory Violence. Rebel groups coercing civilians into compliance through plunder, ta-
xation, forced recruitment, opportunistic rape, brutality against ”easy targets” in order to 
survive or to simply make a profit. Temporary, but large-scale displacement in affected areas, 
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disproportionate to the number of actually attacked; many abductions, especially of young 
adolescents. Example: DRC (´99-´15).
Communal conflict. Whole communities engaged in continuous cycles of violence, dri-
ven by a combination of revenge and self-protection through massacres, abductions, raids, 
destruction fo homes and means of survival. Relatively high number people killed and 
abducted on both sides, especially womed and children; livelihoods stolen or destroyed. 
Examples: Mali (the Tuareg vs. Fulani), South-Sudan (the Lou-Nuer vs. Murle), Abyei (Mis-
seria vs. Ngok Dinka), DRC (Hema vs Lendu)
Government repression. Authoritarian regimes or de facto authorities in the area repres-
sing populations through selective and indiscriminate violence, threats, detention, rape as 
terror, destruction, occasional massacres with the aim of controlling groups perceived to be 
affiliated with the opposition. Mostly combatant deaths, gradual increase in civilian deaths 
due to heavy weapons and in accordance with intensity of fighting, large-scale displace-
ment, wide-spread destruction of population centers. Examples: Ivory Coast (´10-´11), Sy-
ria (´12-present).
Ethnic cleansing. States, or the military superior actor forcing targeted groups to leave 
through threats, highly visible killings, brutality, mass-rape, destruction of property, in order 
to have that particular group expelled from a specific territory. Only a few percent killed, but 
the vast majority of the targeted population expelled. Examples: Bosnia (´92-´95), Central 
African Republic (´14).
Genocide. States, or the military superior actor destroying the existence of a group through 
several, simultaneous mass-killings, deportation camps, systematic rape to prevent repro-
duction, all with the goal of radicalizing that specific group. The majority of members of the 
targeted group killed in relatively short time.
These scenarios are only generic descriptions of what perpetrators of violence may do. In 
many armed conflicts, perpetrators display more than one strategic rationale for attacking 
civilians. Also, their rationales can vary across time and space. This mosaic of rationales can 
cause confusion to those aiming to protect civilians in a certain geographical area. Future 
conflicts may also see other types of scenarios emerge. For example, it is still unclear whether 
and how UN peace operations may provide protection against violent extremism (such as 
ISIS and Boko Haram). 
Understanding the threats as a means to protect 
Civilians are more at risk than soldiers in modern conflicts. This grim fact explains why 
more than half of the ongoing UN peace operations being mandated with explicit tasks to 
protect civilians – and authorized to do so by using all ”necessary means” including lethal 
force. Not only UN peace operations are battling with how to protect civilians from threats 
of physical violence. The international community´s military intervention in Libya in 2011 
was with the sole purpose of protecting the civilian population from being attacked by the 
Ghadaffi regime. 
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Civilian suffering in conflict is not merely a result of so-called collateral damage; uintended 
harm to affected populations as a result of military operations with a goal of defeating other 
military actors. On the contrary: violence against civilians is mostly a part of a perpetrators 
strategy; intended and with a purpose. (Slim, 2008.) 
The types of perpetrators range from state actors, paramilitaries, rebel groups, insurgents, to 
criminal networks, mobs and even tribes and communities. The differences are huge, also 
in terms of goals and weaponry. The one thing these actors have in common, is the use of 
violence against civilians as a means to reach their objectives. (Beadle, 2014.)  
Capabilities and strategies to attack civilians vary greatly from those to attack a military 
opponent.  Consequently, the type of violence may also vary largely: from massacres, rape 
and sexual violence to abductions, displacement and dispersion. The suffering of civilians 
in conflict is more often than not because one or more of the belligerent parties wants it to 
happen, regardless of what international law on armed conflict and international laws on 
human rights. 
To be able to protect civilians from physical violence, one must therefore understand the 
threats. Who are those committing atrocities, why are perpetrators abducting, maiming 
children, raping and molesting innocent, and torturing and killing those who are protected 
by international conventions? Finding the rationale of a perpetrator, provides a way to utilize 
military force to protect civilians against physical violence.
A vital point when applying military force to protect, is to avoid causing more harm to the 
civilians than in the first place. Taking up presence in an area where insurgents are trying 
to gain control, may put the civilians in this area at higher risk when and if own troops are 
pulling out,  because civilians will be ”punished” for being affiliated with government or 
intervening forces. Fighting an insurgency and at the same time being mandated to protect 
civilians, may therefore be extremely difficult.
If a force is destroying crops by using Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) to patrol and 
safeguard a community under threat by rebel forces, poor harvest and lack of food may pose 
a larger threat on the longer term, by causing displacement, malnutrition, to mention few.
Why do perpetrators attack civilians?
The principle of do no harm is essential when considering how to provide protection for ci-
vilians under threat of physical violence.  A perpetrator may not be a clearly identifiable and 
uniformed actor. In some cases, whole communities engage in cycles of violence, driven by 
a combination of revenge and self-protection. Disarming one part in a communal conflict, 
often recognized by a relative balance of means to attack, may turn into a far more violent 
and potentially more deadly scenario for those left without means to protect themselves. 
To military intervening forces, protecting civilians from violence is not equal to neutralizing 
a threat actor, eradicating a rebel group or defeating a belligerent along the logic as one apply 
when fighting an enemy or opposing force. Some threat actors will simply avoid confronting 
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a military force. They may not have the means to engage, and more importantly, fighting a 
military intervening force does not serve their goals. Other perpetrators, in the case of being 
organized military forces, may escalate the conflict  if being strategically challenged, causing 
more harm to civilians, also those not directly affected in the first place. This is not to say 
that state actors should be stopped in their misdoings. The point is to be able to find effec-
tive ways of reducing the threat to civilians under threat. To some perpetrators, this actually 
means to defeat and destroy their ability to attack civilians. To others, it will more effective 
affecting the motivation to attack civilians, as exposure of being held accountable for war 
crimes or crimes against humanity may run counter to their strategic goals. 
Understanding why perpetrators attack civilians is hence key to find effective ways to pro-
tect. In many armed conflicts, perpetrators display more than one strategic rationale for 
attacking civilians. Their rationales can also vary across time and space. This can cause con-
fusion to those aiming to protect civilians in a certain geographical area. Creating a buffer 
zone between tribes involved in a communal conflict may be an effective way of reducing 
the threat on both sides. In other areas, buffer zones of separation may generate more deadly 
scenarios if one of the sides is left with options of attacking other accessible groups affiliated 
with or sympathising with the actual opponent. Future conflicts may also see other types of 
scenarios emerge. For example, it is still unclear whether and how UN peace operations may 
provide protection against violent extremism (such as ISIS and Boko Haram).
Planning for the protection of civilians
Planning for POC is about the relationship between perpetrators and those threatened. Pro-
tection is achieved by affecting the intention and capabilities of a threat actor. Although own 
forces must prepare to defend themselves against perpetrators of violence against civilians, 
the key goal of military protection is to match the perpetrators ability to threaten civilians. 
This will vary with the rationale and the strategies of the perpetrators.
In some cases a passive approach to protection may be the only option. When UN troops 
have offered safe-havens to civilians fleeing from their attackers, international criticism has 
been lashed against peacekeepers for being risk avert and impotent. Without the tools to 
make assessments as to how protection can effectively be conducted – the faults are just as 
much systemic as related to unwillingness among troop contributors. 
Concentrating solely on passive protection of civilians does however not adress the real 
problem. In the case of South-Sudan, with UNMISS having been prone to protect a small 
part of the suffering population by making the five IDP camps the centre of the attention 
of around 12 000 troops – the threat against civilians is left more or less totally unadressed, 
with the inevitable result of a hopeless spiral of more troops required to protect more IDPs 
as the atrocities continue. Seeing a population or a group ghettoized in IDP camps may just 
as well be considered a demographic victory by those dispersing a population, as it is seen by 
others as a convenient political way of providing humanitarian assistance and a safe haven 
(Slim, 2008).
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Even increased effectivenes in conducting basic tasks of a military component will have 
deterring effects on a perpetrator who attack civilians – and so it will have improving effects 
on POC.  Perceptions become reality through strategic communication. Ability to convey 
messages reflecting the capacity and ability of a military force will have immediate effects 
on targets audiences aiming at attacking civilians. Strat comm is the extention of the body 
language of the intervening force.  Activities and actions that create a perception of security, 
deterrence of threats, and amelioration of intolerable conditions and containment of threats 
– will inevitabely resonate in audiences well beyond the presence of those units. This is how 
strategic communication can enhance efforts and thus should be closely linked to – and 
create synergies in POC.
Conclusion
Protection of civilians is a task for the full spectrum of capabilities – military and non-mi-
litary. However, protection from threats of physical violence is a military/police task, and 
only they can do it. Protection from physical violence is also a pre-condition for other means 
of protection. In other words, if the military efforts to protect from physical violence fails, 
other efforts are likely to fail too. POC is an outcome, not an activity. That is also why POC 
becomes an element of all operations and activities. In cases where the host nation is a part 
of the threat to its own population, POC becomes a challenge that first and foremost must 
be handled at the political level, and not left for the military component to become a sca-
pe-goat.The use of force is one key factor dividing opinions on how peacekeeping should 
evolve. The Force Intervention Brigade of MONUSCO has brought this discussion to pra-
gmatic questions about how the military and police units should should resolve their tasks 
in operations where the traditional approach of peacekeeping is by far outdated and where 
the expectations of both local communities, international community as well as within the 
communities of troop contributing countries are creating fundamental dilemmas for those 
who are set to command international operations with blue helmets.  By applying analytical 
and robust tools of planning and developing a thorough understanding of the threats to 
civilians, missions can achieve a lot within their existing capabilities. Protection of civilians 
from physical violence can be enhanced considerably – not raising questions about more or 
less use of force – but how to utilize force – based on knowledge and awareness.
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Introduction: Effectiveness in operational conflict prevention
This contribution presents an analytical approach to evaluating ‘effectiveness’ in operational 
conflict prevention specifically with regard to the European Union’s missions and opera-
tions. First, it emphasises the importance of considering the intervener (EU) as well as the 
target (conflict) and the aspect of the mission/operation examined in this paper (operational 
conflict prevention). Second, it proposes that ’effectiveness’ must include not only what mis-
sions/operations achieve, but also the ways in which they seek to achieve what they do. This 
establishes the relative importance of means and ends in these endeavours; in other words, 
appraising not only whether the intervener did the right thing, but also whether it did thin-
gs the right way. Thus, ‘effectiveness’ should encompas efficiency as well as effect, and the 
input, output and outcomes in operational conflict prevention should all be considered. To 
summarise, effectiveness is when a mission/operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate 
manner when seen from the perspective of the intervener as well as the conflict in which it 
intervenes (at least in part) to prevent (further) violent conflict. 
A two-pronged approach to understanding effectiveness 
Based on the above, it is important to combine perspectives which are (1) internal and 
(2) external to the EU. The internal perspective examines the extent to which missions/
operations succeed according to the EU’s politico-strategic goals and key operational ob-
jectives. This goes further to examine whether their implementation went well according 
to the Union’s plans, procedures and principles. In other words, the internal perspective 
assesses the EU on its own merits. That is, whether it achieved what it set out to do in the 
1 The starting point for this contribution is the notion of ‘success’ that featured in: Annemarie Peen Rodt, 2014. The European Union and Milita-
ry Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success (London: Routledge). Based on that work, this piece defines ‘effectiveness’ in 
operational conflict prevention. A previous version of this paper is published as part of the IECEU project, 2015. Deliverable 1.4. Success Factors 
and Indicators. The project ‘Improving Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention’ received funding from the European Union’s 
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the author’s view. 
The European Commission is not responsible for it or any use that may be made of the information it contains.
80
way that it set out to do so. This perspective acknowledges the internal EU context and its 
constraints and assesses performance against what was possible rather than what would have 
been ideal. The external perspective appraises missions/operations according to the overall 
purpose of conflict prevention. That is, to prevent (further) violent conflict. It considers 
the effectiveness of short-term EU missions/operations with regard to medium-term peace 
building and long-term stability. The external perspective limits its assessment to what can 
reasonably be expected of operational conflict prevention. Likewise, it examines the ways in 
which missions/operations seek to prevent (more) violent conflict and determines whether 
such prevention efforts were proportional to the challenge at hand.
Internal effectiveness: success for the EU?
In order to qualify as an overall success a mission/operation must be internally effective. Two 
key criteria determine whether the main objectives of an EU mission/operation are succes-
sfully achieved and whether the way in which these were (sought) achieved is appropriate 
– from the intervener’s perspective. These two internal effectiveness criteria are (1) internal 
goal attainment and (2) internal appropriateness. 
Internal goal attainment in EU missions and operations
Missions/operations are goal orientated in nature. Their success is typically thought of in 
terms of fulfilling their mandated objectives. EU missions/operations must, thus, be ana-
lyzed according to whether they achieve their intended purpose and the tasks they set out 
to do. To this end, the first effectiveness criterion is internal goal attainment. The indicators 
hereof reflect the key objectives and overall mandate of each individual mission/operation. 
As there may be significant differences between the politico-strategic goals and operational 
objectives of a mission/operation, both must be considered. Likewise, missions/operations 
pursue multiple goals, which may change over time, often making goal attainment a matter 
of degree. Examining internal goal attainment must reflect these nuances and take such 
developments into account, so as to apparaise and allow for operational flexibility, which 
may well be an appropriate response to a changing context. Furthermore, as all goals are not 
equally important to the intervener, evaluating their achievement evenly would be mislea-
ding. It is, therefore, necessary in analytical terms to rank politico-strategic and operational 
objectives to identity the EU’s main goals in each mission/operation to then determine 
whether it successfully obtained its raison d’etre as defined by the Union itself. Internal goal 
attainment is a necessary first condition for overall effectiveness in any mission/operation 
– after all if the EU is not achieving what it set out to do in these endeavours, which are 
often risky and costly in the broad sense of both terms, the Union is unlikely to continue (to 
launch) such efforts and thereby increase its effectiveness in operational conflict prevention.2
2 Baldwin, David A., 2000. Success and Failure in Foreign Policy, Annual Review of Political Science, 3, pp. 167-182; Pushkina, Darya, June 
2006. A Receipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission. International Peacekeeping, 13(2). pp. 133-149; Ross, Mark 
Howard and Rothman, Jay, 1999. Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorising Success and Failure. Palgrave: Basingstoke.
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Internal appropriateness in EU missions and operations
Complementing internal goal attainment with an internal appropriateness criterion allows 
the evaluation of whether the way in which each mission/operation was implemented was 
appropriate, seen from the point of view of the intervener. Internal appropriateness consi-
ders both whether a mission/operation is implemented well on the ground and from the 
Headquarters perspective. Timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness are three key indicators 
of internal appropriateness.
Timeliness refers to early warning as well as early action. It includes efficient decision-ma-
king, budgeting, planning and preparation as well as the generation, training and deplo-
yment of personnel and hardware, as mandates, and mission and operation plans are agreed 
and implemented. In order for a mission/operation to implement its mandate in an ap-
propriate manner in the field, it is essential that it is deployed without significant delay. 
However, timeliness includes not only the arrival of the first sets of boots on the ground, 
but also the timely and otherwise efficient implementation of the mandate. An effective 
mission/operation should implement its mandate as quickly and efficiently as possible wi-
thout compromising its effect.3 Likewise, it should withdraw when its mission has been 
accomplished.
In order to achieve full internal appropriateness, a final concern is that the costs of a mission/ 
operation do not outweigh its benefits for the intervener. Evaluating any policy based on its 
achievements without taking into account its cost is, as Baldwin has suggested with regard 
to Foreign Policy Analysis, like assessing a business solely in terms of its sales disregarding 
its expenses.4 Costs are crucial when assessing implementation from an internal perspective. 
It is important to remember that although the financial burden of EU military operations 
is primarily covered by contributing Member States, the internal appropriateness of these 
operations (like that of the civilian missions) must be evaluated from the perspective of the 
Union as a whole. Moreover, costs are political as well as material. Cost-effectiveness must, 
thus, include the political costs for the EU. 
External effectiveness: success in conflict prevention?
In order to assess the extent to which an EU mission/operation was effective overall, ob-
servers must also consider whether and how the target conflict and country benefitted (or 
not) from the intervention. In other words, whether the aim of the operational conflict 
prevention was achieved: A successful mission/operation must help prevent (further) violent 
conflict, but only by proportional preventative means. Accordingly, the external perspective 
on effectiveness first assesses whether a mission/operation contributed in a meaningful way 
to the prevention of (further) violent conflict, and then examines whether the ways in which 
it sought to do this were appropriate measures of prevention. To this end, two external effe-
ctiveness criteria (1) external goal attainment and (2) external appropriateness are presented 
below.
3 Diehl, Paul F., 1994. International Peacekeeping. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.33-61.
4 Baldwin, David A., 2000. Success and Failure in Foreign Policy, Annual Review of Political Science, 3, pp. 167-182.
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External goal attainment in EU missions and operations
Violence is never a given. It is neither a constant nor necessarily a logical linear next stage 
of conflicts, which may indeed move back and forth between violence and non-violence. If 
a conflict does become (more) violent, however, there are five different processes by which 
this may take place: namely, through initiation, continuation, diffusion, escalation and/or 
intensification of violent conflict. Initiation is when a conflict turns violent in the first ins-
tance. This may be more or less likely, but it is never a sure thing. Continuation is when 
the violent aspect of a conflict continues over time, which may occur over shorter or longer 
periods, sometimes with non-violent ‘interruptions’. Diffusion is a process by which violent 
conflict in one geographic area directly or indirectly generates violent conflict in another 
area. It can take place within or across state borders. Escalation occurs when new actors 
become involved in an existing conflict. Such actors may be neighbouring states, ethnic kin, 
diaspora or others who become actively involved in the violent conflict. Intensification refers 
to a process by which the violence itself increases; and can include both an increase in the 
number and nature of violent incidents, albeit only those directly related to the conflict in 
question should be included in the assessment of operational conflict prevention. Although 
these are five conceptually distinct processes, initiation/continuation, diffusion, escalation 
and/or intensification of violence may well occur simultaneously.5
To fulfil the external goal attainment criterion, a mission/operation must have a positive 
and sustainable impact on the (potentially) violent conflict on the ground.6 This might 
seem an obvious criterion for success, but it is all too often bypassed or misinterpreted when 
missions/operations of this nature are evaluated. Goal attainment from an external conflict 
prevention perspective is not necessarily achieved by a mission/operation, which merely ful-
fils its mandate. However, it is also not necessary – nor desirable – that all underlying issues 
(root causes) related to the conflict are resolved by the mission/operation.7 EU missions/ope-
rations are often undertaken in the hope that they might help bring about the peaceful reso-
lution of a conflict, but this has never been their primary purpose. Conflict prevention must 
not be confused with conflict resolution. There is a significant difference between successful 
conflict prevention (particularly of the operational kind) and successful conflict resolution. 
This distinction is imperative in order not to confuse the responsibilities of EU personnel 
and decision-makers with that of others involved in the conflict or indeed its resolution. In 
the end, it is adversaries, not international interveners, who must resolve their conflicts.8 The 
primary purpose of operational conflict prevention is to prevent (further) violent conflict and 
in this way help to bring about conditions under which the parties involved can resolve the 
conflict themselves. The external goal attainment criterion has been developed to help assess 
5 Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, 2007. Transnational Dimensions of Civil War. Journal of Peace Research, 44, pp. 293-309; Lobell, Steven E. and 
Mauceri, Philip, 2004. Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.1-10.
6 Stedman, S. J. 2001. “Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers”, IPA Policy Paper Series 
on Peace Implementation, New York; Reimann, C. (2004): “Assessing the State-of-the-Art in Conflict Transformation” in Austin, A., Fischer M. 
and Roperts, N. (eds.): Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook, Springer VS; Bercovitch, J. and Simpson, L. (2010): “Inter-
national Mediation and the Question of Failed Peace Agreements: Improving Conflict Management and Implementation”, Peace & Change, 
35:1, pp. 68-103.
7 Johansen, Robert, C., 1994. UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success? Mershon International Studies Review, 38(2), pp. 307-310; 
Reagan, Patrick M., 1996. Conditions of Successful Third Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40(2), 
pp. 336-359.
8 Johansen, Robert, C., 1994. UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success? Mershon International Studies Review, 38(2), pp. 307-310; 
Wolff, Stefan, 2006. Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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whether a given mission/operation is effective in this regard in the specific context in which 
it engages. The indicators of external goal attainment are therefore whether, if this has not 
already taken place, there is an initiation of violent conflict or if the violent conflict is already 
underway whether it continues, diffuses, escalates and/or intensifies. 
EU missions/operations only rarely seek to prevent (more) violence through their own pre-
sence – either directly through containment or indirectly through deterrence. More often, 
they subscribe to theories of change, which propose that peace and stability will result from 
gradual changes in the society, security sector, distribution of power, etc., which they seek 
to bring about through external intervention. Either way, it is important to recognise that 
change can be negative as well as positive – and at times continuity may be the best possible 
outcome. Regardless, EU missions/operations must be assessed according to the extent to 
which they make a meaningful, positive and sustainable contribution to preventing (further) 
violence.  
EU missions/operations are usually part of wider efforts to prevent or even resolve the con-
flict(s) in question. The external goal attainment criterion must, thus, consider the EU mis-
sion/operation in light of these broader efforts – by the Union and other actors involved. 
Does it make a meaningful contribution to the EU’s comprehensive approach towards the 
conflict country or region? Does it facilitate successful cooperation and coordination with 
international, regional, national or local actors involved in preventing (further) violent con-
flict? Does it strengthen peacebuilding, stabilization and/or security sector reform in the 
country? Whether civilian or military – a EU mission/operation is only effective in terms 
of its external goal attainment, when it fulfils its potential role within this wider conflict 
prevention process and contributes meaningfully to it. That is, through a positive and sus-
tainable impact (however small) with regards to preventing (more) violent conflict. 
External appropriateness in EU missions and operations
The final effectiveness criterion is one, which has been much neglected in the analysis of EU 
missions/operations; namely, external appropriateness. Appropriateness assesses the ways 
in which a mission/operation seeks to achieve its purpose. Where internal appropriateness 
evaluates operational effectiveness according to internal indicators (timeliness, efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness), external appropriateness evaluates the implementation of a mission/
operation according to a set of standards focused on appropriateness in operational conflict 
prevention, because as Lund points out, ‘misapplied preventive efforts, even if timely, may 
be worse than taking no action at all.’9
The external appropriateness criterion takes as its starting point that an intervention must 
do good – and more good than harm. This is equally important for civilian and military 
deployments.10 Proportionality should govern any type of external intervention, including 
preventive measures and non-coercive as well as coercive tools. Foreign interventions, which 
9 Lund, M. S. (2009): “Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice” in Bercovitch, J., Kremenyuk, V. and Zartman, I. W. 
(eds.): The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, SAGE, London.
10 Guthrie, Charles and Quinlan, Michael, 2007. Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare. London: Bloomsbury.
84
are inherently intrusive and limiting to both national sovereignty and local ownership, must 
always be proportional to the challenge at hand.11 Therefore, the concept of necessity, which 
condemns unnecessary interventions or measures as illegitimate must be considered in any 
deliberation concerning the external appropriateness of operational conflict prevention.12 
Operational conflict prevention requires that analyses take these principles beyond the batt-
lefield, where they are traditionally applied, and assess any impact – intended or not – on 
the lives and wellbeing of populations in areas where the EU engages as well the impact on 
its own personnel and any (potential) adversaries to its missions/operations. Because if an 
actor such as the EU engages in coercive measures – of any kind – for any purpose – it is 
important to scrutinize its actions according to widely accepted principles governing the 
legitimate use of force, whether that force be violent or not. As the focus of this enquiry 
is on operational conflict prevention by both civilian and military means, it is important 
that these principles are applied to a wider spectrum of interventions, e.g. different types of 
missions and operations as well as a broader concept of ‘coercion’, not necessarily physical, 
violent or lethal. With regard to physical force, which is rare but sometimes mandated in 
EU mission/operations, this criterion scrutinises the appropriateness of it use as well as the 
non-use thereof. 
External appropriateness in operational conflict prevention is best understood as ‘propor-
tional prevention’, which assesses whether more good than harm is done as well as ensuring 
that what is done is done by proportionate means of power and persuasion to facilitate 
the effective prevention of (more) violent conflict. External appropriateness is closely lin-
ked to external goal attainment in the sense that it explores whether the contribution that 
a mission/operation makes is meaningful (positive and sustainable) enough to justify the 
measures (necessary and sufficient) taken to make that contribution. A question that this 
comparison raises is whether – and if so when – it becomes inappropriate to do too little – in 
particular as one response may delay or even exclude another possibly more appropriate one. 
In other words, external appropriateness also addresses whether the mission/operation was 
the most appropriate response to the challenge at hand.
Conclusion
This contribution proposed effectiveness in operational conflict prevention is when a mis-
sion/operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner, seen from the perspective 
of the intervener as well as the conflict in which it intervenes to prevent (further) violent 
conflict. This two-pronged approach to understanding effectiveness in EU missions and 
operations is illustrated in Figure 1, which also presents the four effectiveness criteria: (1) 
internal goal attainment, (2) internal appropriateness, (3) external goal attainment and (4) 
external appropriateness. Finally, it provides indicators for each of the four criteria by which 
effectiveness in operational conflict prevention can be measured. The IECEU project has 
11 Bellamy, Alex, J., 2006. Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq. Cambridge: Polity Press, p.199-228; Walzer, Michael, 2006. Just and Unjust Wars: 
A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic Books, p.127-137.
12 Guthrie, Charles and Quinlan, Michael, 2007. Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare. London: Bloomsbury, p.1-49, 
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applied this approach in a comparative case study of effectiveness in EU missions and opera-
tions in the Western Balkans, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Individual and comparative 
case studies are available at: http://www.ieceu-project.com. Please do not hesitate to contact 
the author for any further information. 
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ETHICS TRAINING AND ITS RELEVANCE TO PEACE OPERATIONS
AUTHOR:  
Seymour, Nicholas. Senior Advisor Transparency International Defence and  
Security & Independent Peacekeeping and Training Consultant
Introduction 
It is unnecessary to labour the point that peace operations have seen significant changes 
over the last two decades, nor that those changes have been accompanied by numerous 
new challenges. In such circumstances peacekeepers can find themselves ill prepared, either 
as the result of the operational situation being such that they are denied time for adequate 
preparation or an over emphasis on the achievement of short-term objectives. In this respect, 
it is entirely understandable that the requirement to restore stability is likely to be a priority 
but there are some very real dangers if longer-term objectives, and the need to address the 
underlying causes of conflict, are seen as less important. This can be a particular problem if 
it results in an absence of training for mission personnel with responsibility for some of the 
more complex tasks that the mission will have to address. 
Mandate implementation
Effective mandate implementation relies on capability, an issue that goes far beyond the 
need for personnel and equipment although clearly those aspects are important. A credible 
posture, both politically and militarily, is key but even this is insufficient if a mission lacks, 
or loses, legitimacy. The deployment of a mission raises the expectation that things are going 
to improve as it comes in the name of the UN with the legitimacy that this implies. This 
is one of the great strengths of UN missions but it can easily be squandered if the mission, 
or members of it, act in a way that is perceived as unethical. Perception is crucial as it only 
takes a few members of a mission to act improperly for the whole mission to be viewed in 
a negative light.
As mandates have increasingly included the requirement to protect civilians the consequen-
ces of failing to do so can be severe. It is one thing when a mission cannot provide protection 
due to lack of intelligence or not having resources in the right place; it is entirely another 
when the actions of a minority of mission members result in the perception that the mission, 
far from providing protection, actively exploits the people. The ensuing loss of legitimacy 
can frustrate the mission’s ability to achieve its objectives, undermine relationships that may 
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have been established with the host government, erode trust between troop / police cont-
ributors and the UN, and lose the support of the host population. The result is likely to 
prolong instability in the mission area and inevitably require more time and resources. 
There are plenty of examples to support this hypothesis. Incidences of sexual abuse and 
exploitation (SEA), particularly in MONUC / MONUSCO and MINUSCA illustrate the 
problem graphically, but notwithstanding the unacceptability of SEA, it is important that it 
is viewed in the context of the full range of activities that can threaten a mission’s legitimacy 
and that action is taken to ensure an overall ethical approach. 
Legitimacy
The importance of mission legitimacy is clearly articulated in the Principles and Guidelines 
for UN peacekeeping, which states:
“The manner in which a United Nations peacekeeping operation conducts itself may 
have a profound impact on its perceived legitimacy on the ground. The firmness and 
fairness with which a United Nations peacekeeping operation exercises its mandate, 
the circumspection with which it uses force, the discipline it imposes upon its per-
sonnel, the respect it shows to local customs, institutions and laws, and the decency 
with which it treats the local people all have a direct effect upon perceptions of its 
legitimacy.”
Similarly, the report of the High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations states:
“The credibility, legitimacy and relevance of the United Nations in the coming years 
will depend on its ability to leverage its strengths, address its weaknesses, and empo-
wer others to realize their own potential to maintain and achieve peace and security.”
While a mission’s senior leadership will be fully aware of the damage that can be done to 
the mission’s legitimacy by the actions of a minority this does not prevent bad things from 
happening. While it is not the intention of this paper to focus on SEA it illustrates the 
problem very clearly in that notwithstanding the policy of ‘zero tolerance’, cases still occur 
and missions suffer the consequences. Disciplinary measures are essential in this context 
yet on their own they will not necessarily address the problem. It is much more complex in 
that it includes issues that involve leadership, the need for a comprehensive risk analysis to 
pre-empt potential threats, operational priorities, the impact on planning, T/PCC cultural 
background, the availability of training and the presence of opportunities that may lead to 
temptation amongst others. The multiplicity of factors calls for a comprehensive response to 
preserve a mission’s legitimacy; these can loosely be grouped under the overall need for an 
ethical approach which, if applied across the spectrum of mission activities, will support the 
successful implementation of a mission’s mandate.
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Developing a comprehensive ethical approach
A first step in establishing an ethical approach is to ensure that standards are established and 
that they are clear to all. A mission must set the example to the host nation with whom it 
is working to consolidate peace, as this is key to long-term success. As far as T/PCCs are 
concerned the process begins in the pre-deployment phase and includes pre-deployment 
training and pre-deployment visits, and continues through induction training and any sub-
sequent continuation training that takes place. 
Inevitably much of the focus tends to be on conduct and discipline and as far as uniformed 
personnel are concerned responsibility rests largely with T/PCCs who are:
“responsible for ensuring that their personnel serving in United Nations field mis-
sions are aware of the expected standards of conduct, including by providing their 
personnel with pre-deployment training on the United Nations standards of conduct” 
Given the impact of SEA the requirement to train personnel to be aware of UN policy and 
of the consequences of committing acts that contravene it has become a major driver behind 
activities undertaken in the field. While this is totally understandable it has meant that the 
emphasis has been placed on conduct and discipline, and one specific aspect of it, to the pos-
sible detriment of developing a more comprehensive ethical approach. By way of example, 
in one mission troops have been given specific instructions not to have any interaction with 
women or children as a means of preventing potential problems, yet the same mission has a 
mandate to protect civilians with all that this implies. Such a situation leaves troops uncer-
tain, risks creating contradictions and distances the mission from the people that it is there 
to help thereby missing and opportunity to strengthen its legitimacy.  
It follows that it is important to avoid focusing on individual issues, especially when the 
response may not necessarily help to further broader mission objectives. Many of the com-
ponents of an ethical approach exist already; these include policies on SEA, Human Rights 
Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP), as well as gender policies and codes of conduct, amongst 
others, yet rarely is there an attempt to develop a coordinated approach that encompasses 
the full range of issues in the context of their impact on a mission’s ability to achieve its 
political objectives. 
The reasons this does not occur are many and include the pressures of time, operational pri-
orities and a lack of resources or expertise that make it difficult to develop a coordinated ap-
proach.  A coordinated approach will only be possible if it is based on a comprehensive risk 
analysis of the threats that have the potential to damage the mission if they are not identified 
and steps taken to pre-empt them. This process, call it an ‘ethics risk analysis’ would support 
the wider political and conflict analysis and the planning process and should be applied 
whenever a new mission is deployed or a transition from another organisation takes place. 
The circumstances under which the UN takes over responsibility for a mission from another 
organisation deserve specific attention, particularly when significant numbers of troops are 
re-hatted to the UN. Such troops are likely to have been deployed under different standards, 
may not have had previous experience of serving in a UN mission and may not have had 
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the opportunity to benefit from the same level of pre-deployment training. This is not a 
criticism, but it is the reality, and it is a reality that cannot be ignored; and it has resulted in 
troops that not only have little understanding of the standards expected by the UN but who 
are guilty of committing sexual abuse, other breaches of human rights and involvement in 
corrupt and criminal activities. It will never be possible to eliminate every potential threat, 
but a lack of awareness of problems increases the likelihood that missions will be caught off 
guard and suffer significant damage to their legitimacy. 
Developing a comprehensive approach is not straightforward given the nature of the issues 
involved, the responsibilities of the various agencies and the need to acknowledge operatio-
nal priorities but doing so enhances mission capability. It ensures that potential problems 
are identified early and can be pre-empted on one hand while simultaneously strengthening 
a mission’s legitimacy by ensuring that it is seen to act in the long-term interests of the host 
nation population on the other. 
In the past, it may have been sufficient to make the personnel aware of the complexities that 
they would encounter, but having some understanding is insufficient unless it is supported 
by proactive measures to address the problems. Observing and reporting breaches of human 
rights is insufficient unless it is backed up by measures to resolve the issues; knowing that 
corruption is prevalent is not going to achieve much in the absence of initiatives to mitigate 
the consequences; and neither will gain traction unless a mission establishes appropriate 
values.
Implementing an ethical approach
Most missions have existing elements of a comprehensive ethical approach, but the challen-
ge to their successful implementation as a coherent strategy is that they are not sufficiently 
integrated on the one hand, and on the other that some elements may be seen as something 
that can be deferred in favour of operational priorities. While flagrant breaches of human 
rights or cases of SEA will tend to demand immediate attention, other issues may be seen 
as less important. 
It follows that the first step is to identify potential problems through a detailed mission spe-
cific ethics assessment and that should support the mission’s wider mandate. The assessment 
would identify potential problems and allow the mission to mitigate the consequences. To 
illustrate this the mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) provides a useful 
example; the need to affect a transition from the African Union to the UN to prevent further 
loss of life was the operational priority but achieving this meant assuming responsibility for 
troop contingents that had not undergone the preparatory training that would normally 
have taken place. While a comprehensive assessment would not necessarily have prevented 
the subsequent cases of SEA, excessive use of force or other human rights abuses it would 
have flagged the potential problems and enabled the mission to take pre-emptive action. 
An assessment would enable a mission to achieve clarity and ensure that all personnel un-
derstand what amounts to its ‘values.’ These would draw upon legal documents such as the 
International Humanitarian Law, key policy documents such as that for SEA and appropri-
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ate SOPs. There can be no room for misunderstanding. While a mission may be under 
pressure to meet its operational priorities, ensuring that all personnel are aware of their 
obligations and responsibilities is crucial to a mission’s ability to maintain legitimacy. The 
appointment of a Special Coordinator to improve the UN’s response to SEA is a welcome 
step in terms of addressing that specific issue but perhaps the approach could be broadened 
to address the wider ethics at large.
Policies and SOPs can only go so far, they cannot have the desired effect unless they are pro-
mulgated and supported by training. The former calls for strong leadership throughout the 
chain of command and the means to ensure accountability, while the latter is complicated 
by the fact that the requirements are likely to vary according to the level of appointment. 
The minimum requirement is to train senior appointees who may, or may not, have served 
in a UN mission to ensure that they are aware of the potential threats and the various means 
available to mitigate them. 
The time available for training will always be short, especially for senior appointees, but time 
spent in preparation has the potential to prevent problems that might otherwise threaten a 
mission’s ability to implement its mandate effectively. It is not the intention of this paper to 
list every issue that has an ethical dimension, but it is important to highlight some of the key 
ones that would be part of an ethical risk assessment: 
Human Rights, including the application of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy 
(HRDDP). Steps have been taken in recent years to reduce the risk of including personnel 
with a record of human rights abuses being deployed on UN missions; this may be effective 
in the case of new mission but it can be a serious challenge when the UN assumes responsi-
bility from another organisation as occurred in the Central African Republic.
Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (SEA) has received an enormous amount of attention in 
recent years following the large number of cases that have occurred in missions such as 
MONUC/MONUSCO and MINUSCA. Notwithstanding the Secretary General’s zero 
tolerance policy, the problem is still there as evidenced by the appointment of the Special 
Coordinator. Training is essential to ensure that senior appointees are better prepared to act 
proactively rather than to react once cases come to light. Assessment of the potential risk is 
clearly critical in this respect. 
Corruption has often been seen in the context of financial malfeasance on behalf of mission 
members and as such largely a disciplinary issue. Peacekeepers may still be tempted to exp-
loit opportunities for personal benefit and measures exist to deter them but there is a broader 
and potentially more serious issue in the threat posed by operating in an environment in 
which endemic corruption is rife. The increasing threat posed by organised crime and fragile 
governments which lack the strength to resist its influence have created an environment in 
which missions must understand the implications if they are not to be perceived as complicit 
in their dealings with government. 
Somewhat inevitably the aforementioned are interlinked, hence the need for training to 
support a comprehensive approach. Underlying that approach is the need for missions to 
ensure that their actions are transparent and that all personnel are accountable and seen to 
92
be so; this is both complex and sensitive as it may affect the relationship with T/PCCs and 
encompasses other issues such as the importance of reporting infringements and protection 
of whistle-blowers. 
In addition to the above it remains important to address any issues that relate to, or have 
the potential to undermine, These issues range from lesser disciplinary incidents to abuse of 
authority.
Conclusion
There is little that comes as a surprise and missions will always face challenges, either through 
the behaviour of individuals or as a result of being confronted by issues that had not be seen 
as a threat and consequently had not been given the priority that they deserved. The inc-
reasing complexities facing today’s missions demand a comprehensive approach that will 
enable missions to pre-empt potential challenges, manage the perceptions of host nation 
populations and ensure that legitimacy is not undermined. Failure in this respect will reduce 
the ability to implement mandated tasks and prolong the life of the mission. Much has been 
done in terms of strengthening the political approach, providing protection for civilians and 
taking steps to address specific issues such as SEA but there is a need to develop a comp-
rehensive ethical approach that covers the full range of threats that arise either directly, or 
indirectly, from the mission’s profile and how it is perceived in the eyes of the host nation 
population. Achieving a comprehensive ethical approach will only be possible if it is sup-
ported by a detailed ethical risk analysis and comprehensive training.
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“WHEN DIVERSITY IS THE ONLY UNITY” 
 – How to Train for a Comprehensive Approach in  
EU Crisis Management
AUTHOR:  
Taitto, Petteri. Principal Scientist at the Laurea University of Applied Sciences 
Introduction
There is no doubt that training increases the effectiveness of any EU field mission, since 
trained personnel are equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills to be operational 
immediately after deployment, and to thereby contribute more effectively to the imple-
mentation of the mission mandate. One of the key factors, when preparing personnel for 
complex, multidisciplinary operations, is to enhance the understanding of other actors and 
the Comprehensive Approach. 
All of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions operate in the fra-
mework of a comprehensive approach. There are currently more than 5,000 persons serving 
in six military missions and operations and in nine civilian CSDP Missions. Civilian mis-
sions contain fewer than 2,500 persons and half of them are locally recruited staff, whereas 
the military missions and operations have approximately the same number of people, mainly 
military personnel seconded from EU Member States and third states. Personnel competen-
ces are the most important capability in the CSDP missions and operations.
Civilian and military cooperation was the buzzword of 1990s crisis management, and since 
then it has been acknowledged that responding to crises and conflicts requires an even broa-
der context of cooperation. In 2017, comprehensive crisis management means the effective, 
coordinated use of different tools and capabilities, such as conflict prevention, diplomatic 
activity, economic support and sanctions, developmental cooperation, and lastly, civilian 
and military intervention. So, crisis management is a subtle blend of activities that the inter-
national community can carry out.
“Consolidating a comprehensive approach to EU security is dependent on ensuring suf-
ficient, regular and systematic training” captures the essence of one of the recent IECEU 
project research studies.1 “Train as you fight” is a slogan in many military organisations, 
1 IECEU review 1.3 of civil-military synergies. http://www.ieceu-project.com accessed 29 April 2017
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and the motto of the EU is: “United in Diversity”. This article presents views on how to 
plan and conduct training in the spirit of these mottos and principles, and how to organize 
CSDP mission related training in a way that deploying personnel would understand the EU 
Comprehensive Approach in a better way in the field. 
The EU Comprehensive Approach
The current understanding and definitions of a comprehensive approach reflect the present 
response to conflicts and crises. International organizations hold their policies and concepts 
for different political purposes, and hence it is hard to find one single definition for a comp-
rehensive approach. UNSCR 2086 on Multidimensional peacekeeping and ‘EU’s Compre-
hensive Approach to ex ternal conflict and crises’, both written in 2013, laid the foundations 
for a joined-up policy to more effectively respond to the causes of instability.
The EU Comprehensive Approach (CA) to external crisis and conflicts is a description and 
vision of how the EU should improve its capabilities. The CA is based on the shared analysis 
and common vision on how to best respond to crises. The CA focuses on conflict prevention 
and emphasizes that internal and external operators should work closely together and always 
commit in planning to seek a long-term solution.2 
The EU Comprehensive Approach corresponds in some parts to the UN Integrated Mission 
Concept, which means a peace keeping operation where there is a shared vi sion between all 
UN actors of the strategic objective of the UN presence at the country level, and that brings 
together all UN components (security, political, humanitarian, human rights and develop-
ment). The UN has however, progressed to a more advanced system for coordination by also 
introducing an integrated mission command structure. 
The Comprehensive Approach has been introduced in the EEAS and for the Member States. 
The EEAS has successfully implemented CA as concept and searched for common ground 
with other EU actors – in particular the European Commission – on its interpretation. 
Some structural changes have also been implemented by establishing a new division, called 
PRISM, within the EEAS to further coordinate conflict prevention, rule of law, an integrat-
ed approach, SSR and mediation. CSDP mission planning has benefitted from this shared 
analysis and vision as the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) has developed 
over the last years. However, on the operational level much needs to be done. 
The Comprehensive Approach is only as strong as the personnel deploying in the theatre of 
operations apply it. Therefore, training the personnel to understand and to act in the spirit 
of the Comprehensive Approach is of the  utmost importance.
2 EU Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crisis. Joint Communication, 11 December 2013
95
Different audiences – same training needs?
“Training for CSDP is driven by requirements, not events,” states the new EU policy on 
training for CSDP. CIVCOM and the EUMC have the responsibility for defining civilian 
and military training requirements respectively for CSDP training activities through their 
specialised training groups: the EU Military Training Group (EUMTG) and the EU Civili-
an Training Group (EUCTG). The working groups are also responsible for defining quality 
assurance standards and overseeing their implementation in CSDP training and education, 
in accordance with international educational standards, civ/mil standards developed by Eu-
ropean Security and Defence College (ESDC) and the EU Qualification Framework.3 
Furthermore, the evolving nature of missions and the security environment itself creates 
new requirements. The CSDP Training Requirements may derive from political guidance, 
operational requirements of the EU generic civilian and military tasks, and new capabilities. 
CSDP lessons identified annually provide recommendations on what to include in the mis-
sion related training.4 
For the civilian CSDP missions the general essential and desirable skills and experience re-
quired for every job in every mission are presented in the Call for Contributions. Applicants 
must meet at least the general essential qualifications and experience before they can apply 
for a position within a mission. Training is mentioned as a desirable skill, so it is not neces-
sary to undergo any CSDP specific training before recruitment. Furthermore, an essential 
requirement for civilian personnel is that the candidates “must have excellent interpersonal 
and communication skills, both written and oral”. In addition, future mission members 
“must have the ability to work professionally as a member of a team, in task forces and wor-
king groups with mixed composition (e.g. civilian and military staff)”.5 
For military operations, the force generation is a slightly different process. Member States 
agree on their respective contributions, and fill in the previously agreed positions with pre-
defined ranks and qualifications based on the NATO qualification system. The EU Military 
Staff (EUMS) has examined the CSDP specific training requirements and concluded that 
the NATO training system covers most of the basic tasks for envisaged military scenarios. 
However, it was identiﬁed that the EU has some distinct military training requirements and 
they need to be further elaborated.6 
The training policy continues, that, “Appropriate training is a prerequisite of deployment, so 
all staff recruited for CSDP missions or operations shall receive certificated pre-deployment 
training prior to deployment.”7 So, training complying with EEAS standards is required at 
the time of deployment. Pre-deployment training in particular is important for the coheren-
ce in a multinational force or HQ. Pre-deployment is an important part of mission prepa-
ration and training can make the management culture of the CSDP missions more uniform 
and promote a European identity among the participants.  
3 Draft EEAS Implementing Guidelines for the EU Policy on Training, 2016
4 Draft EEAS Implementing Guidelines for the EU Policy on Training, 2016
5 CPCC, Force Generation for the civilian CSDP Missions: A planning guide for Member States Seconding Authorities, 19 September 2016
6 Bodescu, A. 2014, p. 22.
7 EU Policy on Training for CSDP. 1 July 2016
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The European Security and Defence College has developed a specific pre-deployment trai-
ning (PDT) for CSDP missions. During the planning phase of this training, the training 
needs analysis revealed that the core of the training should be fostering a European iden-
tity and enhancing the understanding of the CSDP Missions’ functioning principles. Fur-
thermore, it was identified that the EU Comprehensive Approach should be considered 
a cross-cutting theme in pre-deployment training courses for both civilian and military 
audiences.8
Civilian and military mission members possess different educational and professional back-
grounds. Each function requires specific civilian and military expertise that can be achieved 
through relevant education and working experience. However, much of the generic training 
requirements are the same: All should obtain basic knowledge and skills on working in the 
conflict areas. Furthermore, all should understand what the EU is, why the EU is deploying 
the mission, and what the external actions of the EU are all about, since, after all, the per-
sonnel are there to represent the Union. 
Plenty of CSDP training is available
 “Training for CSDP is a shared responsibility between the EU Member States, its instituti-
ons and dedicated bodies, and the training of personnel for CSDP missions and operations 
is primarily the responsibility of the Member States.”9 Training for CSDP missions can be 
provided in various phases, settings and frameworks. Training activities can be classified as 
basic, advanced, pre-deployment and in-mission training.10 Pre-deployment training (PDT) 
is the most important type of the training and it should be organised immediately before the 
mission deployment. PDT aims to harmonise the management culture of CSDP missions 
and ensure that the persons concerned receive the knowledge and skills they will need to be 
fully operational from the beginning of their tour of duty. 
The sole training network specifically for CSDP is the European Security and Defence Col-
lege (ESDC), mandated by all EU Member States. The objective of the ESDC is to provide 
Member States and EU Institutions with knowledgeable personnel able to work efficiently 
on CSDP matters. In pursuing this objective, the College makes a major contribution to a 
better understanding of CSDP in the overall context of CFSP and to promoting a common 
European security culture. The ESDC organises approximately 80 CSDP related training 
events annually and all training courses are offered to civilian (including diplomats), military 
and police personnel. In 2014-2015 the European Security and Defence College developed 
specific pre-deployment training (PDT) for CSDP missions, targeted for personnel already 
selected, but not yet deployed on civilian and military CSDP missions. 
8 ESDC Curriculum: Pre-deployment training for CSDP Missions and Operations. Activity 33. Steering Committee 17 June 2016
9 EU Policy on Training for CSDP, 1 July 2016
10 The training types and terminology are described in the Implementing Guidelines annexed to the training policy. Draft EEAS Implementing 
Guidelines for the EU Policy on Training, 30 June 2016
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Another network college at the European level, working closely with the ESDC, is the Eu-
ropean Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training, CEPOL. According to the renewed 
mandate since 1 July 2016 “CEPOL shall support Union missions developing and provi-
ding training to prepare law enforcement officials for participation in Union missions.”11 
In addition, EU Commission Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) funded projects, such as 
ENTRi and EUPST provide advanced training for experts deploying on crisis management 
missions. Both of the projects limit their training audiences to either civilian or to law en-
forcement authorities respectively.12 It is noted that FPI funded projects are not aimed at 
enhancing purely EU capabilities, but also those of the UN, OSCE and AU.
Security training programmes and standards are a perpetual challenge in the EU. The trai-
ning requirements were already laid down in 2009, when the Council set the rules for 
deploying civilian personnel to medium and high-risk areas. At that time an e-learning tool 
(eHEST), was developed for the low-risk missions and a training course was created for the 
high-risk areas (HEAT). After the Lisbon treaty and establishment of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) crisis management structures were developed, and security structures 
within the EEAS started to drift apart. Headquarters for civilian missions (CPCC) with 
its security coordinator currently steers security management in missions, and EEAS Field 
Security is developing a security system for the EEAS and EU delegations. Due to scarce 
resources, the CPCC is still relying on the 2009 standards and materials, whereas an advan-
ced security training system, including advanced e-learning courses (BASE and SSAFE), 
has been developed for the EEAS delegations. Furthermore, the Directorate-General for 
International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) and the European Commission’s 
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) have imposed their 
own security standards and training systems for field personnel.
In addition, two more training systems outside the scope of CSDP, that can complement the 
competences needed in the crisis management, are the Union Civil Protection Mechanism 
training programme and training for the election observers. Learning more about these trai-
ning systems could be beneficial for the CSDP, too.
There have also been initiatives to develop on-line portals to strengthen the availability of 
relevant training courses. One of them is the “Schoolmaster” database, a portal that Member 
States have decided will be a central platform for training coordination. Schoolmaster con-
tains information on all courses delivered through the EU with relevance to CSDP. In April 
2017, there were 22 training courses on the list, of which approximately half are conducted 
in the framework of the CSDP. It is obvious that the number does not reflect the real availa-
bility of the courses, it rather describes the general awareness of the portal. 13
11 Regulation (EU) 2015/2219 of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training 
(CEPOL), 25 November 2015.
12 Information on the two EC-funded projects and on the activities of ESCD can be found at the following websites: http://eeas.europa.eu/esdc, 
www.eupst.eu and www.entriforccm.eu. Accessed 17 April 2017
13 https://goalkeeper.eeas.europa.eu/. Accessed 29 April 2017
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As presented, there is plenty of CSDP specific training available, and some of the courses 
do not limit participation or exclude any of the personnel categories. Thousands of persons 
receive CSDP related training every year, but according to vague sets of statistics14 it seems 
that non-trained personnel are those selected to join missions. There is plenty of space for 
improvement when it comes to EU internal coordination and cooperation in the field of 
training. However, many good practices exist in training networks, e.g. the ESDC model 
of including a comprehensive approach to pre-deployment training and inviting civilian, 
military and police to the same training audience.
Conclusions
Preparing personnel for field missions that operate in the framework of the EU Compre-
hensive Approach, requires specific knowledge and multiple skills. Adapting these skills and 
knowledge, can lead to the envisaged outcome of adapting European security culture and 
European identity. Learning the required knowledge and skills can be achieved in several 
ways. Some guiding principles could be:
• ensure that training course curricula includes the awareness raising of other EU 
actors in the field
• benchmark training curricula learning outcomes with other actors, and try to 
streamline them
• include other actors’ mandates, principles and terminology in the training course 
curricula
• train different actors together when appropriate in order to facilitate peer-learning
• exercise soft skills: communication, negotiation skills, and trust building
• share actively good practices on how to enhance comprehensiveness
Multidiscipline international crisis management exercises, such as the EU’s MultiLayer and 
VIKING, are excellent platforms to train personnel for the Comprehensive Approach. In 
exercises, different crisis management actors solve problems, conduct joint analysis and 
planning, and learn how to interact in a safe learning environment. Training exercises have 
been also identified as one of the areas of deeper EU-NATO cooperation15.
The new training policy states that training for CSDP should respect adult learning prin-
ciples. Therefore, developing skills and knowledge needed in a comprehensive approach, 
should be a constructive process, where the learner’s previously adapted competences are 
14 1)PSC, Civilian crisis management pre-deployment training - report on survey results and elements for way ahead ,10976/11, 8 June 2011. 
2)CPCC survey on training. August 2015
15 The Joint Declaration signed by Presidents of the European Council Donald Tusk, of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker and 
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in Warsaw on 8 July 2016
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recognised and utilised. The learning process begins always by screening what competences 
participants have and those competences that can be utilised to enhance others’ learning 
processes. Knowledge needed in a complex multifaceted crisis environment is therefore 
mutually constructed by future mission members and later on utilised together. This so-
cio-constructivist learning approach can create a framework and theoretical basis for a trai-
ning system focussed on the Comprehensive Approach.
Although many deficiencies exist in the various EU training networks, the EU deploys 
highly qualified experts to its missions. Globally seen, the EU has the most training poten-
tial for peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and now it is time for the EU to take advantage and 
further develop one of its own strengths, which is training for crisis management.
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 PROGRAMME EAPTC 2017 – 5TH ANNUAL MEETING, HELSINKI
“ADDRESSING THE CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN MULTIDIMENSIONAL  
PEACE OPERATIONS FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE”
Tuesday, 02 May Wednesday, 03 May Thursday, 04 May
Arrivals 
08:00 - 18:00 
Shuttle transport 
from the Airport to the  
Hotel Scandic Paasi/Santa-
hamina
07:30 - 08:00 
Transport from the Hotel Scandic Paasi  
to FINCENT, Santahamina
08:00 - 08:30 
Registration for the meeting at FINCENT
08:30 - 09:10  
Meeting Opening and welcome  
Admin remarks
09:15 - 10:15  
Introduction to Theme Topic 1:  
Ethicality in Peacekeeping
08:00 - 08:30 
Transport from the Hotel Scandic Paasi  
to FINCENT, Santahamina
09:00 - 10:00 
Introduction to Theme Topic 3:  
Comprehensive approach
10:15 - 10:45 Coffee Break 10:15 - 10:45 Coffee Break
12:00 -
Registration for the meeting  
at the Hotel Scandic Paasi
10:45 - 11:45  
4 Parallel Working group Sessions  





11:45-12:45   
Conclusions  of the working groups
10:30 - 11:30  






11:30 - 12:30  
Conclusions  of the working groups
12:45 – 14:00 Lunch  
(National Defence University, Helsinki)
12:30 – 13:45 Lunch  
(National Defence University, Helsinki)
14:00 - 16:00 
Market Place preparations
14:00 - 15:00  
Introduction to Theme Topic 2:  
Protection of civilians
13:45 - 14:45 
Concluding remark Hand over of the 
EAPTC chairmanship
15:00 - 17:30 
IECEU Project Policy Dialo-
gue (optional)
15:00 - 16:00  







Transport to the Hotel Scandic Paasi/
Airport
15:00 -  
Cultural Event at pleasure, Guided 
Suomenlinna Tour and Military Museum 
(optional)
16:00 - 16:30  Coffee Break
16:30 - 17:30  
Conclusions  of the working groups
17:30 - 18:45  
Guided Bus Tour of Helsinki, ending at 
the Hotel Scandic Paasi (or direct tran-
sport to the hotel)
19:30  
Transport from the Hotel Scandic Paasi 
to the Restaurant Pörssi
17:30 - 21:00
Ice Breaker and Market Place 
at the Hotel Scandic Paasi
20:00 -  
Hosted Dinner at the Restaurant Pörssi 
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